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Executive Summary
This thesis strives to enrich macroeconomic theories with behavioural components.
For this purpose, laboratory experiments are conducted to investigate effects of
individual decision making in a macroeconomic context. First, the interlinks
between economic policy and the labour market are investigated. Employment
and wages react on policy changes mainly according to theory. Fiscal policy
is applied adequately if employment goals are not met, price policy focuses on
stability goals. A behavioural explanation for a relatedness of inflation and
employment is derived. The second emphasis lies on exchange rate uncertainty and
currency trade in a laboratory experiment. Subjects fail to predict the direction of
exchange rate movements with more than random accuracy. Therefore currency
trade is mainly guided by interest differences and this kind of speculation is
profitable on average. The third scope is on a Tobin tax on an experimental asset
market as a scheme to cope with excess volatility. Markets with a low tax rate
achieve best results compared with untaxed and highly taxed markets in terms
of efficiency, volatility, and trade volume. The last part derives practical ways
of measuring statistical significance of differences in experimental data. (188 words)
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Abstract
Traditional macroeconomic theories often assume that aggregate economic figures
originate in the behaviour of individuals who optimise their utility. In doing so,
it is casually taken for granted that all agents act self-centered, profit maximis-
ing, and risk neutral. A growing number of studies, mainly from the areas of
microeconomics and psychology, contradicts this presupposition. Through data
gathered by laboratory experiments it is possible to explore whether humans behave
according to theoretical predictions. In order to lay a behavioural foundation to
macroeconomic theories, such laboratory experiments can be conducted with a
macroeconomic scope. In this dissertation thesis, three different macroeconomic
topics are investigated experimentally.
One focus is put on the interlinks between economic policy and the labour market.
In a laboratory experiment where players in the role of various institutions interact,
the policy decisions of governments and central banks, their motivations, and
their consequences are analysed with respect to wages and employment. The
reactions of the labour market are mainly in line with theory. If the official
sector’s employment goals are not met, governments tend to increase expenditures,
whereas the decisions of central banks seem rather to be motivated by the
attainment of price goals. The total of the effects observed deliver a new expla-
nation for the existence of a relationship between employment and the inflation rate.
The second emphasis is on the currency trade decisions of firms in the same
experiment. The players are guided by interest rate differences rather than by
expected exchange rate movements since they are unable to predict exchange rate
changes correctly and thus are ambiguity averse. This results in the absence of
technical trade, highest profits for interest-conforming traders, and pessimistic
expectations concerning the exchange rate. The firms engage in hedging their
production-incurred foreign debts against exchange rate risks. A simple decision
rule is described on the base of which players would have made profits on average.
A transaction tax as proposed by James Tobin is studied in the third part.
Experiments have been conducted with an asset market model that includes
equally endowed traders. In another variant of the model, a transaction tax is
levied on the asset. The trade volume decreases with an increasing tax rate,
and so do the fiscal revenues. Price volatility is reduced drastically under a
tax regime. Although the market efficiency is higher on taxed markets, there
is evidence for lower efficiency with higher tax rates. Concluding it can be
said that the Tobin tax has volatility reducing effects on the market, but the tax
rate should be low to limit a negative impact on trade volume and market efficiency.
The last part derives efficient ways to calculate significance levels of differences in
two independent and in two matched samples. This is done with Fisher-Pitman
permutation tests, which are frequently used throughout this thesis. (470 words)
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1 On Experiments in
Macroeconomics
“[...] the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is
comparison of prediction with experience.”
– Milton Friedman (1953b, p. 8–9)
1.1 Introductory Comments
One of the criticisms on traditional Keynesian macroeconomic theories is their
lack of microfoundations (see for example Bruun 1999 and Lucas 1976). Modern
neokeynesian approaches try to compensate this flaw by deriving microeconomic
theories on individual behaviour to explain aggregate effects. In doing so, it is
generally assumed that individuals make only rational decisions and that devia-
tions from fully rational behaviour disappear in the error term of the respective
regressional model tracelessly. On the other hand, a growing number of economic
and psychological studies demonstrates that economic behaviour is often far from
being rational, self-centred, and risk-neutral. Laboratory, class room, and field
experiments are frequently used to gather data to derive theories that explain the
boundedly rational behaviour. The relatively young discipline of experimental
macroeconomics closes the gap between theories and actually observed macroeco-
nomic phenomena by taking into account individual behaviour measured in the
1
abstract context of an experiment.
When and why is the means of a laboratory experiment useful? It is difficult at
best, if not even impossible, to confirm external validity of a model by the means
of a laboratory experiment. The participants of experiments, or experimental
subjects, are usually confronted with decision situations that do not capture
the complexity of such situations in practice. This holds true especially for
macroeconomics, where a great diversity of agents interacts to generate the
aggregates which are investigated. It is beyond the scope of the thesis at hand to
compare results gathered by experimental models with empirical data from the field.
However, when it comes to confirming the internal validity of a model, that
is, the consistency of human behaviour with theoretical predictions, laboratory
experiments are a useful method to augment rational theories with behavioural
elements. In situations where the actual behaviour of experimental subjects devi-
ates systematically from game-theoretical and thus rational predictions, the data
can be used to create new theories that are founded not only on rational but also
on boundedly rational behavioural aspects. This also applies to macroeconomics.
A recent example is the study by Heinemann et al. (2004), who investigate the
outcome of speculative attacks. They use the model by Morris and Shin (1998) to
experimentally implement a speculative attack on a currency peg as a coordination
game: If one expects a devaluation of the currency, one should short-sell it in
order to increase the pressure on the central bank to abandon the peg. The
attack is successful only if a sufficient number of traders engages in this behaviour.
Heinemann et al. find among other things that public information implies a higher
prior probability of a successful attack, that is, the devaluation of the currency.
Another example for the use of the experimental method in the field of macroeco-
nomics is the investigation of the emergence of money as a medium of exchange
by Duffy and Ochs (1999). They derive a laboratory experiment from a search-
theoretic model, originally designed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). In the model,
2
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there are three types of goods and three types of players, the latter ones being
defined by a pair of goods: the good they consume and the good they produce.
Each player can hold one good at a time. If a good is not consumed (resulting
in the production of another good), storage costs are implied. Every period,
players are randomly paired and decide whether they want to exchange the goods
they currently hold. Duffy and Ochs find that the subjects’ trading decisions are
mainly motivated by past experiences and not, as theory predicts, marketability
considerations.
There have also been successful attempts to create more complex economic systems
in the laboratory. Lian and Plott (1998) ran experiments with a complex economy
in which producers and consumers interact. Two goods exist in the model, namely
labour and a consumption good. Furthermore, the model includes a financial
market on which both types of agents, producers and consumers, can borrow money
in the form of bonds. Lian and Plott find that the behaviour of the experimental
subjects converges to general competitive equilibrium in the long run. They cannot
find evidence for the existence of Phillips curves, that is, a negative correlation
between unemployment and inflation. Nevertheless, the data speaks out strongly
for a relatedness between real GNP and unemployment, an interlink known as
Okun’s law (see Okun 1962; newer estimates for the US economy can be found
in Prachowny 1993). The authors conclude that an implementation of a complex
macroeconomic setting in the laboratory can help in finding relevant results. Other
works that strive to do so are mentioned in the survey of the relevant literature of
chapters 2 and 3.
While the dissection of empirical field data is an appropriate instrument to confirm
the external validity of a model, it is nearly impossible to show causal connections
between variables that way. If a positive correlation between two variables A and
B is found in field data, it is difficult to determine whether A causes the change
in B, B causes the change in A, or if changes in both A and B are caused by a
change in a third – possibly unobserved – variable C. The controlled environment
3
of a laboratory experiment allows for explicitly investigating not only correlations,
but also causality between the occurrences of certain data patterns by conducting
variants of the experiment with only one parameter modified.
The dissertation at hand investigates different macroeconomic models from a
behavioural point of view. In three self-contained chapters, it is shown how
boundedly rational behaviour of individuals in decision situations influences the
outcome of macroeconomic aggregates. Furthermore, theories are derived to
explain the behaviour of economic subjects. In an additional chapter, ways to
computationally carry out some statistical significance tests are outlined and used
as a tool to demonstrate the relevance of the theories found.
The study described in chapter 2 investigates how changes in economic policy
influence the labour market and vice versa. To do so, a complex macroeconomic
two-country model by Pope et al. (2003) is used to conduct laboratory experiments
with human players. A game-theoretical solution to this model exists in the paper
mentioned before. Additionally, it is derived how the labour market – that is,
employment and wage – should ceteris paribus react on changes in fiscal policy
determined by the government and target price policy determined by the central
bank. The experimental data speak in favour of policy decisions causing reactions
of the labour market mainly in the direction of theory. However, reactions are
stronger if target price policy and expenditure policy are coordinated. If target
price and expenditure changes are opposite, reactions of the labour market are
much weaker. The majority of policy pairs are coordinated. Furthermore, it is
shown how governments and central banks fail to achieve their employment goals
although they are endowed with instruments which are suitable for that purpose.
One reason for this phenomenon is that central banks rather focus on price than on
employment goals. Additionally it can be observed that governments irrationally
try to reduce the difference between nominal home and foreign expenditures. The
total of the discovered effects delivers evidence on the existence and mechanisms to
a correlation between employment and the rate of inflation.
4
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Chapter 3 is based on the same model. It grew from a collaborative paper (joint
work with Sebastian Kube) entitled “Currency speculation behaviour of industrial
firms: evidence from a two-country laboratory experiment”. A condensed version
of this paper has been published by the Journal of Behavioral Finance1. The
behavioural components of a firm’s currency trade decisions are investigated.
Contrary to the situation in game-theoretical equilibrium, currency trade takes
place and exchange rate variation arises. It is shown how both exchange rate
variation and interest rates can influence a firm’s currency trade behaviour and how
exchange rate uncertainty is incurred. The uncertainty results in highest profits for
traders who don’t base their decisions on individual exchange rate estimates but
solely on interest differences. As a consequence of the uncertainty, technical trade
does not have a big influence on the trade decisions. Instead, the individuals try to
compensate their inability to predict exchange rate changes correctly by hedging
and pessimistic expectations. The traders would have made the highest profits if
they had used a decision rule that postulates – simply put – always to offer the
same amount of the cheapest currency. One can observe that central banks can
curb the influence of speculation on exchange rate volatility if they are powerful
enough and collude.
Chapter 4 deals with the influence of a transaction tax on markets and is derived
form an earlier version of the paper “The Tobin tax: A game-theoretical and an
experimental approach” (joint work with Thorsten Chmura and Thomas Pitz)2.
In the 1970’s, James Tobin suggested the introduction of a transaction tax on the
currency market to cope with exchange rate volatility. In spite of his proposal being
discussed frequently and very controversial ever since by economists and policy
makers, the so-called Tobin tax has never been imposed on any currency market.
The consequences of the introduction of such a tax are hence investigated on an
asset market model from a game-theoretic and an experimental point of view. The
1see Kaiser and Kube (2009)
2see Kaiser et al. (2006)
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main results imply that in this model the Tobin tax has in fact consequences on
trader’s actual behaviour, contrary to the situation in game-theoretic equilibrium.
Although the overall trade volume is reduced by a tax, the trade turnover – that
is, the money paid in exchange for the asset – stays uninfluenced. This happens
because prices are higher on taxed markets on average. The demand is negatively
correlated with the tax rate, and the overall supply of the asset is higher on taxed
markets. This can be seen as evidence for a propensity of traders to prefer cash
over the asset under the tax condition. Volatility gets reduced drastically by a
tax as such, but the market inefficiency increases with a growing tax rate. So do
the fiscal revenues. This might also be caused by the non-existence of tax escape
routes in the model. Furthermore, earnings inequality is lower on taxed markets.
Overall, a low tax rate seems to achieve best results in the experiment.
The econometric methods applied in this dissertation are not part of the standard
set of tools in the field of experimental economics. Chapter 5, which has been
published independently3 in a peer-reviewed journal, describes the Fisher-Pitman
tests for paired replicates and independent samples. After theoretically outlining
the exact tests, Monte Carlo simulations for both of them are derived. Simulations
can be useful if one deals with a large number of observations because the exact
algorithms possess a high complexity in regard to sample sizes. The tests are
designed to be a more powerful alternative to the Wilcoxon signed ranks test and
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test if the observations are given on an
interval scale at least. By the means of comparative simulations it is demonstrated
that the results gained by Monte Carlo versions of the tests are sufficiently accurate
in comparison to the exact versions. In the end, the application of both tests is
exemplified with a notional data set.
All chapters have originally been written as independent research papers. How-
3Johannes Kaiser (2007): “An Exact and a Monte Carlo Proposal to the Fisher-Pitman Per-
mutation Tests for Paired Replicates and for Independent Samples”, Stata Journal 7 (3), p.
402–412
6
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ever, the versions included in this dissertation thesis have been edited and enriched
compared to the research papers, the latter ones presenting the essential points in
condensed form.
7
2 Economic Policy and the Labour
Market
“There is wide agreement about the major goals of economic
policy: high employment, stable prices, and rapid growth. There
is less agreement that these goals are mutually compatible or,
among those who regard them as incompatible, about the terms
at which they can and should be substituted for one another.”
– Milton Friedman (1968)
2.1 Aims of Economic Policy
Economic policy is used by governments and central banks to achieve a variety of
economic goals. For this purpose, institutions have several different instruments
at hand. Some important objectives of economic policy are an acceptable inflation
rate, a high employment, stable exchange rates, and economic growth. In practice,
the instruments which are applied to achieve these goals differ, like the goals
themselves, across countries. They include monetary ones like interest rates and
open market operations, and fiscal ones like taxation and expenditure setting.
This experimental study focuses on how governments and central banks miss their
employment goals and explores reasons for this failure.
Both empirical and theoretical evidence on the interlinks of economic policy and
the labour market exists in a broad variety. As a supplement, methods from
experimental economics are applied to test macroeconomic theories in the lab and
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to enrich them with behavioural components. In this study, a game-theoretical
two-country model by Pope et al. (2003) is used to conduct experiments with
human players in the role of various institutions and firms. In their model the
government fixes the total expenditure of the economy. It is assumed that this is
done by fiscal policy in a way which is not explicitly modelled. Central banks have
several instruments at hand to fulfil their goals: the interest rate, exchange rate
aims, and the price target. The objectives of governments and central banks are
largely identical and include several goals for price stability (as McDonough 1997
postulates), employment, exchange rate stability, interest rates, and international
competitiveness. Identical objectives on output and inflation for governments and
central banks help the institutions to attain their policy goals better – see Dixit
and Lambertini (2001) for a study on this topic.
The data gained by the experiment already have been investigated in other
respects. It has for example been shown that in the experiment a currency union
improves the achievement of institutions’ goals for international competitiveness
(Pope et al. 2006). Kaiser and Kube (2009) find strong effects of exchange rate
uncertainty on currency trading decisions of firms in a way that the firms rely
in their trade decision rather on interest rates than on individual exchange rate
estimates. This paper is the base for chapter 3 of this dissertation. Exchange rate
volatility has also a negative influence on the attainment of the official goals (Pope
et al. 2006). Over time, the exchange rates move in the direction of a relation of
1:1 (Pope et al. 2006b) – a phenomenon labelled nominalism. Furthermore, one
can observe that gradual expenditure changes have better effects on firm profits
and government goals than short sharp shocks (Pope et al. 2006a).
Experiments in macroeconomics have been established and used before to analyse
behavioural components of macroeconomic phenomena and to test macroeconomic
theories. Some of these experiments are described in a literature survey by Ricciuti
(2005). Duffy (1998) gives a review on some laboratory experiments done on
monetary theory. Noussair et al. (1997) describe a complex model with two
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economies, how they interact and how the exchange rate is determined. In an
earlier study, Noussair et al. (1995) investigate how international trade happens
and that a big fraction of economic activities happens in disequilibria. Deriving a
laboratory experiment from the theory of global games, Heinemann et al. (2004)
find that thresholds for successful speculative attacks on currencies are lower if
central banks disclose information publicly.
Of course, most of the academic work on the interlinks between the labour market
and economic policy is not of an experimental nature. Much has been written on
the connection between monetary instruments and wages and employment. For
example, Holden (2003) derives from a theoretical model that the existence of the
monetary instrument of the exchange rate target is likely to induce lower wages in
traded and higher wages in the non-traded sector than does a price target. It has
been outlined theoretically by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) how labour unions
adjust wages to prices following changes in monetary policy and that the interplay
of governments and unions thus creates a persistent tendency towards stagflation.
Under a currency union regime, exchange rate rigidity induces problems in wage
setting when demand shocks occur asymmetrically. Calmfors (1998) finds that
variations in payroll taxes can be used as a substitute for exchange rate changes
under a currency union regime. The degree of independence of a central bank from
a government is negatively correlated with inflation rates, but seems to have no
impact on employment in a country (Bleaney 1996).
Not only monetary policy influences the labour market, but also fiscal policy.
Fata´s and Mihov (2006) show theoretically and empirically that positive changes
in government expenditures are followed by increases in employment. The study
at hand confirms this result experimentally. A higher effectiveness of fiscal policy
in improving employment if the exchange rates are flexible than if the exchange
rates are fixed is found by Mundell (1961). Our experimental data, however,
cannot reproduce this finding. There exists also evidence in line with the new
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neoclassical synthesis1 for an impact of government demand on labour demand and
thus employment: Linnemann and Schabert (2003) rule out that price stickiness is
the main reason for this relationship.
It is crucial for economic policy institutions to align fiscal with monetary policy
in regard to their goals. While Mishkin (2000) reports that coordinating fiscal
and monetary policy yields a better price stability, it will be demonstrated in this
chapter that equidirectional fiscal and monetary policy decisions result in stronger
reactions of the labour market to the instruments.
In 1958, Alban W. Phillips revealed an astonishing property of British employment
data from 1861 to 1957: Without a macroeconomic model, he fitted annual data
point pairs of money wage rate changes and the rate of unemployment into a curve
with a negative slope. He argued that in phases of high employment the demand
for labour is high and so employers are willing to pay more to attract workers and
employees from other firms and industries. In times with low employment, workers
are only hesitatingly accepting wage rates below the prevailing ones. This explains
a non-linear negative relation between changes of the money wage rate and the
unemployment rate according to Phillips (1958). Two years later, Samuelson
and Solow (1960) introduced the price-level modified Phillips curve: They found
a non-linear negative relation between the inflation rate and the unemployment
rate. The model fitted real data of inflation and unemployment rates well –
remember the unforgettable quote of Germany’s minister of economic affairs and
finance Helmut Schmidt that he prefers an inflation rate of five percent over an
unemployment rate of five percent2 –, but only until the nineteenseventies, when
1The New Neoclassical Synthesis is a concept coined by Goodfriend and King (1998) that merges
features of both postkeynesian and neoclassical models.
2see Richter (1999, p. 36). The original quote can be found in an interview with Helmut Schmidt
in the German periodical Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung from 28th of July 1972, where he said on page
8: “Mir scheint, daß das Deutsche Volk – zugespitzt – 5% Preisanstieg eher vertragen kann,
als 5% Arbeitslosigkeit.”. This roughly translates to: “To put it bluntly: it seems to me that
the German people can rather accept a price increase of 5 % than an unemployment rate of
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stagflation began to paralyse European economies. Stagflation, often nicknamed as
the “two-headed monster”, describes the situation where missing economic growth
(and thus a high unemployment) goes hand in hand with a high inflation rate.
Nowadays, the theory of Edmund S. Phelps (1967) is regarded as a model that
matches the data observed so far best. He augmented the approach by Samuelson
and Solow (1960) with the inflation expected by the subjects. Thus, an increased
inflation can only have an employment-increasing effect if this inflation was not
expected beforehand. Policy implications for Phelps’ model have been tested
experimentally: Arifovic and Sargent (2002) use an expectation-augmented Phillips
curve model to confront subjects with a time-consistency problem (see Kydland
and Prescott 1977) in order to investigate policy maker’s behaviour in inflation
setting. They conclude that regarding inflation rates, a majority of policy makers
gradually reaches for the optimal inflation rate with regard to unemployment. In
this chapter, more evidence is revealed on the correlation of inflation rate and
employment and how this mechanism applies to the model investigated.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, features of the model
are outlined. Some theoretical implications of the structure of the model are derived
thereafter. Afterwards, the observed behaviour of the participating players is anal-
ysed. It is demonstrated how the labour market reacts on policy changes and how
the interplay of economic policy instruments works. The analysis of the institutions
on missed goals suggests a novel behavioural explanation of the negative correlation
of unemployment and inflation rate.
5%”
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2.2 An Experimental Macroeconomic Two-Country
Model
The model used in this investigation was developed by Pope et al. (2003). Their
study, yet unpublished, describes not only the complete features of the model. It
also describes a new game-theoretic equilibrium concept and applies it to the model.
It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to illustrate both the model and its
game-theoretical solution, so the interested reader may find details in the paper
mentioned before and in the English translations of the written instructions in
appendix D.1 or in Pope et al. (2007).
2.2.1 Features of the Model
In the model, there are two countries (A and B) and a discrete, finite time horizon.
In each country, there are markets for labour, intermediate materials, and a
consumption commodity. Furthermore, there exists one market for currency. The
model is symmetric, so one country will by called the home country and everything
will be described from its perspective. Variables from the foreign country will be
denoted with an asterisk. There are nine players in each country: One govern-
ment, one central bank, one employers’ association, one labour union, and five firms.
Time Structure of a Period
Every period consists of nine steps with each step carried out simultaneously in
both countries (confer to fig. 2.1 for a schematic diagram). In the first four steps,
the players make their decisions. First, the government fixes the size of the total
expenditures D of the economy. It is assumed that this is done by means of fiscal
policy. The details are not explicitly modelled. In the second step, the central
bank decides on the interest factor r (defined as one plus one hundredth of the
percentage interest rate), next period’s target price p+, and an exchange rate aim
f . When this has been done, the labour union and the employers’ association
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bargain on the nominal wage rate w in step 3. In the fourth step, each firm i
decides on the size of its production Qi. Additionally, firms have the opportunity
to engage in currency trade.
The Labour Market
The labour union and the employers association have only limited time to agree on
a wage rate w. They can bargain by exchanging text messages. If they are able to
settle on a wage, the labour union’s payoff U is given by the wage rate divided by
current period’s target price (as set by the central bank in the previous period):
(2.1) U =
w
p
The employers’ association receives a payoff V that is proportional to the expendi-
ture deflated profit of all firms Π:
(2.2) V =
Π
D
If they fail to agree on a wage in the given time, a strike is imposed in the concerned
country and the wage is fixed to a statutory minimum wage of w0 =
7
50
p. In this
case, neither labour union nor employers’ association receive a payoff.
The Consumption Commodity and the Intermediate Materials Market
The firms produce a consumption commodity. They decide on how many units of
the good Qi (with 20 ≤ Qi ≤ 45 in the case of strike and 20 ≤ Qi ≤ 60 else) they
want to produce. The commodity is sold only domestically on a Cournot market;
the country’s expenditures are spent completely and solely on the commodity (in
the case of strike, only 60% of the expenditures are spent on the consumption
commodity). Thus, the commodity’s price q is equal to
(2.3) q =
D∑5
i=1Qi
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Figure 2.1: Time structure of one period
For producing one unit of the consumption commodity, a firm needs one unit of
labour (bought from the domestic labour market at price w), one unit of the inter-
mediate material from the home country available at price m, and one unit of the
intermediate material from the foreign country at price m∗. Consequently, the need
for home materials Mi and foreign materials M
∗
i are equal to the produced number
of units Qi. The materials industry is modelled implicitly: one unit of material is
produced at price w times interest factor r, that is, m = wr and m∗ = w∗r∗. Addi-
tionally, 15 units of fixed labour are needed to run the firm, so the total amount of
labour to be paid by the firm totals to Li = Qi+15. LetM be the total demand for
home material by domestic firms,M∗ the total demand for home material by foreign
firms, Q the aggregate production of the home country, and Q∗ the total production
of the foreign production good. Then, the total employment of one country thus is
equal to
(2.4) L = Q+M +M∗ + (5 · 15) = 2Q+Q∗ + 75
since it incorporates labour induced by the production of the consumption commod-
ity, the fixed labour needed by five firms, and the labour induced by the production
of the intermediate material needed by firms in both home and foreign country.
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Firm Accounts and Currency Market
Each firm has two bank accounts: one in the home country and one in the foreign
one. In the beginning of each period, both accounts have a balance of 0. In the
further proceeding of the period, costs for foreign materials are deducted from the
foreign bank account and costs for labour and home materials are deducted from
the domestic bank account. Sales revenues are transferred to the home account. All
accounts (be their balance positive or negative) are subject to interest payments at
the interest factor r or r∗. At the end of the period home and foreign accounts are
transferred to the owners. Profits for this period are calculated in home currency
units and therefore depend on next period’s exchange rates. Consequently this
period’s profits become known in the next period only.
The firms have the opportunity to engage in currency trade. They can decide on
whether they want to borrow an amount3 of money X∗i from their foreign account
and transfer it to their home account at the exchange rate e (with e = 1
e∗
). The
exchange rate e is the price of one unit of the foreign money in home currency.
Alternatively, they can borrow an amount of money Xi of their home account and
transfer to their foreign account at the exchange rate e∗. It is not allowed to do
both at the same time, but they are free to refrain from currency trading. Thus,
their home (Si) and foreign (S
∗
i ) account balances total to
Si = Qiq + r(X
∗
i e− Liw −Xi)−Mim(2.5)
S∗i = r
∗
(
Xi
e
−X∗i
)
−M∗i m
∗(2.6)
A schematic draft of the account structure is shown in fig. 2.2. In the end of a
period, the account balances of the firms are transferred to their owners. They
receive all profits and bear all losses. The foreign account balance gets transferred
to the owner only at next period’s exchange rate e+. However, e+ is not yet known
at this stage, so the foreign account balance is implicitly offered on the currency
market in the next period. Therefore, this period’s profits are consumed by the
3in this case, the asterisk denotes foreign currency, and not the foreign country
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Figure 2.2: A firm’s account and payoff structure if home currency is offered
A firm’s payoff Πi equals its profit:
Πi = (Si + e+S
∗
i )(2.7)
= [Qiq + r(X
∗
i e− Liw −Xi)−Mim] +
e+
[
r∗
(
Xi
e
−X∗i
)
−M∗i m
∗
]
Exchange Rate Determination
The exchange rate mechanism is completely endogenous with neither stochastic
components nor external shocks. The exchange rate e is influenced by total
currency supply and the central bank’s exchange rate aim f . The latter one is the
exchange rate which the central bank is willing to defend as far as this is within
its capability. If both central banks choose the same exchange rate aims (f = 1
f∗
),
the exchange rate e is set to f . Otherwise, the exchange rate resides somewhere
between f and 1
f∗
depending on the total currency offers of the firms, their foreign
bank account balances from the previous period, and implicitly determined central
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bank interventions. Details on the exchange rate determination are beyond the
scope of this chapter, but can be found in Pope et al. (2003), Kaiser and Kube
(2009), and Pope et al. (2007) or in chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Government and Central Bank Goals
The government and central bank of a country receive identical payoffs. Altogether,
they have seven goals to fulfil to receive their maximum payoff. The goals regard
inflation, interest policy, materials price parity, exchange rate stability, and
employment. Employment L is defined as the sum of labour needed by the firms
producing the consumption commodity and labour incurred by the materials
industry (confer eq. 2.4). This includes the home material needed by foreign firms.
Governments and central banks are penalised if the employment lies out of the
normal employment range defined by a lower border La and an upper border Lb.
The payoff function is split into several components.
Each term in the payoff function represents a specific goal. Goal (2.9) penalises the
institutions for deviations in the target price from previous period’s target price,
(2.10) penalises for deviation of this period’s target price as fixed in the previous
period from the actual price. These two goals focus on the central bank’s target price
policy. Goal (2.11) penalises for deviations of the interest rate from an ideal interest
rate of 5%, goal (2.12) penalises for a materials price parity that is not equal to 1.
Goal (2.13) penalises for exchange rate volatility. The remaining two goals penalise
under- (2.14) and overemployment (2.15). The weight b6 for underemployment is
twice as high as the weight b7 for overemployment.
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BC = BG = b0(2.8)
−b1
(
p+
p
− 1
)2
(2.9)
−b2
(
q
p
− 1
)2
(2.10)
−b3 (r − 1.05)
2(2.11)
−b4
( m
em∗
− 1
)2
(2.12)
−b5
(
e
f
− 1
)2
(2.13)
−b6 ·max {0;La − L}(2.14)
−b7 ·max {0;L− Lb}(2.15)
Currency Unions
The game has two variants. The first, as described in the previous subsections, deals
with the situation of one currency in each country. In a second variant, a currency
union is imposed. The model differs in some key aspects. At first, there is a fixed
exchange rate of e = 1. There is only one central bank whose policy decisions affect
both countries. Thus, governmental (BG) and central bank (BC) payoff functions
differ:
BG = b0(2.16)
−b1
(
p+
p
− 1
)2
(2.17)
−b2
(
q
p
− 1
)2
(2.18)
−b3 (r − 1.05)
2(2.19)
−b4
( m
m∗
− 1
)2
(2.20)
−b6 ·max {0;La − L}(2.21)
−b7 ·max {0;L− Lb}(2.22)
There is no penalty for exchange rate volatility, since it does not exist anymore.
Second, the materials price parity goal is no more corrected by the exchange rate.
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The central banks’ payoff function differs in more aspects:
BC = b0(2.23)
−b1
(
p+
p
− 1
)2
(2.24)
−b2
(
q + q∗
2p
− 1
)2
(2.25)
−b3 (r − 1.05)
2(2.26)
−b4
(
m
2m∗
+
m∗
2m
− 1
)2
(2.27)
−b6 ·
(
1
2
max {0;La − L}+
1
2
max {0;La − L
∗}
)
(2.28)
−b7 ·
(
1
2
max {0;L− Lb}+
1
2
max {0;L∗ − Lb}
)
(2.29)
The penalty for deviations of the target price from the actual price (2.25) now
penalises deviations of the target price from the average price in both countries.
The penalty for materials price imparity (2.27) is now symmetrised so that the
central bank’s penalty is identical for deviations in both directions. Furthermore,
the central bank is penalised for under- (2.28) and overemployment (2.29) in both
countries.
The firm players have no longer the opportunity to engage in currency trade: no
profits could be reaped with a single interest rate and a single currency. Their
payoff functions adjust accordingly.
Parameters are set as described in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Parameter calibration
parameter b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 La Lb
value 5 6 6 3 3 1 0.02 0.01 600 720
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2.2.2 Theoretical Considerations
The game-theoretic solution to this completely endogenous model is derived by Pope
et al. (2003) as an incomplete equilibrium. Some features of the solution relevant to
this investigation will be briefly outlined here. For complete coverage of the concept
of an incomplete equilibrium and the game-theoretic nature of this model, confer
to this article. Questions of interest are in particular how employment and wages
react to changes in fiscal and target price policy.
Wages
Recall that a labour union receives a payoff of the wage divided by the target
price for the actual period if there is no strike. Equation (2.1) describes this
objective. The payoff an employers’ association receives is the expenditure deflated
profit of the firms – see equation (2.2). Pope et al. (2003, p. 27) use coopera-
tive bargaining theory (see Nash 1950) to select the equilibrium wage. On the
equilibrium path, labour union and employers’ association should agree on a wage of
(2.30) w =
16
63
p
Assume that in a period t, the parties agree on a wage of wt while the target price
for this period has been set to pt in period t−1. If the target price pt+1 for the next
period increases by ∆p = pt+1 − pt, the new equilibrium wage is
(2.31) wt+1 =
16
63
(pt +∆p)
Consequently, the wage should increase by ∆w = 16
63
∆p. It can be deducted that an
increase of the target price should ceteris paribus result in an increase of the wage.
Production and Employment
Let Qi denote the production decision of firm i and Q−i the total production of
other firms in its country. The price for one unit of the consumption good would
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then yield q = D
Qi+Q−i
. The firm’s operating profit can be derived from equation
(2.8) to:
Πi = Qi(q − c)− C(2.32)
For reasons of simplicity, the structure of the unit variable costs c and the fixed
costs C are not explicitly derived here. In the following, let us neglect the capacity
constraints of the firms. The best response production quantity QBRi that maximises
the profit function of a firm i given the production quantity of others Q−i, the
expenditures D, and the variable costs c is given by
(2.33) QBRi =
√
DQ−i
c
−Q−i
For five firms, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium production quantity4 on this market
is equal to:
(2.34) QC =
4D
5c
In the following QCt denotes the Cournot quantity at period t:
(2.35) QCt =
4Dt
5ct
If in t+1 the expenditures adjust by ∆D = Dt+1−Dt and all other variables remain
constant, the increase of the Cournot-Nash quantity in t+ 1 is equal to
(2.36) ∆QC = QCt+1 −Q
C
t =
4(Dt +∆D)
5ct
−
4Dt
5ct
=
4∆D
5ct
From (2.4) it follows that employment increases with increasing production. We
have
(2.37)
∂L
∂Q
> 0
An increase of the expenditures thus results ceteris paribus in an increased
employment. Accordingly, a decrease of D results in a decreased employment.
4Due to demand depression, this quantity reduces to 60% of the original value in the case of strike.
However, this plays no role for the directions of changes in employment and expenditures being
the same in equilibrium.
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The opposite holds true for the wage.Unit variable costs increase with w:
(2.38)
∂c
∂w
> 0
Consequently, an increase in the wage results ceteris paribus in a lower Cournot-
Nash production quantity and thus in a lower employment and the other way round.
From this and from what is known from subsection 2.2.2, an increase of the target
price between two consecutive periods should result in a decreased employment.
2.2.3 Experimental Setup
The experiments were conducted as computer-based laboratory experiments in
the Laboratory for Experimental Economics of the University of Bonn between
January 2002 and June 2005. The software was first programmed in Pascal
with the Ratimage library (Abbink and Sadrieh 1995), but has been completely
rewritten in Java at a later point by the author of this dissertation. The latest
version of the software included about 30000 lines of code for the server (including
SQL statements and comments) and about 23000 lines of code for the client.
Screenshots can be found in appendix A.3.
All participants have been students of economics for at least two years. Before the
game was started, written instructions were handed out to the participants. For an
English translation of the German instructions, confer to Pope et al. (2007) or to
appendix D.1. Thereafter, an introduction of about one hour was given to them
including example calculations of various figures. Some test questions were posed,
and after the subjects gave the right answers, the roles were assigned at random.
Then the game was started. One session lasted about 8 hours, including a lunch
break of one hour. After a short debriefing session and the handing out of an ex-post
questionnaire, the participants were given their converted cumulative round payoffs
in Euro. Each student was furthermore given a show-up fee of e5, totalling to an
equilibrium payoff of e72.50. The average payoff per hour was approx. e10.23 in
the case of no currency union and e10.88 under a currency union. 15 sessions were
conducted, thereof the first 6 with and the following 9 without a currency union.
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The game starts in an existing world with all decision variables being in equilibrium,
but the players are not aware of that.
2.3 Observed Behaviour
How does the labour market react to changes in policy decisions? Or, more pre-
cisely, how do wages and employment react to changes in fiscal and price policy?
How do governments and central banks react on deviations from employment of
an acceptable size? In the following, findings answering these questions are pre-
sented. Details on the econometric and statistical methods applied can be found in
appendix A.1, actual data in appendix A.2.
2.3.1 Policy Changes and Their Influence
As derived in subsection 2.2.2, employment should increase if the government
increases the expenditures. Comparing the changes in D with the changes in
L, it is evident that a majority of governmental decisions significantly influences
employment in this direction (details in table A.1). Even if this is the case, in some
sessions (e. g., session 8) the opposite is the true. This can be considered first
evidence that fiscal policy is not always effective. No treatment effects between the
currency union treatment and the non-currency union treatment can be confirmed.
Some note on the graphical representation used here and in the following: Boxplots
have been utilised to draw a distributional graph of the investigated variables. In a
box plot, the median of the sample is denoted by a vertical line. Around this line, a
box is drawn that represents the interquartile range (IQR): The left limit of the box
is given by the .25 percentile, the right one by the .75 percentile. Outliers, that is,
values that are smaller than the left quartile minus 1.5 times the IQR or greater than
the right quartile plus 1.5 times the IQR, are denoted by dots. The whiskers de-
scribe the observations in the sample that are no outliers but reside outside the IQR.
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Figure 2.3: Box plots of Yule coefficients over treatments
Does an increase in the target price influence the employment negatively as
predicted? Table A.2 shows the association measures of changes in p and changes
in L (of both countries in the currency union treatment and of the respective home
country in the treatment without a currency union). Astonishingly, no significant
influence can be found in the one-currency case. A weakly significant negative
influence can be observed in the two-currency case.
An association between wage changes and employment changes can be confirmed
(see table A.3), but only directional. Neither the product moment nor the
Spearman rank correlation nor the linear regression coefficient are significantly
below zero. However, the Yule coefficients are significantly below zero. Thus, there
exists a negative association between wage changes and employment changes: an
increasing wage tends to be connected to a decreasing employment in a country.
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The wage seems to react to changes in expenditure only weakly, but only in the
currency union treatment. Also, there is some evidence that this effect is stronger
under a currency union (see table A.4). The reactions of the wage to changes in
target price p seem to be stronger (see table A.5). The reactions of employment
and wage to policy changes are depicted in figure 2.3.
Note that a positive Yule coefficient indicates a positive association between two
categories and a negative Yule coefficient indicates a negative association. A
combined measure which incorporates both expenditures and target price, the
target price deflated expenditures D/p, has a significant influence on employment
(table A.6), but not on wage (table A.7).
Summarising the findings regarding labour, one can observe
• positive reactions of employment to both changes in expenditures and target
price deflated expenditures,
• negative reactions to changes in the target price in the case of two currencies
and to changes in the wage rate.
Regarding the wage rate, it is evident that it reacts
• positively to changes in expenditures in the case of a currency union and to
changes of the central banks’ instrument of the target price.
Although the majority of the observed reactions are in line with theory, there is still
a high fraction of decisions that do not cause the predicted changes in wage and
employment. In the following, reasons for this behaviour are given.
2.3.2 Dissecting the Interplay of Fiscal and Price Policy
As shown in subsection 2.2.2, an increase of expenditures should ceteris paribus
result in an increased employment (and vice versa). The opposite should hold
true for the target price, because an increased target price induces higher wages
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and thus higher variable production costs. Consequently, the instruments D and p
should have contrary effects on employment changes.
How does the labour market react if the changes of D and p in two consecutive
periods have the same sign? If this is the case, target price policy and fiscal policy set
incentives for opposite effects on the labour market. Henceforth, any combination
of either positive or negative changes in both target price and expenditures will be
termed an uncoordinated decision pair. If the signs of the changes are not identical
or if both D and p remain constant, decision pairs are labelled to be coordinated in
the following. This terminology is illustrated in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Categories of policy decision pairs
not considered not considered
not considered
not considered
uncoordinated coordinated
coordinated uncoordinated
coordinated
> 0
> 0
< 0
< 0 = 0
= 0
∆D
∆p
Note that uncoordinated policy decisions are not necessarily irrational per se´:
central banks and governments have more goals to fulfil than keeping employment
in an optimal corridor. Coordinated policy decisions might have opposite effects
on other goals. Recall furthermore that the central banks fix the target price
for the current period one period ahead. This has two implications. At first,
governments already know the target price at the time of their decision, thus
having the opportunity to adjust the expenditures to imply equidirectional effects
on the labour market. Second, the central bank’s target price decision for the
actual period is made when only employment and wage from two periods before
are known. The government’s decision on expenditures for the current period is
however made when employment and wage from the preceding period are known.
Hence, the central bank’s information on the labour market is one period older
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than the government’s information. This is a possibility for uncoordinated decision
pairs to arise in spite of both institutions reacting rationally with respect to the
labour market.
two currencies
one currency
coord. uncoord.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Figure 2.4: Fractions of decision pairs by category over treatments
In the experiment, decision pairs of both categories can be observed (see figure
2.4). On average, 24.8% of the decision pairs are uncoordinated with regard to
the labour market, whereas 35.7% are coordinated. The remainder of the decision
pairs is not considered. The latter ones outnumber opposite ones on session level
(p = 0.0317 two-tailed permutation test, p = 0.0464 two-tailed Wilcoxon signed
rank test). In the treatment with a currency union, the central bank has to
keep the employment of two countries in the optimal employment range by the
means of one single target price. In the treatment without a currency union,
each central bank has to keep the employment of only one country within the
optimal employment range. This yields a more complex decision situation in
the one-currency case. It would thus be plausible that the share of coordinated
decision pairs is higher in the two currency case. Exactly this phenomenon
can be observed. The difference is also significant at p = 0.0601 (one-tailed two-
sample permutation test) and p = 0.0851 (one-tailed Mann-Whitney ranksum test).
How efficient are the institutional instruments to influence wages and employment
if they are coordinated and if they are uncoordinated in respect to the labour
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market? Let us take a look at the association of changes in target price deflated
expenditures and employment or wages, respectively, in both categories of decision
pairs. Note that investigating expenditure and target price changes separately
under the condition is not valid here, because a change in employment could be
due to target price or expenditures.
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
coordinated
opposite
pooled
Yule’s Q for ∆(D/p) and ∆L
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
coordinated
opposite
pooled
Yule’s Q for ∆(D/p) and ∆w
Figure 2.5: Yule’s Q by both decision pair categories and all pooled decisions for
D/p and L resp. w.
Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of Yule coefficients for changes in employment
(or wages, respectively) and changes in D/p. Recall that a positive Yule coefficient
is associated with concurrent positive and concurrent negative changes in both
variables observed, whereas a negative one stands for negative changes of one
measure that come with positive ones of the other. The data gives strong evidence
for the importance of coordinating policy decisions for them being effective on the
labour market:
Regarding employment, the positive influence of a change in D/p on employment
is significantly higher if the decision pair is coordinated compared to pooled
(p = 0.0392, Wilcoxon two-tailed signed rank test) and uncoordinated (p = 0.0914)
decision pairs. A contrary effect can be observed for wages: If the decision pair is
coordinated, an increasing D/p has a higher influence in lowering w than for pooled
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(significant at p = 0.0342) and for uncoordinated decision pairs (evidently by mean
and median, but not significantly). Moreover, changes in target price deflated
expenditures only influence employment and wage significantly if the decision pairs
are coordinated in respect to the labour market (confer tables A.8, A.9, A.10, and
A.11 in the appendix).
Concluding, it has been shown that
• due to the increased complexity of the coordination problem of the central
bank in a currency union (i.e., considering two labour markets instead of only
one in the two-currency case), decision pairs that are coordinated with regard
to the labour market are smaller in number in this case. In general however,
coordinated decision pairs outnumber uncoordinated ones in both currency
union and two-currency case,
• if the decision pairs are coordinated with regard to the labour market, the
effect of changes in target price deflated expenditures on both wages and
employment is strongest,
• if the decision pars are uncoordinated, these effects are weaker and even con-
trary for the changes in wage.
One can see that the institutions are endowed with the right instruments to effec-
tively fight both over- and underemployment. However, they seem not always to
coordinate their policy decisions with regard to the labour market. The next sub-
section reveals how governments and central banks react to employment penalties.
2.3.3 Institutional Reactions on Unfulfilled Employment Goals
If the current employment L resides out of the boundaries of a range [La, Lb], the
objective functions of both government and central bank deteriorate. As was shown
in the previous subsection, the instruments at hand can help institutions to im-
prove their employment goals. To test whether these instruments are used to keep
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employment in the corridor for which institutions are not penalised, a measure in-
corporating penalties for missing any of the employment goals is used. The measure
ε is derived directly from the payoff functions of the institutions. It denotes the
employment change necessary for achieving all employment goals weighed with em-
ployment penalty constants, or shorter, the weighed necessary employment change:
εG = εC2 = b6 ·max {0;La − L} − b7 ·max {0;L− Lb}(2.39)
εC1 = b6 ·
(
1
2
max {0;La − L}+
1
2
max {0;La − L
∗}
)
(2.40)
−b7 ·
(
1
2
max {0;L− Lb}+
1
2
max {0;L∗ − Lb}
)
Index G denotes this necessary weighed employment change for governments;
index C2 marks the necessary weighed employment change for central banks in
the two-currency case. Index C1 denotes a measure for the central bank in the
currency union case. This measure averages the necessary weighed employment
changes for both countries. For overemployment, εG and εC2 is negative; in the
case of underemployment, both are greater than zero. If the employment lies
within the range of [La;Lb], εG and εC2 equal zero. In the one-currency treatment,
the central bank can be penalised for over- and underemployment simultaneously.
Hence, the measure εC1 is positive if the unemployment penalty outweighs the
overemployment penalty, negative if the overemployment penalty outweighs the
underemployment penalty, and 0 if the employment of both countries lies in the
range of [La;Lb].
The association between a government’s expenditure changes and weighed necessary
employment changes is significantly positive (see table A.12). Consequently, the
governments seem to react on employment-induced penalties: If they are penalised
for underemployment, the expenditures are increased. If they have to pay a penalty
for overemployment, the expenditures are decreased. This behaviour is rational in
respect to the labour market. Overall, this effect is strong. Interestingly, the effect
is significantly weaker under a currency union. Reasons for this treatment effect
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will be explored in subsection 2.3.4.
Surprisingly, opposite effects can be observed in central bank behaviour. According
to section 2.2.2, a central bank should increase its target price if it observes
overemployment and decrease it in the case of underemployment. The central bank
players in the experiment behave exactly the other way round: They decrease
the target price in the case of overemployment and increase it in the case of
underemployment. Evidence is presented in table A.13. The Yule coefficient,
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, and Bravais-Pearson’s product-moment
correlation coefficient are significant for a positive association of the weighed
necessary employment change εC and the change of p+ in the next period.
It seems that the application of the government’s expenditure instrument is at least
partially driven by the wish to achieve the employment goals. The central bank
however applies the target price instrument in the opposite direction than would
seem appropriate. What else drives the decisions of governments and central banks?
The next subsection outlines other factors.
2.3.4 Determinants of Institutional Behaviour
How can the central banks’ and the governments’ behaviour be explained? Recall
from subsection 2.2.1 that governments and central banks have several conflicting
goals to achieve. In the following, the aggregate penalties for deviations of the
target price from the actual price (2.10), (2.25), (2.18) and for deviations of
the actual target price from next period’s target price (2.9), (2.24), (2.17) are
labelled the price penalty, whereas the aggregate penalties for underemployment
(2.14), (2.28), (2.21) and for overemployment (2.15), (2.29), (2.22) are labelled
the employment penalty. Figure 2.6 shows the mean absolute penalties for both
institutions. The heavier burden of the employment penalty compared to price
penalty is obvious and significant (central banks: p = 0.0106 two-tailed Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p =0.00632 two-tailed permutation test; governments: p = 0.0106
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Wilcoxon, p = 0.01056 permutation test).
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Figure 2.6: Average penalty of institutions for missing employment and price goals
One can see that the institutions fulfil their price goals better than their employ-
ment goals. At the point of its decision, a central bank could, if it is trying to
minimise the price penalty, track the reference price q¯− = qt−1 (the average price
q¯− =
qt−1+q
∗
t−1
2
in the currency union treatment) from the last period. Although
this would minimise the penalty for an inaccurate target price (confer equation
2.10 in the two-currency case and equation 2.25 in the currency union case) if
the actual price q (or q+q
∗
2
, respectively) in the following period was equal to the
reference price in the previous period, the penalty for target price instability (2.9)
would increase. To minimise both target price instability penalty and target price
inaccuracy penalty, a central bank should set a target price between the actual
period’s target price and the reference price observed in the previous period if
it believes that next period’s actual price equals the reference price. Figure 2.7
displays the reference price observed and the target price decision of a central bank
in an example period.
The target price line looks like a smoothed version of the reference price line. Quan-
titatively, it can be shown that the central banks significantly behave in this way
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Figure 2.7: The central bank’s next target price and previous period’s price in
session 9, country B
by deriving a tracking condition from the central banks’ payoff functions. If one
counts how often the tracking condition
(2.41)
(
q¯−
p
− 1
)2
≥
(
q¯−
p+
− 1
)2
is fulfilled, one comes to the conclusion that on average 76.50% of the decisions can
be explained by this theory. The session average is greater than 50% (p = 0.0006
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p = 0.0001 two-tailed permutation test).
Governments do not have the possibility to set or modify target prices, so they
have no influence on the target price stability goal. However, they can try to use
the expenditures to influence the price. This affects the target price accuracy goal.
Increased expenditures lead ceteris paribus to an increased price. If the government
is aware of that, it should act in the following way: if it expects the target price
for the next period be equal to the target price in this period, they should increase
D under the condition that qt−1 is smaller than p and decrease it when qt−1 is
greater than p. All measures of association computed except the Yule coefficient
are significantly smaller than zero in the currency union case (see table A.14) and
thus in favour of this hypothesis. In the case without a currency union, they are
not. A possible explanation for the absence of this behaviour in the latter case and
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for a verifiable presence in the currency union case could be that it is inevitably
harder for the central bank to minimise the target price inaccuracy penalty in the
one-currency case. The governments are conscious about that and try to support
the target price policy of the central bank.
In the two-currency case, the governments do not support the central bank in fulfill-
ing the target price accuracy goal. Instead, a different phenomenon can be observed:
a government tries to minimise the nominal difference between its own country’s’
expenditures and the expenditures of the foreign country. Note that the nominal
difference of both expenditures has no meaning in real terms since both expen-
ditures are stated in their respective currency. In terms of their payoff function,
minimising the nominal difference does not make any sense at all. The collected
evidence nevertheless speaks in favour of this hypothesis: In most cases, the nom-
inal percentage difference between both countries’ expenditures in the last period
of the game is smaller than in the beginning of two-currency sessions (in period 0
or equilibrium, the percentage nominal difference is 28%, whereas at the end, the
average percentage nominal difference of the expenditures is 12.8%). This effect is
significant (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = 0.0152, two-tailed permuta-
tion test p = 0.0117). Further evidence for this behaviour is that on average 67.8%
of the decisions satisfy the nominalism condition:
(2.42)
∣∣Dt−1 −D∗t−1∣∣ ≥ ∣∣Dt −D∗t−1∣∣
The share of expenditure decisions that conform to equation (2.42) is significantly
greater than 50% (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = 0.0707). At a first
glance, this seems to be a rather perplexing result from a macroeconomic point
of view. Although easily explained with cognitive effects, e. g. the theory of
prominent numbers by Albers and Albers (1983), it does not strike the economist
to be convincing on a macroeconomic level. There are however many examples for
nominalism in macroeconomics. In an investigation that considers both field and
laboratory data, Pope et al. (2006b) outline occasions where nominalism could be
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observed in historical exchange rates.
Summarising, it is demonstrated that
• both institutions achieve their price goals better than their employment goals,
• central banks use their target price instrument rather for tracking the prices
observed than for improving their employment goals
• governments try to influence the price for achieving the target price accuracy
goal in the currency union case
• governments irrationally decrease the nominal difference of their respective
country’s expenditures to the foreign country’s expenditures
2.3.5 Inflation and Employment
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, it has been discovered that there is a negative correla-
tion between the unemployment rate and inflation (confer Samuelson and Solow
1960). Theories describing the mechanisms that cause this relation have been mod-
ified over time, and nowadays, the Nobelprize winning theories of Edmund Phelps
(1967) are considered to describe the machinery most accurately. He augmented the
traditional Phillips curve with inflation expectations and concluded that only unex-
pected inflation can in the short run reduce unemployment. Nevertheless, inflation
and unemployment have been correlated negatively over a long period of time.
The existence of similar patterns in the experimental data can be shown: a
positive percentage change in prices comes with a positive percentage change
in employment in the period thereafter and a negative percentage change in
prices comes with a negative percentage change in employment in the period
thereafter . More precisely, the association between qt−qt−1
qt−1
and Lt+1−Lt
Lt
is signifi-
cantly positive in the data for all four association measures (confer table A.15 in
the appendix). Figure 2.8 shows a scatter diagram of the relationship in one session.
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Figure 2.8: Relative changes of employment in tand of prices in t− 1, regressional
fit of session 3
A similar connection exists between qt−qt−1
qt−1
and Qt+1−Qt
Qt
(see table A.16). A be-
havioural explanation can be derived for the occurrence of increasing employment
after prices have increased and decreasing employment after prices have decreased.
Imagine the following constellation and refer to figure 2.9 for an illustration of the
items denoted by Roman numbers: For whatsoever reason, the production quantity
in one country drops from period t− 1 to period t.
(I) Of course, a reduced production results in a lower employment (Spearman’s ρ
for session averages of total production and total employment is 1, two-tailed
p < 0.0001). This becomes also clear if one takes into account that the total
employment of one country as described in equation (2.4) includes twice the
production of the home country.
(II) As a consequence of (I), the price of the consumption commodity increases.
This would be a mathematical necessity if Dt was kept equal to Dt−1, for the
price q is equal to q = D/Q. It can however not be assumed that this is
always the case. Nevertheless, there is a strong empirical connection between
a decrease in Q and an increase in q (see table A.18).
(III) The government observes in t+1 that the employment has dropped from Lt−1
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Figure 2.9: Interrelation between changes in prices and employment
to Lt. Having been penalised for underemployment or fearing, if the optimal
employment range has not been violated, a further decline of employment to
a point out of the optimal employment range, it increases expenditures and
thus the demand for the consumption good. It has been shown in subsection
2.3.3 that governments tend to react this way on unfulfilled employment goals
(confer also table A.12). But even if the underemployment avoidance goal is in
fact achieved, there is a general and significant negative correlation between
the relative change in employment and the relative change in expenditures
in the period thereafter (confer table A.17). Consequently, the governments
engage in fiscal policy that is anti-cyclical with regard to employment.
(IV) Observing the increase in D, the firms step up their individual production
quantities. This effect is significant (as demonstrated in subsection 2.3.1 and
visualised in figure 2.3 on page 25).
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(V) For the same reasons as described in (I), the boosted production results in a
higher employment compared to t.
This effect is also valid in the opposite direction. Note that in the case of an
increased production, the motivation for the government to cut down expenditures
in step (III) lies not in the underemployment avoidance goal, but in the overem-
ployment avoidance goal.
This evidence sheds new light on the mechanisms at work when Phillips curves can
be observed. In the model investigated, an observed price increase is often caused
by production decreases, which cause employment cutbacks. This employment cut-
back is not in the interest of the government, so it strives to increase employment
by elevating expenditures. The tactic of the government works out: The firms in-
crease their productions and employ more people. This way, price increases and
consequent employment increases are connected. Although inflation and employ-
ment are associated, this association is not due to a causal influence of one onto the
other. An association is due to a third factor, a very low or very high production. If
one introduced an ad valorem tax to artificially increase prices in order to increase
employment, this plan would fail in the boundaries of this model.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This study investigates how governments and central banks interact to achieve
employment goals. In a complex laboratory experiment under controlled conditions,
two macroeconomies are simulated by human players. A variation of the experiment
imposes a currency union on the two countries. Governments and central banks
have several goals to fulfil. To achieve minimal penalties for unfulfilled policy goals,
governments can use the fiscal instrument of the expenditures. Central banks’
decisions include stating a price target for the consumption good that is produced
domestically by five firms. Both institutions have objective functions as such
that they receive their maximum payoff only if they keep employment between a
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minimum and a maximum accepted employment, if the central bank’s target price
is equal to the actual price, if the target price does not change in regard to the
period before, and if they achieve three more goals that are not relevant for this
study. Before firms make their production decision, labour unions and employers’
associations bargain on a wage. Unions receive a payoff depending on the wage and
the target price, whereas the employers’ association’s payoff is proportional to the
firms’ profits. Theory predicts positive reactions of production and employment
on changes in expenditures and negative ones on changes in the target price.
Additionally, changes in the target price should influence wage positively.
A significant fraction of policy decisions influence the labour market as described by
theory. However, there are many reactions of employment and labour that cannot
be explained by variations of the instruments. It is shown that the effects of policy
decisions are stronger if changes in expenditures and the target price have unequal
signs and are thus coordinated. Moreover, the influence of the policy instruments
on wage is even opposite to theoretical predictions if the decisions are uncoordinated.
One can observe that governments adjust the expenditures correctly to reduce
over- and underemployment penalties in the majority of cases. This does not hold
true for central banks and their target price instrument. Instead, they use the
target price to track the previously observed price to minimise their target price
penalties. Besides reacting on over- and underemployment penalties, governments
try to influence the actual price with their expenditure instrument in case of a
currency union. In case of two currencies, governments irrationally try to minimise
the nominal difference between their own country’s and the foreign country’s
expenditures. The observed phenomena also deliver a new explanation for a
non-causal negative correlation between unemployment and inflation: An increased
price is caused by decreased production amounts. The latter ones come with a
decreased employment on which the government reacts counter-cyclical with an
increase of expenditures because they experience or fear underemployment. The
firms adapt to the increased demand for the consumption good by enhancing their
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production amounts, thus increasing employment.
In this chapter, it is demonstrated how the relatively young discipline of experimen-
tal macroeconomics can be applied to study labour market reactions on economic
policy decisions and how employment influences economic policy decisions. The
controlled environment of the laboratory allows to abstract from problems that are
prevalent when using field data: In practice, the goals of governments and central
banks are either defined in an inaccurate manner or not revealed to the public.
Furthermore, it is almost impossible to quantify to which extent policy institutions
achieve their goals. Although price targets find application in practice, their height
is usually not common knowledge.
However, there is still room for future work. Interrelations between the labour mar-
kets of the two countries are not yet investigated. One could also think of a model
that features not only two but more different countries. Also, a tie between wage and
unemployment could possibly exist. The model and the experimental data gained
might thus be used to test the theories of Phillips (1958) and of Lipsey (1960): They
assume a negative correlation between the wage change rate and unemployment. It
would also be interesting to check whether the idea of the expectations-augmented
Phillips curve by Phelps (1967) applies to the observed behaviour. There have been
experimental approaches to deliver a behavioural explanation, e. g. Arifovic and
Sargent (2002), but none with a model that indeed features players in important
roles of macroeconomic entities. In order to do so, it would be necessary to change
the model to include consumers. With some modifications, the model by Pope et al.
(2003) could be used as a workhorse for a whole series of macroeconomic studies on
wage setting and employment.
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“It’s important to remember, when economists are asked to
forecast, they divide themselves into two camps: those who don’t
know, and those who don’t know that they don’t know.”
– John Kenneth Galbraith
3.1 The Currency Market
Foreign exchange trade has always had a vast influence on systems of flexible
exchange rates. A large variety of empirical, experimental, computational, and
theoretical investigations deal with this topic. For example, Evans and Lyons
(2002) fit a model in which order flow in the foreign exchange market plays a
strong role in exchange rate determination.
But what determines the currency trade decision of a firm? Why do non-financial
firms engage in currency trade? How do they deal with exchange rate uncertainty?
In this study, evidence is described from a computerised laboratory experiment
under controlled conditions, in which industrial firms have the opportunity to pro-
duce a consumption good as well as to offer currency on the currency market. This
is the first approach in behavioural finance to cover this topic. To investigate the
trading behaviour of subjects, it is necessary to utilise an appropriate experimental
model which describes an exchange rate mechanism.
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In traditional economics, currency trade behaviour is usually explored by evaluating
empirical field data. As a complement, the controlled environment of a laboratory
experiment allows to abstract from problems that are prevalent when using field
data. In the lab, every trader has identical sources and channels of information,
the prevailing circumstances are the same, the endowments of the traders can be
kept at equal level, and external shocks can be controlled for. Yet it is important
to utilise an appropriate experimental model which describes an exchange rate
mechanism.
There exist some experimental designs of international economies in literature that
describe the mechanism of exchange rate determination. For example, Noussair
et al. (2003) derive the exchange rate from the flow of funds theory of exchange
rates and use the import and the price of goods as components of the exchange rate
in a complex three-country model. In an earlier paper, Noussair et al. (1997) use
the same model of exchange rate determination in a two-country model with less
agents and less markets. The model of Arifovic (1996) utilises a purchasing power
parity model for the calculation of the exchange rate. In contrast to exchange
rate determination based on international trade of goods or purchasing power
parity, Fisher and Kelly (2000) let traders buy or sell two foreign currencies and
one home currency in a double auction. Thus, the exchange rates are the average
relative prices paid by currency traders. Note that these models take into account
either international trade of goods, purchasing power parity, or currency trade.
Pope et al. (2003) create a synthesis of external key features in which currency
trade, international trade of goods and materials, and central bank interventions
determine the exchange rate. Using this model allows to focus on the influence of
different economic variables on the currency trade decision of firms.
This experimental investigation focuses on the influence of different economic
variables on the currency trade decision of firms. Mundell (1960) describes a model
in which speculators base their actions on the observed size of the monetary reserve
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of central banks. Professional traders might take this figure into account, but it
seems unlikely that industrial firms, whose demand for foreign currency is mainly
caused by international trade of goods and secondarily caused by currency trade,
consider the central bank’s monetary reserve. Keloharju and Niskanen (2001)
investigate the decision of firms to raise foreign currency debts. Their findings
include that firms whose exports constitute a significant fraction of net sales are
more likely to raise currency debts and that the firms tend to borrow in periods
when the nominal interest rate for the loan currency, relative to other currencies,
is lower than usual. The results described in this chapter fall in line with the latter
finding. It is also demonstrated that firms who only produce goods for the domestic
market and who need foreign materials for the production tend to borrow money
in their own country rather than in the foreign one. In a market survey study,
Cheung and Chinn (2001) show that technical analysis of exchange rates is used as
a means of determination of currency trade decisions by only thirty percent of the
the US foreign exchange traders at most. It is confirmed in the study at hand that
at least in the laboratory the influence of technical analysis on the currency trade
decision is rather weak compared to other determinants.
Cheung et al. (2004) describe a survey of UK-based traders in 1998 regarding
their beliefs on the importance of macroeconomic factors on exchange rates. They
conclude that the traders think that exchange rates are determined in the long run
by economic fundamental values and in the short run by overreaction, speculation,
and bandwagon effects. The data gathered through our experiment suggests that a
large proportion of subjects indeed adapt their trade behaviour to economic figures
besides interest and exchange rates. Moreover, subjects who neglect the variation
of previous consecutive exchange rates and instead base their decision solely on the
difference of the interest rates in the countries scoop in the highest currency trade
profits in our experiment. The literature partially states that different determinants
of stock market speculation decisions don’t influence their profits. For example,
Malkiel (1973) conjures up the image of a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at
financial pages and doing just as well as expert stock-pickers. Chakrabarti (2004)
44
3.2 Experimental Setup and Procedure
describes how the Wall Street Journal picked up this idea and let leading stock
analysts compete against dart shooting employees of the journal. Over the years,
the analysts won – but only slightly. The evaluation of the Wall Street Journal’s
experiment undertaken by Liang et al. (1995) concludes that in the long run the
dartboard picks were even more profitable than the professional picks.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, a brief introduction on
the experimental model as well as the procedures used is given. Thereafter, a short
descriptive review of currency trade and incurred profits and losses as taken place
in the experiment is given. Determinants of the firms’ currency trade behaviour are
identified in the following section and the existence of exchange rate uncertainty is
shown. Afterwards, implications of the firms’ incapability of predicting the exchange
rate correctly are lined out as well as ways of how the subjects tried to cope with
exchange rate uncertainty. The section closes with a short evaluation of the influence
of currency trade on the exchange rate volatility. In the final section, the findings
are discussed before concluding. A condensed version of this thesis chapter has been
published in the Journal of Behavioral Finance1.
3.2 Experimental Setup and Procedure
As a vehicle for the experimental investigation, a symmetric and deterministic
two-country model as described in Pope et al. (2003) is used. Originally designed to
investigate the economic effects of currency unions, it provides all features necessary
for this evaluation. The model consists of two treatments. In the following, the
focus is set exclusively on the case without a currency union – the details of the
currency union case are omitted since currency trade does not exist in the latter
condition. The model has an identical game-theoretical equilibrium solution for
both versions which will not be discussed here. Since this model displays a high
degree of complexity, its description will be limited to the mechanisms which are
1see Kaiser and Kube (2009)
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related to currency trade and exchange rate determination2. The game was set up
as a computer-based laboratory experiment under controlled conditions as follows:
In each of the two countries A and B, nine players act as economic entities in a
round-based experiment: one government, one central bank, one labour union,
one employers’ association, and five firms. The model is symmetric, so in the
following a ‘home’ country (for example A) will be looked upon. Everything will
be viewed from its perspective. Parameters of the ‘foreign’ country (B in the
example) are denoted by an asterisk. Two types of goods exist in each country: a
domestic consumption good Q that is produced by the firms in the country, and a
material M . The material is traded internationally because a firm needs materials
from both countries, M and M∗, for the production of the domestic consumption
good. The firms have two bank accounts each to their disposal: one in the
home country and one in the foreign country. The account in the home country is
denoted in domestic currency, the account in the foreign country in foreign currency.
The model spans over multiple periods. Each period has a number of steps which
follow a certain structure. In each step, the active players choose their decision
variable(s) simultaneously in each country. After each step, the decisions are made
public.
In step 1, the government chooses the total nominal expenditures D of the
economy. It is assumed that this is done by means of fiscal policy. The details are
not explicitly modelled. All of the expenditures will be spent completely on the
domestic consumption good Q in a later step.
In step 2, the central banks have to decide on three variables (see fig. A.2):
they set the interest factor r (defined as 1 plus a hundredth of the interest rate
2The interested reader can find the details of the solution and of both cases of the model in Pope
et al. (2003). Furthermore, the English translation of the instructions of the experiment as
handed out to the participants can be found in appendix D.1.
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percentage) for their country, fix an exchange rate aim f and choose next period’s
target price p+ for the domestic consumption good. The exchange rate is defined
as the price of one unit of foreign currency in home currency. The actual target
price p equals p+ in the preceding period, and is exogenously given in the first period.
In step 3, the union representative and the employers’ association of each country
bargain on the nominal wage rate w that has to be paid for one unit of local labour.
This is done by exchanging text messages in a computer-based chat system. If at
the end of a fixed period of time (10 minutes) the union wage offer wu differs from
the employers’ association wage offer we, there will be a strike in the corresponding
country. A strike causes not only a reduction of the firms’ maximum production
capacity Qc to Q0 < Qc, but also a decrease of the demand D for the produced
consumption good to σD. Furthermore, the wage is set to a statutory minimum
wage w0 = ηp.
In step 4, the firms decide on the quantity of the consumption good they want
to produce. The firms interact in a Cournot market (as defined in Cournot 1834)
for consumption goods. Now that the firms know how much they have to pay for
interest and labour and the amount of total nominal expenditures to be spent
on the consumption good, it is their turn (see fig. A.3). A firm i can choose its
production quantity Qi above a minimum production quantity Qm and below the
capacity constraint Qc. A firm needs labour, home materials (M), and foreign
materials (M∗) to produce the good. The market for materials is modeled to be
competitive. For producing one unit of material, one unit of local labour is needed
at cost w. Wage payments are paid before interest, so the marginal costs of one
unit of material are wr. In a competitive market the price equals the marginal
costs, so the price for the material is m = wr, resp. m∗ = w∗r∗. The labour
Li consists of the two components fixed labour F , which is needed to run the
company, and variable labour, which is equal to Qi.
Besides producing, a firm may borrow money for one period either from its home
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or foreign account at the interest factor r resp. r∗ and offer it on the currency
market. Xi (X
∗
i ) denotes the amount of home (foreign) currency offered
3. The
money borrowed must be paid back in the next period including interest. This will
be labelled currency trade in the following. Note that only the overall production
quantity Q will be revealed to the firms in the next period, whereas neither
individual production quantities and currency offers nor total currency offers are
made public.
At the end of each round, the firm home (Si) and foreign (S
∗
i ) accounts total to:
Si = Qiq + r(X
∗
i e− Liw −Xi)−Mim(3.1)
S∗i = r
∗(Xie
∗ −X∗i )−M
∗
i m
∗(3.2)
Two credit constraints limit the firm accounts: The sum of labour costs and the
amount of home currency offered must not exceed C1 = γ1w, furthermore the
maximum amount of foreign currency offered is C2 = γ2w
∗. This limits the currency
offers to:
X¯i = γ1w − Liw(3.3)
X¯∗i = γ2w
∗(3.4)
The next steps don’t require player interaction. All costs and revenues incurred by
production and currency trade of a firm i get deducted from, and transferred to,
respectively, the corresponding home or foreign account. The price q for one unit
of the consumption good Q is defined as q =
D
Q
(q =
σD
Q
in case of strike). The
final account balances (positive as well as negative) are taken over by the firm’s
owner, clearing the account for the next period. They consume their profits in
the next period in their home country, so they have to trade the money from the
foreign account back into their home currency at next period’s exchange rate e+.
The currency trade mechanism and the payoff and account structure of a firm is
3Note that here the asterisk denotes the currency rather than the country.
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illustrated in figure 3.1 with the example of a home currency offer.
X/e
firm profit
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balance
at exchange rate e
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Transfer to foreign
0 0 0 0
labour
(country A’s currency)
home account foreign account
(country B’s currency)
labour
(country A’s currency)
home account foreign account
(country B’s currency)
materials
home
materials
foreign
home
currency
offer
X
h. cur. offer
materials
home
materials
foreign
home
currency
offer
h. cur. offer
interest
interest
net sales
home
account
balance
for. acct. bal.
exchange rate
converted at
next period’s
e+
1.) transfer of the home currency offer in period t 2.) profit outflow to firm owner in period t+1
Figure 3.1: Schematic display of the account and payoff structure if home currency
is offered
The exchange rate itself is determined by a mechanism which also takes the central
banks’ exchange rate aims f and f ∗ into account. In sessions 7 to 12, the exchange
rate aims were publicly announced, but in sessions 13 to 15 they were not known to
the firms, which makes guesses on the height of the future exchange rate even more
inaccurate. If both exchange rate aims are the same (f = 1
f∗
), then the central
banks jointly intervene on the currency market in order to realise their common
exchange rate aim. The exchange rate is then f . Now assume f 6= 1
f∗
. In this
exchange rate conflict both central banks intervene on the currency market, each in
favour of its own exchange rate aim. One has to distinguish two kinds of exchange
rate conflicts, a low aim conflict with f > 1
f∗
and a high aim conflict with f < 1
f∗
.
In a low aim conflict each central bank wants a smaller value for its currency than
the other bank and in a high aim conflict each of them wants a higher value of its
own currency than the other bank. Therefore in a low aim conflict both central
banks intervene by offering their own currency, whereas in a high aim conflict each
of them offers the currency of the other country.
Let m− and m
∗
− be previous period’s material prices of the home country and the
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foreign country, respectively. In the case of a low aim conflict the home country
bank offers I = ζ1m− and the foreign bank offers I
∗ = ζ1m
∗
−. In case of a high
aim conflict the foreign bank offers I = ζ2m− and the home bank offers I
∗ = ζ2m
∗
−.
Here, ζ1 and ζ2 are positive constants with ζ1 > ζ2. This inequality is based on the
idea that central bank interventions in own currency are less restricted than those
in the other country’s currency. What has been said about I and I∗ leads to
(3.5) I =


ζ1m− if f >
1
f∗
(low aim conflict)
ζ2m− if f <
1
f∗
(high aim conflict)
and
(3.6) I∗ =


ζ1m
∗
− if f >
1
f∗
(low aim conflict)
ζ2m
∗
− if f <
1
f∗
(high aim conflict)
Other components of the exchange rate are the foreign accounts of foreign firms
from the previous period (K−), the foreign accounts of domestic firms from the
previous period (K∗−), the aggregate currency offer X of the currency of country A,
the aggregate currency offer X∗ of the currency of country B. and The tentative
exchange rate e¯ is defined as the ratio of the total currency offers:
(3.7) e¯ =
X +K− + I
X∗ +K∗− + I
∗
This measure is the base for the determination of the actual exchange rate e of the
next period:
(3.8) e =


min(f, 1
f∗
) for e¯ ≤ min(f, 1
f∗
)
e¯ for min(f, 1
f∗
) < e¯ < max(f, 1
f∗
)
max(f, 1
f∗
) for e¯ ≥ max(f, 1
f∗
)
This model of exchange rate determination is new in economics literature, because
its interpretation of currency offers is not limited to either currency trade, purchas-
ing power parity, or international trade. As can be seen, it includes central bank
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intervention, international trade, and currency trade as influence factors on the
exchange rate.
The objective of a firm vi is its expenditure deflated profit. Thus, the payoff of a
firm i is defined as
(3.9) vi =
Si + e+S
∗
i
D
Each firm has the possibility to utilise a profit calculator (see fig. A.3). The player
can enter an estimate for this period’s expected exchange rate (which is unknown to
him at the moment of his decision) eˆ, next period’s expected exchange rate eˆ+, his
own production quantity Qˆi, and the total production quantity of the other firms in
his country Qˆ−i. The firm then selects a grid constant sˆ for the profit table, which
displays the own production quantity on the ordinate, the total production of the
other firms on the abscissa, and the corresponding expected profits in the fields. The
table is centred4 around the chosen quantities Qˆi and Qˆ−i. Furthermore, the profit
calculator gives an advice on which currency offer would be the most remunerative
if the exchange rate estimates are correct. This speculative advice also takes the
differences of the interest factors of both countries into account. Let h := eˆ+
eˆ
r∗− r.
The speculative advice will then be:
• “offer home currency” if h > 0
• “offer foreign currency” if h < 0
• “don’t offer currency” if h = 0
The experiments were conducted as computer-based laboratory experiments in
the Laboratory for Experimental Economics of the University of Bonn between
January 2002 and June 2005. All participants have been students of economics
4In session 14, the table was not centred but Qˆi and Qˆ−i were the lowest quantities for i and the
competitors of i, respectively.
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for at least two years. Before the game was started, written instructions were
handed out to the participants; an English translation of these instructions can be
found in appendix D.1. Thereafter, an introduction of about one hour was given
to them including example calculations of various figures. Some test questions
were posed, and after the subjects gave the right answers, the roles were assigned
randomly. Then the game was started. One session lasted about 8 hours, including
a lunch break of one hour. After a short debriefing session and the handing out of
an ex-post questionnaire, the participants were given their converted cumulative
round payoffs in Euro. Each student was furthermore given a show-up fee of e5,
totalling to an equilibrium payoff of e72.50. The average payoff per hour was
approx. e10.23. 9 sessions (namely sessions 7 to 15) were conducted without a
currency union. In each session, 10 players acted as firms. A total of 18 players
took part in each session. Hence, a total of 90 of 162 subjects have taken part in
the experiments as firm players. No subject was allowed to participate more than
once in the experiment.
3.3 Analysis of the Trade Decisions
The results will be enumerated in four subsections. Firstly, a brief descriptive
summary of the exchange rate variation, the currency trade behaviour, and the
profitability of the firms’s trade decisions will be given. After that, the findings
concerning the determinants of a firm’s trade behaviour are described and the ex-
istence of exchange rate uncertainty is demonstrated. The next subsection outlines
the behavioural implications of exchange rate uncertainty. The remainder of the
result section shows the effects of currency transactions on exchange rate volatility.
3.3.1 Descriptive Summary of the Currency Trade Behaviour
According to the game theoretical solution of the model, no firm should offer
currency in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the aggregate currency offer of all firms is
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never zero for any currency in any period. The following paragraphs give a brief
descriptive overview on the currency trade decisions and exchange rate development.
Although the exchange rate stays stable according to the game theoretical solution
of the model, exchange rate variations can be observed in the experiment. As an
illustration, the exchange rate development of session 13 is displayed in figure 3.2.
The figure includes markers for the exchange rate aims of the central banks as well
as the actual exchange rate.
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Figure 3.2: Exchange rate development in session 13
Altogether, there have been 1800 currency trade decisions in 9 sessions with 20
periods by 10 subjects each. In 1327 of those, a positive offer of either home or
foreign currency was placed. If there was a positive offer of home currency, the
subject offered 65.17% of the maximum home currency offer X¯ (see equation 3.3)
on average, whereupon the size of the foreign currency offer was on average 61.96%
of the maximum foreign currency offer X¯∗ if not 0. In 549 cases, foreign currency
was offered, whereas in the remaining 778 cases home currency was offered. This
seeming tendency to offer home currency more often and to a higher extent than
foreign currency will be investigated further in subsection 3.3.3. The mean share
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of home currency offers to total home expenses was 15.38%, the mean share of
foreign currency offers to total foreign expenses was 21.49%. The higher share of
foreign offers to total foreign expenses can be explained by lower production costs
in foreign currency, since no labour has to be paid from the foreign firm account.
As a measure of the profitability of individual currency trade decisions, the currency
trade profit is an appropriate figure:
(3.10) vcurr =
( r
∗e+
e
− r)(Xi −X
∗
i e)
D
Table 3.1 displays a summary of the cumulative currency trade profits
∑
vcurr of
the players in all sessions.
Table 3.1: Descriptive summary of cumulative currency trade profits
session agg. players with∑
vcurr
∑
vcurr < 0
∑
vcurr > 0
7 .6046015 3 7
8 .0559865 5 5
9 .4795765 3 7
10 .1411873 2 8
11 .6395505 2 8
12 .6581888 1 9
13 .0619988 1 9
14 1.429293 4 6
15 -.0894841 5 5
mean 0.44232 2.89 7.11
As can clearly be seen, a majority of 71.1 % of the players makes profits on average
by trading with currencies. A share of 28.9 % of the players incurs losses by currency
trade, but in most sessions, the cumulative aggregate currency trade profits are
positive. Statistical support for positive cumulative aggregate currency trade profits
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by a two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates (p = 0.0156) is
found. This significance test is a powerful alternative to the rank-based Wilcoxon
test traditionally used in experimental economics. Details on the methodology can
be found in chapter 5.
3.3.2 Determinants of Currency Trade
In the previous subsection, it has been shown that firms tend to engage in currency
trade and make profits on average by doing so in spite of no currency trade
taking place in equilibrium. How can the existence of non-zero currency offers be
explained? In this subsection, the determinants of the currency trade behaviour
are investigated.
Interest Differences
The most obvious motivation for placing currency offers would be the difference in
interest rates in both countries. This behaviour can also be observed by looking at
the data. Let
(3.11) ∆rt := rt − r
∗
t
be the difference in interest rates in both countries. A firm determining its
currency trade decision solely by the interest difference should offer home currency
if ∆rt < 0, foreign currency if ∆rt > 0, and no currency if ∆rt = 0. Instead of
determining the decision by ∆rt, a firm could also consider the speculative advice
h given by the profit calculator. The profit calculator could be used arbitrarily
often per period, so there is the possibility of entering more than one guess for
actual and upcoming exchange rates. However, 75.67 % of the profit calculator
utilisations were done with only one estimate for the exchange rates, and 94.45 %
were done with three estimates at most.
Due to computer failure, parts of the profit calculator data of one session have been
lost. This is why there has been a total of 1600 instead of 1800 trade decisions of
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which profit calculator estimates have been collected. In 958 cases of these, either
home or foreign currency was offered, and interest differences existed. A special
interest arises in the propensity of the players to trade either conforming to the
speculative advice or conforming to interest differences. Table B.1 and figure 3.3
show a direct comparison of those cases.
8.98%
4.91 %
58.87%
conforming to
advice point in the 
speculative advice
conforming to not conforming to
interest difference
13.78%
interest differenceinterest difference
conforming to
interest difference
and speculative
advice requested advice not
77.24% 22.76%
13.46%
same direction
requested
Figure 3.3: Conformance to trading motive
What can be deducted from those figures? If the speculative advice was requested
and if it recommended to offer the currency which was the cheaper one in terms
of interest rates, about five times more of the currency trade decisions followed
both the advice and the interest difference instead of speculating against it. This
is a strong indication for an influence of the interest rate on the currency trade
decision, because the interest rates are taken into account by both the interest
difference and the speculative advice.
But which both determinants is relied on more often? If the speculative advice
was requested and it recommended to offer the opposite currency than the interest
difference did, then a majority of the decisions followed the recommendation of
the speculative advice rather than interest rates. It can be inferred that subjects
56
3.3 Analysis of the Trade Decisions
prefer basing their decisions on the speculative advice over basing them on interest
rates. Contrary to that, subjects tend to rely rather on interest rates than on other
determinants if the speculative advice is not requested. Concluding, it can be
stated that interest differences do matter, but people tend to take into account also
individual exchange rate estimates when placing their currency trade decisions.
Do subjects usually offer the right currency with regard to ∆rt? Recall that in case
of a constant exchange rate a profit-motivated subject should offer home currency
if ∆rt < 0 holds true, foreign currency if ∆rt > 0, and no currency at all if there is
no difference in interest rates in both countries.
To check whether the experimental participants behave like this, one looks at all
periods in which a difference in interest rates arose and a firm traded currency. One
then counts how often home or foreign currency was offered. This results in a 2× 2
table for each firm player as shown in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: 2× 2 table for the computation of Yule coefficients
offer foreign currency offer home currency
∆rt > 0 y
+
f y
−
h
∆rt < 0 y
−
f y
+
h
A firm can either offer home currency or foreign currency. If subjects base their
currency trade decisions on interest differences, then they should offer foreign
currency when the home interest rate exceeds the foreign interest rate (y+f ), or offer
home currency when the foreign interest rate is greater than the home interest rate
(y+h ), but not vice versa.
For each firm, such a 2× 2 table has been determined to calculate a Yule coefficient
Y as follows:
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(3.12) Y =
y+f · y
+
h − y
−
f · y
−
h
y+f · y
+
h + y
−
f · y
−
h
The Yule coefficient ranges from −1 ≤ Y ≤ 1. More details on the Yule coefficient
can be found in appendix A.1. In this case, Y equals 1 for subjects who offer the
cheaper currency in terms of interest.5 For some players, a Yule coefficient could not
be determined because of four possible reasons. One subject did not trade at all in
periods with interest rate differences. Eleven subjects were ‘home-currency-biased’:
five subjects only offered currency when their home interest rate exceeded foreign
interest rate but not otherwise, and six subjects only offered home currency and
never foreign currency. Another five subjects were ‘foreign-currency-biased’. They
only offered currency when the foreign interest rate exceeded the home interest
rate. These subjects have not been considered in the following evaluation of Yule
coefficients. This effect will be investigated further later on.
The median of the Yule coefficients’ distribution is 1. Table B.2 displays the session
averages of Y , whereas a distributional graph of Y is shown in figure 3.4. The aver-
age Y is .72, or .8 if just the strictly positive ones are considered. The distribution
is modal, with 47 times Y = 1. Only eight subjects have Y < 0, four of them
at the extreme Y = −1. If firms with Y ≥ .5 are classified as interest difference
oriented subjects, 84% of the firms belong to this group. All session averages of Y
are positive, and a two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates
on these averages for H0 : Y ≤ 0.5 and H1 : Y > 0.5 implies the rejection of H0 at
a significance level of p = 0.0078.
Summarising, there exists a significant influence of interest rates on a firm’s decisions
of which currency to offer. Given that there is a difference in interest rates between
the two countries, subjects usually offer the right currency to reap the benefits of
this situation. Although this behaviour seems sensible, there are are also other
5Note that this does not imply that all other subjects behave irrationally. It does neither mean
that subjects with Y = 1 necessarily act rationally. It is possible that subjects with a Yule
coefficient smaller than 1 are considering different aspects when placing their currency offer.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the Yule coefficient
factors which influence the currency trade profits. The exchange rate variation can
be so high that all benefits of the interest difference are eliminated. It would be
wise to take the development of the exchange rate into account when placing the
currency offer, but this is not an easy task to do: current and future exchange
rates are not known to the players, so an estimate of the exchange rate risk is only
possible by looking at other figures with only indirect effects on the exchange rate.
The estimate is likely to be not very accurate, and so it is plausible to assume that
subjects tend to base their currency offers rather on the difference in interest rates
than on the expected percentage change of the exchange rate.
Simple Trend Extrapolation
The objective function of central banks punishes the central bank player if the
interest factor in the own country is not equal to an ideal interest factor r0 = 1.05.
Hence, the likelihood of a high difference in interest rates in both countries is low.
Usually, only marginal currency trade gains can be made by simply exploiting the
interest rate difference in both countries. Contrary to that, the variation of the
exchange rate between two consecutive periods might be high (see table 3.3).
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics on absolute interest rate differences and absolute
exchange rate changes
variable n average std. dev. max.
|∆rt| 175
a .0106883 .0146039 .096
| e+
e
− 1| 180 .0531488 .1190195 .7682168
a5 observations have been excluded due to obvious typing errors
This phenomenon can also be observed by the firms. It would seem plausible that
the players try to extrapolate a trend from exchange rate variations observed in the
past because they lack the capability of computing the real value of the exchange
rate: the firm players don’t know the size of central bank interventions, total firm
currency offers, and foreign firm accounts.
Note that a subject could also take a great variety of other factors with only
an indirect influence on the exchange rate into account. The answers given by
some subjects in the ex-post questionnaires6 indicate that players also consider
wages, expenditures, material’s prices, this and previous period’s total amount
of production, and the target price. However, a visible correlation between these
figures and the currency offers could not be found.
A simple measure for estimating upcoming exchange rates is the difference between
the previous period’s exchange rate and the exchange rate in the period therebefore.
Although this can be seen as a chartist approach and a means of technical analysis
– methods applied in the currency exchange market in practice, confer Frankel and
Froot (1990) and Neely (1997) –, this figure is not the only way to use technical
analysis. In spite of that, the investigation will be limited to this form of simple
trend extrapolation because an all-embracing evaluation of technical analysis in the
currency market is not subject of this essay. Let ∆et−1 be the difference between
6In particular, it was asked: “Which variables influenced your currency trade decision?”
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the exchange rate of the previous period and the period therebefore:
∆et−1 = et−1 − et−2(3.13)
For testing the correlation between ∆et−1 and the currency offers of the firms, a
standardised measure ψ of the latter needs to be created for each firm and each
period. This can be done by dividing the actual currency offers by the maximum
currency offers (see eq. 3.3 or eq. 3.4, respectively). ψ ranges between 0 and 1; the
lower ψ is, the lower the relative offer has been:
ψi =
(
Xi
X¯i
+
X∗i
X¯i
∗
)
(3.14)
Now, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ρ for each player’s standardised
currency offer (ψi) and the possible currency trade determinants ∆rt and ∆et−1 is
calculated. The correlation coefficient would be positive if trends were extrapolated
and negative if a return to the second last value is expected. In the following, the
absolute value of ρ is used, since only the strength of the correlation matters and
not its direction. If a player did not take an active part in currency trade, this figure
could not be determined. Figure 3.5 displays the session averages of the absolute
values of the correlation coefficient for each player. The actual values can be found
in table B.3. A Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates applied to
the session averages with H0 : |ρ
ψi,∆et−1| ≥ |ρψi,∆rt | and H1 : |ρ
ψi,∆et−1| < |ρψi,∆rt |
rejects H0 with a significance of p = 0.0566.
Although the exchange rate differences have a much higher influence on currency
trade profits than interest differences, firms rather use the difference in interest
rates than the difference in historical consecutive exchange rates as a tool for
determining the size of their currency offers. This behaviour seems to be na¨ıve at
first sight and is likely to be caused by the incapability of predicting changes in
exchange rates. As will be shown in section 3.3.3, the neglect of the exchange rate
change is by no means unsophisticated. In order to find evidence for the existence
of exchange rate uncertainty, the exchange rate estimates entered into the profit
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Figure 3.5: Correlation between standardised currency offer and exchange rate vari-
ation and interest rate difference, respectively
calculator are compared with the actual exchange rates.
Exchange Rate Uncertainty
Recall that the speculative advice h takes into account only the relation of eˆ to eˆ+
but not their absolute values. The estimated percentage change of the exchange
rate e˜g :=
eˆ+
eˆ
− 1 and the real percentage change of the exchange rate e˜r :=
e+
e
− 1
can thus be compared to gather information on the accuracy of exchange rate
estimates. If the estimated change in the exchange rate is correct, e˜r = e˜g holds
true. Figure 3.6 shows a scatterplot of both measures.
In only 158 of 1262 profit calculator utilisations, the estimated percentage change
of the exchange rate has been correct. This figure seems rather high at first sight,
but it really is not: There have been experimental sessions with long phases of a
constant exchange rate, and 155 out of the 158 correct estimates have been true
predictions of no exchange rate change at all. No obvious correlation between e˜r
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Figure 3.6: Scatterplot of real and estimated percentage change of the exchange
rate. The line denotes correct estimates
and e˜g can be observed in figure 3.6. A OLS regression for the model
(3.15) e˜g = b0 + b1e˜r
shows an extremely low R2 value of 0.0002. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
for both figures equals 0.0017. All these figures let it seem safe to assume that
the subjects’ exchange rate estimates have no connection with actual exchange rates.
Table B.4 displays the session values of these measures. A one-tailed Fisher-Pitman
permutation test for paired replicates implies that the absolute value of Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient is lower than 0.15 on a significance level of p = 0.05.
The same test states that the R2 value is lower than 0.03 on the same significance
level. This is very strong evidence for the existence of exchange rate uncertainty.
In many cases, subjects were not able to predict the change of the exchange rate
correctly. If only the cases are considered in which there was a change in the
exchange rate, only three exchange rate estimates have been correct. The share
of correctly predicted directions of exchange rate changes (on average, 32.5%
– see table B.5 for session values) is significantly lower than 50% (one-tailed
Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates, p = 0.0058). Combined with
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the result of the previous subsection, it can be assumed that firms know or at least
learn that their estimates are likely to be wrong. This is the reason why they don’t
rely on their own predictions and rather base their decisions on interest differences.
So far, the determinants of the currency trade behaviour of firms have been
investigated. It was shown that subjects base their currency trade decisions rather
on differences of the interest rates than on the change of the exchange rate and
that subjects also tend to borrow money rather in the country with the lower
interest rate. It seems that the firms do not always trust their own exchange rate
estimates, because they ignore the speculative advice provided to them by the profit
calculator. The reason for this behaviour is likely to be the observed incapability to
predict the change in the exchange rate precisely. Using the terminology employed
by Ellsberg (1961), the firms don’t face risk (because the distributional parameters
of the exchange rate are not known) but ambiguity. This has consequences for the
behaviour of the players.
3.3.3 Consequences of Exchange Rate Uncertainty
The results gained suggest that subjects are incapable of predicting exchange rate
changes correctly and thus base their currency trade decisions rather on interest
differences. In this subsection, the consequences of this exchange rate uncertainty
will be outlined and ways of how the firms try to cope with it will be explored.
Profitability of Trade Decisions
In the previous subsection, three different classes of trade decisions have been
distinguished: Some decisions rigorously followed the speculative advice h, some of
them went in the opposite direction because the difference in interest rates ∆rt was
in favour of the other currency, and the rest were based on unknown heuristics. In
the following, these three classes will be termed h, ∆rt, and u (with the possibility
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of one decision being counted in more than one class). A special interest arises
in the profitability of the currency transactions in the different classes. The most
profitable decision class would be h if the percentage exchange rate variation was
guessed correctly. If this variation estimate was wrong, the other two classes
could scoop in higher profits. The previously gained results suggest that currency
trade decisions taking individual exchange rate estimates into account lead to less
revenue than currency trade decisions based on interest rate considerations alone.
The average values of the currency trade profit vcurr for each class of currency trade
decisions are shown in figure 3.7 whereas the actual values can be seen in table B.6.
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Figure 3.7: Average profitability of different classes of trade decisions
To check whether the resulting trade profit differs between these cases, a Friedman
two-way analysis of variance by ranks has been conducted. At least two of the cases
have different profits with significance at 0.1% level. A two-tailed Fisher-Pitman
permutation test for paired replicates shows that the payoffs of classes h and u
as well as the payoffs of ∆rt and u differ at a significance of p = 0.0039. The
difference in payoffs between ∆rt and h is also significant at a level of p = 0.0078.
The results of the statistical tests imply that trade decisions which are in line with
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∆rt are most profitable on average, followed by the decisions in line with h. The
lowest currency trade profits were earned by subjects who base their decisions on
determinants that could not be classified.
So far, only the trade decisions have been classified to investigate the profitability
of different currency trade determinants. The line of reasoning will now be extended
by classify the players according to their conformance to the three possible trading
motives. Firstly, it is counted how often each player’s trade decision was conform
to ∆rt, h, and u. Then, a classifying variable κ is created for each player with the
following rule:
(3.16) κ =


1 if (#u > #h) ∧ (#u > #∆rt)
2 if (#∆rt > #h) ∧ (#∆rt > #u)
3 if (#h > #∆rt) ∧ (#h > #u)
Altogether, there have been 18 subjects who mostly traded conforming to ∆rt, 26 to
h, and 41 subjects who preferred other heuristics. 5 subjects could not be classified
with this rule: in one case the subject equally preferred h and u over ∆rt, and in 4
other cases the subject equally preferred h and ∆rt over u. To make the profits of
the players comparable, the standardised currency trade profit is utilised:
(3.17) v¯curr =


vcurr
Xi
ifXi > 0
vcurr · e−
X∗i
ifX∗i > 0
0 otherwise
The standardised currency trade profit v¯curr describes the profit of one unit of cur-
rency offered. Furthermore, the currency trade profit has to be multiplied with
the previous period’s exchange rate to make the currency offers comparable. The
actual session averages are displayed in table B.7. Note that a dash (“–”) in a
column denotes that there has been no player of this class in this session. Figure
66
3.3 Analysis of the Trade Decisions
3.8 illustrates the mean standardised currency trade profits per session and trader
class7.
0
.
00
00
5
.
00
01
.
00
01
5
v¯κ=1curr v¯
κ=2
curr
v¯κ=3curr
st
d
’i
se
d
c
u
rr
e
n
c
y
tr
a
d
e
p
ro
fi
t
Figure 3.8: Mean standardised currency trade profits per trader class
Fisher-Pitman test for paired replicates are applied on all combinations of two
currency traders’ classes. Table 3.4 shows the results of the tests. It is important
to mention that not every trader class was present in each session. The amount of
tested sessions is displayed in the column labelled n.
Table 3.4: Test results for the profits of different trader classes
H0 H1 n p-value
v¯κ=1curr ≥ v¯
κ=2
curr v¯
κ=1
curr < v¯
κ=2
curr 6 0.015625
v¯κ=1curr ≥ v¯
κ=3
curr v¯
κ=1
curr < v¯
κ=3
curr 7 0.03125
v¯κ=3curr ≥ v¯
κ=2
curr v¯
κ=3
curr < v¯
κ=2
curr 4 0.125
How can the significance levels be interpreted? It is obvious that subjects whose
decisions conform to motives other than interest differences and the speculative
advice make the least profits by currency trading. Although there is a tendency
of subjects mainly motivated by the speculative advice not to make as high
7For reasons of readability, aggregate values are shown. Data points are only considered if all
three of them were present in a session
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profits as subjects motivated by interest differences solely, the significance level of
p = 0.125 cannot be considered low enough to be convincing evidence. However,
only 4 sessions exist in which there have been mainly speculative advice motivated
and mainly interest motivated subjects – a sample size usually not sufficient for
non-parametric testing. Nevertheless, if one combines this result with the highest
profitability of interest difference motivated trade decisions (confer p. 65), the
evidence demonstrates that higher profits are plausible if one relies on interest
differences.
The previously discovered evidence of the superiority of interest rate motivated
currency trade decisions can be confirmed for player types, too, albeit to a lesser
extent. Remember that the speculative advice h differs from ∆rt only by the
consideration of the estimated percentage change of the exchange rate. Hence, the
only reasonable explanation for the supremacy of ∆rt-based decisions over h-based
decisions is the incapability of subjects to estimate the variation of the exchange
rate correctly.
A Simple Decision Rule
So far, it has been outlined that the difference of interest rates not only seems
to have the highest influence on the currency trade decision of individuals, but
also that decisions based solely on the interest difference make the highest profits
on average. In the following, a decision rule will be created on which base a firm
realises most likely currency trade gains. Following the approach of Gigerenzer and
Todd (1999), this decision rule is kept simple on purpose.
Assume that a subject always offers the currency that is the cheapest in terms of
interest. To normalise the size of the currency offer, assert that an individual always
offers the same absolute amount of home currency X˙ if it offers home currency at
all. The corresponding height of the foreign currency offer if ∆rt > 0 would be
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X˙∗ = X˙
e
. Since the current exchange rate e is not known to the firm player, one has
to replace it by the exchange rate in the previous period e−. Formally expressed,
this decision rule postulates the currency offers to be:
X =


X˙ if ∆rt < 0
0 else
(3.18)
X∗ =


X˙
e−
if ∆rt > 0
0 else
(3.19)
Now, this simple decision rule is evaluated. For reasons of simplicity, X˙ is set
to 1. In doing so it is avoided that the credit constraints are exceeded. The
theoretical cumulative currency trade profits
∑
vcurr for one firm in each country
is calculated in all sessions. The influence of the currency offer on the exchange
rate will be neglected in this case. It is safe doing this because the influence of the
currency offer of a single firm on the exchange rate is only marginal at best. The
results of this evaluation are shown in table 3.5. For this purpose, the hypothetical
standardised hypothetical currency trade profit has been computed according to
the following formula:
(3.20) vhypcurr =


0 if ∆r = 0
1
D
·
(
et+1 · r
∗
et
− r
)
if ∆r < 0
1
D
·
(
et+1 · r
∗
et
− r
)(
−
et
et+1
)
if ∆r > 0
Note that the profits shown in table 3.5 are only hypothetical profits. The trade
decision of a firm has few but existing influences on the exchange rate of the next
period, on the own currency offer in the following periods, on the height of next
period’s exchange rate aims of the central banks, and probably even on the produc-
tion decision of the firm. By neglecting these influences the results might be less
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accurate, but it is likely that the general direction of the decision rule is correct
because of the marginal relevance of these influences. Nevertheless, the profitability
of this decision rule would probably change if every firm in both countries made use
of it.
Table 3.5: Hypothetical cumulative currency trade profits for a firm if the decision
rule was applied
session avg. vhypcurr for a firm in
country A country B avg (A&B)
7 0.000014 0.00000817 0.0000111
8 -0.000000497 0.000000448 -0.0000000247
9 0.00000433 0.00000379 0.00000406
10 0.00000353 0.00000185 0.00000269
11 0.0000048 0.00000486 0.00000483
12 0.0000129 0.0000114 0.0000122
13 0.00000132 0.000000873 0.0000011
14 0.0000222 0.00001 0.0000161
15 0.0000192 0.0000133 0.0000163
There was only one case in which a firm would have made overall losses by trading
currency as proposed by this decision rule. Session 8 is marked by an almost
monotonic increasing exchange rate for country A: In only 3 non-consecutive
periods the exchange rate decreased weakly. This explains the failure of the
decision rule in session 8. In every other case, the decision rule seems to be a
successful way of deciding which currency to offer. The decision rule is thus a
profitable one (p = 0.0078, two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired
replicates).
To compare how this decision rule competes against actual decisions by traders, the
currency trade profit made by firms is standardised with the size of the currency
offer (in units of the home currency). The resulting figure vstdcurr is identical in
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dimension to vhypcurr:
(3.21) vstdcurr =


vi
Xi
if Xi > 0
vi
X∗i · e
if X∗i > 0
0 else
The session averages and country averages of this measure are displayed in table
B.8 in the appendix, an illustrative figure of the session averages can be found in
figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Hypothetical (if decision rule was applied) and standardised trade prof-
its
The findings so far insinuate that the real standardised profits should be smaller
than the hypothetical profits that could have been realised if the decision rule was
applied. Comparing the average session values of the hypothetical decision rule and
the actual decisions, it turns out that the former is significantly higher (one-tailed
Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates (p = 0.0605). This further
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strengthens the assumption of supremacy of this rather simple decision rule which
currency to offer if future exchange rates are unknown.
Concluding the case for the decision rule, it can be stated that the firms would
make profit on average if they relied on interest differences only and always offered
a fixed amount in the respective currency on the market. Even stronger conclusions
can be drawn: the profits made by the decision rule outperform the profits made
on average by the players. The main cause for this shown superiority of interest
based decisions lies in the incapability of subjects to predict exchange rate changes
correctly.
Exchange Rate Volatility and Currency Offers
Does the ambiguity sparked of by exchange rate uncertainty lead to a change in
the currency trade behaviour of the players? If subjects are aware of their limited
ability in predicting exchange rate changes, it is likely that they reduce the size of
their currency offers with an increasing experienced volatility.
As a figure for the cumulative exchange rate volatility per period, a symmetric
measure seems appropriate. Hence, the value of
(3.22) δ¯t =
t∑
j=1
(
ej
ej−1
+
ej−1
ej
− 2
)2
is computed for each period in each session. The value of δ¯t increases monotonically
over time; the more it increases in one period, the higher the exchange rate volatility
has been. To test the correlation between δ¯t and the currency offers of firms, the
aggregate value of the standardised currency offers (confer p. 61) is used:
(3.23) ψ =
10∑
i=1
(
Xi
X¯i
+
X∗i
X¯i
∗
)
Now, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ρψ,δ¯t between aggregate standardised
currency offer ψ and cumulative exchange rate volatility per period δ¯i gives further
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information (see table B.1 and figure 3.10). As later will be shown in table 3.8, the
overall volatility was extremely small in session 13. This explains the relatively
high correlation in this period.
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Figure 3.10: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ρ of cumulative exchange rate
volatility and aggregate standardised currency trade volume
Running a one-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates for
H0 : ρ
ψ,δ¯t ≥ 0 and H1 : ρ
ψ,δ¯t < 0, a positive correlation can be rejected at a
significance level of p = 0.0292. This shows that experience with volatility over
time seems to matter. One might object the explanatory power of testing a
monotonically growing measure against the aggregate standardised home currency
offer, because the latter one could also be correlated with the time. However,
neither time nor a normalised volatility figure are significantly correlated with it.
This rather strong result is completely in line with the other findings: the subject’s
currency offers decrease with increasing experienced exchange rate volatility. The
high volatility in the past leads to a higher exchange rate uncertainty. More profits
could be earned with a higher volatility, but since the firm owners find it hard to
predict the direction of the changes, they decide to decrease their currency offers: a
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great disadvantageous change of the exchange rate will certainly destroy the gains
made by exploiting the interest differences.
The Home Currency Bias Explained
In section 3.3.1, it was mentioned that subjects tend to offer home currency
more often and to a higher extent than foreign currency. In behavioural finance
literature, a home bias is known as the phenomenon which lets investors prefer
to buy domestic assets over foreign (see Fellner and Maciejovsky 2003, Lewis
1999, and Cooper and Kaplanis 1994). Note that the opposite occurs in this
context: subjects offer home currency to buy foreign currency. In the following,
this phenomenon will be labelled a home currency bias. Before possible reasons for
this behaviour are outlined, the significance of the tendency towards higher home
currency offers compared with foreign currency offers is shown.
As a tool for measuring the relative size of home and foreign currency offers, the
cumulative aggregate standardised home and foreign currency offers
ψh =
20∑
t=1
(
5∑
i=1
Xi,t
X¯i,t
+
10∑
i=6
X∗i,t
X¯∗i,t
)
(3.24)
ψf =
20∑
t=1
(
5∑
i=1
X∗i,t
X¯∗i,t
+
10∑
i=6
Xi,t
X¯i,t
)
(3.25)
are used for each session, whereas the firms in the home country are numbered
from 1 to 5 and those in the foreign country from 6 to 10. Since the standard-
ised home and foreign currency offers range between 0 and 1 in each period
and since there are 10 firms and 20 periods, both ψh and ψf range between 0
and 200. The session averages of these values can be found in table B.10 in the
appendix, whereas a graphical representation of the values is displayed in figure 3.11.
The standardised home currency offers have always been higher than the stan-
dardised foreign currency offers. Support for this thesis is gathered through a
one-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates with a significance
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Figure 3.11: Cumulative aggregate standardised home and foreign currency offers
of p = 0.0019.
This behaviour could also be explained by exchange rate uncertainty. A home
currency offer is transferred to the foreign account at this period’s exchange rate
(Xier
∗). This is the only positive component of the firm’s foreign account balance.
Expenses for foreign currency offers (−X∗i r
∗) and costs of foreign materials (−Mim
∗)
are deducted from the foreign account. In the following period, the account balance
gets transferred to the firm owner at the actual exchange rate. If a subject wants
to pay parts or all of its foreign account debts rather now than in the next period,
it should place a positive home currency offer. This makes only sense if the subject
does not want to risk a higher debt caused by a possibly smaller exchange rate in
the following period. The propensity to settling the foreign account debts in the
actual period rather than in the following can be regarded as a very simple and
primitive form of hedging against exchange rate risks. To investigate the hedging
behaviour of firms, the relation of currency offers to foreign account debt
(3.26) Ψ :=
r∗(Xi
eˆ
−X∗i )
M∗i m
∗
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is used as a measure. A Ψ greater than zero expresses the percentage of foreign
account debts settled by the home currency offer at the estimated exchange rate, a
Ψ smaller than zero equals the increase of foreign account debt by foreign currency
offers. Table 3.6 shows the session averages of Ψ.
If one compares Ψ for positive home currency offers (ΨXi>0) with the absolute
value of Ψ for positive foreign currency offers (|ΨX∗i >0|), it yields that the mean
percentage increase of foreign account debt is smaller than the mean percentage
decrease of foreign account debt on average. A two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permuta-
tion test for paired replicates of H0 : ΨXi>0 ≤ |ΨX∗i >0| and H1 : ΨXi>0 > |ΨX∗i >0|
is significant for p < 0.01. If a subject feels secure about its own prediction and if
this subject wishes to hedge against an increasing exchange rate, a Ψ of 1 would be
the ideal value. Ψ < 1 can be interpreted as an expression of uncertainty about the
own exchange rate estimate. In most cases, Ψ is even smaller than 0.5 if Xi > 0.
If subjects do follow the thesis of hedging, they still don’t feel very secure about
their exchange rate estimates.
What at first seems to be a result of medium importance appears in a new
light when one compares the session average of the relation of currency offers to
foreign account debt with the respective overall session’s exchange rate volatility:
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the session exchange rate volatility
and the relation of currency offers to debt has the high value of ρ = 0.6667.
This means that the hypothesis that those two figures are not at all or negatively
correlated can be rejected at a significance level of p = 0.0499 (two-tailed).
One might object that increasing currency trade activities destabilise the ex-
change rate and that the reason might be the consequence in this case. As later
will be shown, currency trade has no significant influence on exchange rate volatility.
It can be inferred that a higher exchange rate volatility increases the propensity of
firms to engage in hedging activities to safeguard exchange rate risks which might
influence the height of production profits. Although this finding also includes that
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Table 3.6: Relation of currency offers to debt (session averages) and overall session
exchange rate volatility δ (see eq. 3.22)
session Ψ if Xi > 0 Ψ if X
∗
i
> 0 Ψ δ
7 .36552487 -.30605193 .06577762 .0363223
8 .44483818 -.3111075 .02944369 .000035
9 .48100904 -.33237057 .07760347 .0010411
10 .46563531 -.23704799 .10555662 .0009401
11 .40150467 -.30142939 .04477621 .0125613
12 .37167138 -.24952556 .11123972 .0023613
13 .24726002 -.27796907 .03284282 .0000001
14 1.2918399 -.47550419 .35278018 .3426598
15 .41020969 -.29141708 .11093025 .0709927
firms only seldomly settle their foreign account debts to their full extent, it seems
to be one way of how firms deal with exchange rate risks.
Pessimistic Expectations
How does a firm cope with exchange rate uncertainty if it engages in hedging only
to a relatively small extent? Another way of doing so would be to enter rather
pessimistic exchange rate estimates into the profit calculator.
If a firm expects the exchange rate to rise in the next period with no difference in
interest rates in both countries in this period, it would be profitable to offer home
currency. More home currency is offered in almost each session, so it is plausible to
assume that subjects have expectations of growing exchange rates more often than
they expect falling exchange rates.
To confirm this hypothesis, the gathered profit calculator data can be used. Like on
page 55, only the last estimate for the exchange rate is taken into account. Firstly,
a measure is created to describe the exchange rate expectations in each session. For
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each session, let
ǫ+ :=
#(eˆ+ − eˆ > 0)
#(eˆ+, eˆ)
(3.27)
ǫ− :=
#(eˆ+ − eˆ < 0)
#(eˆ+, eˆ)
(3.28)
ǫ= :=
#(eˆ+ − eˆ = 0)
#(eˆ+, eˆ)
(3.29)
In general parlance, ǫ+ is the relation of the number of expectations of a growing
exchange rate to the number of all existing exchange rate estimates. Similarly, ǫ−
(ǫ=) denotes the percentage of falling (constant) exchange rate estimates. The sum
of ǫ+, ǫ−, and ǫ= equals always 1 in one session. Figure 3.12 shows the ǫ values for
each session. The actual values are displayed in table B.11.
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Figure 3.12: Shares of growing, falling, and constant exchange rate expectations
They demonstrate that constant exchange rate estimates have the greatest share in
most sessions, and that in 2 of 9 sessions rising exchange rates are expected more
frequently than falling ones. Fisher-Pitman permutation tests for paired replicates
have been run for different hypotheses to gain some significant conclusions. The
78
3.3 Analysis of the Trade Decisions
test results are shown in table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Results of permutation tests for paired replicates
H0 H1 p
ǫ+ ≤ ǫ− ǫ+ > ǫ− 0.00976
ǫ= ≤ ǫ− ǫ= > ǫ− 0.00585
ǫ= ≤ ǫ+ ǫ= > ǫ+ 0.02539
ǫ= ≤ ǫ+ + ǫ− ǫ= > ǫ+ + ǫ− 0.32812
The significance levels of the tests imply that firms rather have expectations of
constant exchange rates than either growing or falling exchange rates, but also
that they rather have expectations of growing exchange rates than falling, and that
a tendency towards expectations of constant exchange rates being more frequent
than both expectations of growing or falling exchange rates cannot be supported.
What can be deduced from this finding? Taking a look at the production profit
structure of a firm
(3.30) vprod =
1
D
(Qiq − Liwr −Mim− e+M
∗
i m
∗)
and neglecting the currency trade profits, it becomes clear that a growing exchange
rate lowers the production profit by (e+−e)M
∗
i m
∗. Consequently, firms have rather
pessimistic expectations concerning the development of the exchange rate. The
pessimism is likely to be caused by exchange rate uncertainty – subjects are feeling
insecure in predicting changes of the exchange rate, so they tend to calculate with
rather downbeat expectations to obtain a worst-case profit estimate by the use of
the profit calculator.
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3.3.4 Consequences of Currency Trade
The existence of macroeconomic consequences of currency trade cannot be denied
in practice. Neoclassical theory states that currency trade must have a stabilising
effect on exchange rate volatility. Friedman (1953a) asserts that stabilising
speculation is equivalent to profitable speculation: If speculators buy an asset
when its price is low and sell it when its price is high, this will drive the asset’s
price towards its equilibrium. This view of the relation between speculation and
stabilisation seems tenuous. de Long et al. (1990) find that because noise traders
can earn higher profits than long term investors and both types of speculators are
trading, Friedman’s model appears incomplete. Carlson and Osler (2000) argue
that Friedman’s line of reasoning does neither incorporate interest rates nor a risk
model, which both could in fact make speculators sell an asset when its price is
low and buy it when its price is high, thus destabilising the price. In general, most
post-Keynesian authors assert the opposite of Friedman’s theory.
The model used endows central banks with enough power that they are able to rein
back the influence of currency trade by implicit cooperation. Is there nevertheless
an influence of currency trade on exchange rate volatility?
The measure already used in section 3.3.3 is taken as a descriptor for the volatility
of one session:
(3.31) δ¯ =
20∑
t=1
(
et
et−1
+
et−1
et
− 2
)2
The higher δ¯ is, the more volatile e has been. Now, the actual exchange rate e is
compared with a hypothetical exchange rate eh, which is defined as the exchange
rate which would have prevailed if no firm had placed currency offers and the rest
of the parameters stayed constant (central bank interventions, exchange rate aims,
materials prices, and materials demands).
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Furthermore, a binomially distributed variable ̟ is constructed which is 1 for ses-
sions with a hypothetical volatility higher than the actual volatility and 0 in the
opposite case. Table 3.8 shows the volatility of actual (δ¯curr) and hypothetical ex-
change rates (δ¯hypo) as well as ̟ for each session.
Table 3.8: Actual vs. hypothetical exchange rate volatility
session δ¯curr δ¯hypo ̟
7 0.0363223 0.0791757 0
8 0.0000350 0.0001090 0
9 0.0010411 0.0008752 1
10 0.0009401 0.0005754 1
11 0.0125613 0.0014151 1
12 0.0023613 0.0048185 0
13 0.0000001 0.0000002 0
14 0.3426598 0.4068589 0
15 0.0709927 0.0664837 1
mean 0.0518794 0.0622569
The volatility averages suggest that volatility decreases with currency trade volume.
In spite of that, a significant difference in the exchange rate volatility in the different
cases could neither be substantiated by applying Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test (two-
tailed p = 0.7671) nor the Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates
(two-tailed p = 0.4258). The same holds true for different asymmetric volatility
measures δ¯asyme =
∑20
t=1
(
et
et−1
− 1
)2
and δ¯asyme =
∑20
t=1
(
et−1
et
− 1
)2
. The mean value
for ̟ is 0.44444. Note that a value of 0.5 would indicate no influence of currency
trade on exchange rate volatilities. However, the binomial confidence interval at
a level of 0.9 for the expected value of ̟ is [0.2180471; 0.6965233]. This range
cannot be considered tight enough to deduce that currency trade has no influence
on the exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless, neither a volatility increasing nor
a volatility decreasing effect of currency trade can be found in the experimental data.
Currency crises in the late 1990’s have been sparked off by wrong monetary policies
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and currency trade (e. g. see Ko¨hler 1998, Eichengreen et al. 1995, and Krugman
2001). Similar phenomena could not be observed in the experiments: there seems
to be no systematic influence of currency trade on the exchange rate. This is
caused mainly by model design: The central banks implicitly collude to keep the
exchange rate in the interval of their exchange rate aims. Exchange rate variation
is still possible, but only within this interval.
The strength of the central banks surely is one reason for the insignificance of the
influence of currency trade on the exchange rate volatility in the data. According
to Cheung and Chinn (2001), the prevailing opinion among professional currency
traders states the opposite: US currency traders think that central bank interven-
tions do not have any substantial effect on exchange rate besides increasing exchange
rate volatility. However, the example of China and Japan shows that exchange rates
can be kept within narrow limits by central bank interventions.
3.4 Concluding Discussion
The subject matter of this investigation is the currency trade decisions of indus-
trial firms in a laboratory experiment. The experimental design was very rich,
that is with subjects in the role of numerous institutions, there was wide scope
for endogenous shocks or variations in exchange rates and interest rates. Op-
portunities to speculate with currency arose, and the firms tried to reap the benefits.
Two determinants of the currency trade behaviour have been identified: There are
subjects who base their decision on interest differences or on individual exchange
rate estimates. A third fraction acts according to some other heuristics that could
not be captured. The firms usually borrow money to place their currency offer
from the account with the lower interest rate. The influence of simple technical
analysis of the exchange rate on the currency trade behaviour is significantly lower
than the influence of the interest difference. This might be due to the fact that
subjects fail to estimate the exchange rate correctly. The estimates being stated
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by the firms confirm this hypothesis, because they were mostly inaccurate.
Although the firms use the given profit calculator tool when they based their
currency offer on individual exchange rate estimates, their currency trade profits are
on average significantly below the ones of subjects reacting to interest differences.
A simple decision rule by the use of which a firm could make positive currency
trade profits in most cases has been considered: The decision rule postulates to
always offer a fixed amount of home currency if the interest rate in the home
country is lower than in the foreign country, offer the same fixed amount in foreign
currency at previous period’s exchange rate if the home interest rate exceeds the
foreign one, and offer no currency at all if the interest rates in both countries
are the same. A higher session volatility of the exchange rate leads to a higher
exchange rate uncertainty and thus to lower currency offers. Not only the possible
losses, also the possible gains are affected by a volatile exchange rate, but subjects
fear the uncertainty and trade less often when past exchange rates show major
variations. The subjects usually offer home currency to a higher extent and more
frequently than foreign currency. This home currency bias can be seen as a way to
cope with exchange rate uncertainty by offering home currency in order to settle
part of their foreign account debts in the actual rather than in the next period.
Another way of meeting exchange rate uncertainty would be to calculate with
pessimistic expectations. Significant evidence for the existence of these could be
found.
Although the influence of currency trade on the exchange rate cannot be denied,
neither a significant increase nor decrease of the volatility can be found in the
experimental sessions: central banks are strong enough to curb the influence of
currency trade on volatility.
The firms’ overconfidence in the criterion of interest rate difference surprises,
because the variation of the exchange rate has the larger impact on the resulting
payoff. That leads to the assumption that subjects just like to base decisions
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under uncertainty on safe facts rather than on their beliefs about uncertain future
events. Room for future research is left not only on this topic. Especially the
trade heuristics that could not be explained by the experimental data should be
investigated more thoroughly. The central banks have a very strong influence
on the exchange rate: they fix the definite range in which the exchange rate is
allowed to vary. In the real world, this can only be done to a certain extent and by
drawing on the monetary reserve if the policy makers from different countries do
not collude. Note that the experimental design chosen limits the currency offers of
the firms, but it does not limit the currency offers of the central bank. A currency
crisis cannot arise in this model. Because of the strength of the central banks and
the only low influence of currency trade on the exchange rate, financial phenomena
such as bubbles or crashes cannot be observed.
Furthermore, a model with three countries could give deeper insights on the strength
of the determinants of the currency trade behaviour. Our work and the experimental
design of Pope et al. should be seen as a starting point for future experimental
research.
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“The volatility of international capital is obviously destabilizing
markets today.”
– Jeffrey D. Sachs
4.1 A Tax to Reduce Volatility
Foreign exchange markets are the most liquid financial markets in practice. The
traded volume has even increased within the last years: the daily average turnover
on the foreign exchange spot market has surged to 621 billion US dollar in 2004
(cf. the triennial central bank survey by the Bank for International Settlements,
see Galati et al. 2005). But the enormous trading volume is not the only striking
feature of currency markets: the prices of the currencies, that is, the exchange
rates, also incorporate information very rapidly. This yields volatility. It can
not be denied that unstable exchange rates can have dire consequences for whole
economies. Exchange rate uncertainty affects international trade, the liquidity of
firms which have foreign debts, the behaviour of foreign investors, and even fiscal,
domestic, and monetary policy. In general, excess price volatility decreases the
willingness of investors to engage in trading activities in the concerned markets.
Currency speculation is not the only factor in exchange rate determination,
although it seems to have an influence on the short-term development of a
currency’s value. There exist different sights on the influence of speculative
currency trade on exchange rates. In 1936, John M. Keynes partitioned trading
parties on financial markets in long-run investors and short-run speculators. In his
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eyes, short-run speculators play a price-destabilising role on the market, whereas
long-run investors stabilise prices. In his fundamental work The general theory of
employment, interest, and money1, he pointed out that imposing a transaction
tax on markets could increase the weight of long-term fundamentals of the assets
against speculators’ guesses of the short-term behaviour of other speculators, thus
stabilising the asset’s price. Friedman (1953a) is however of a different opinion.
He claims that stabilising speculation is equivalent to profitable speculation: If
speculators buy an asset when its price is low and respectively sell it when its
price is high, this will drive the asset’s price towards its equilibrium. This view of
the relation between speculation and stabilisation seems tenuous. For example, de
Long et al. (1990) find that because noise traders can earn higher profits than long
term investors and both types of speculators are trading, Friedman’s model appears
incomplete. Carlson and Osler (2000) argue that Friedman’s line of reasoning does
neither incorporate interest rates nor a risk model, which both could in fact make
speculators sell an asset when its price is low and buy it when its price is high,
thus destabilising the price. In general, most post-Keynesian authors assert the
opposite of Friedman’s theory.
How can one cope with price volatility? This study focuses on a transaction
taxation scheme. Sticking to the example of foreign exchange markets, there is a
constantly ongoing discussion about imposing transaction costs to reduce excess
exchange rate variation. James Tobin (1978) proposed a transaction tax of up to
1 percent on all spot transactions. He hoped not to affect long-term investors, but
to scare away short-term speculators with his tax. The desired effects of such a
tax on short-term and long-term currency traders can be illustrated in an example
which has been drawn up by Frankel (1996): Consider a home interest rate of
ten percent and a transaction tax in the height of one percent. A foreign asset is
attractive to potential investors with an investment horizon of one year if it yielded
at least 11.11% per annum if only the interest earnings were brought back. If the
1see Keynes (1936)
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horizon was only one month, the asset should yield at least 22.12% annual revenue
to remain attractive. The shorter the horizon, the higher the asset yield had to be:
A duration of the investment of one week would require a yield of 62.52%, and if it
was a one-day investment the yield would have to be no less than 378.68%.
This approach is highly controversial. In their comprehensive standard work,
Grunberg et al. (1996) review current arguments for and against this tax from
an economic point of view. Major points of critics are for example that it would
be easy to evade the tax by means of financial engineering (e. g., short-termed
futures are not subject to this tax) or by shifting markets to countries where
the tax is not imposed. Furthermore, Aliber et al. (2003) find in an empirical
study that higher transaction costs are positively correlated with exchange rate
volatility. Hau (2006) studies data from the Paris stock exchange and comes to a
similar conclusion. However, his study deals with stock market data and not with
a currency market. Spahn (1996) extends Tobin’s taxation scheme by modelling a
two-tier transaction taxation scheme: like in Tobin’s approach, a fixed percentage
of up to 1 percent is imposed on all currency spot transactions. If however the
exchange rate lies out of the boundaries of a precalculated threshold determined by
a crawling peg plus a safety margin, a transaction tax with a significantly higher
tax rate of up to 100 percent will be imposed on the transactions. Spahn calls his
approach a Tobin-cum-Circuit-Breaker Tax. A more detailed view on this approach
is provided by Spahn (2002). Already in the same issue of the journal in which
Spahn initially published his taxation proposal, Janet Stotsky (1996) criticises
his approach. She claims that variable taxation rates would increase uncertainty
on the market, spreads, as well as the administrative burden for tax payers and
tax authority. Furthermore, in her opinion the levy of the tax as an instrument
of monetary policy under the control of the fiscal authority would require a high
extent of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities which she claims
does not exist in practice.
In the context of politics, the concept of a Tobin tax is recurring in discussions
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frequently; especially in European countries and after financial crises. The interest
in the Tobin tax soon dies once the media coverage on financial crises ceases to
exist. A small anecdote describes this phenomenon best. Otmar Issing, chief
economist of the German Bundesbank in 1990-98, once told journalists when asked
about the Tobin tax: “Oh, that again. It’s the Loch Ness Monster, popping up once
more.”2 Nevertheless, some hesitant steps towards such a tax are taken. In 2004,
France and Belgium agreed to introduce a Tobin tax as soon as all other countries
of the European Union will do. Germany, France, and Austria claimed pro-Tobin
tax positions only in 2005, knowing that if the European Union levied a Tobin tax
it would have an own source of fiscal revenues. On the American continent, Brazil’s
president Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva, Venezuela’s president Hugo Cha´vez, as well as
the Canadian House of Commons spoke out in favour of the Tobin tax within the
previous 8 years. At the moment, one of the major adversaries of the Tobin tax
is the United States of America. It is unlikely that a Tobin tax will be effective if
introduced multilaterally without participation of the USA (and at least the EU,
Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Australia, and Canada, as Kenen 1996
states in his dissection of evadability by migration).
There exist different views on the impact of a Tobin tax on financial crises.
Whereas some authors, e. g. Tobin (1996a), claim that financial crises caused
by an inadequate monetary and fiscal policy mix and sparked off by speculative
attacks could at least have been curbed by a transaction tax, some authors assert
the opposite. For instance, Grabel (2003) states that concerning the Asian crisis,
speculation in real estate and construction is not subject to Tobin’s tax proposal
in spite of contributing significantly to fragility risk in Asia. Furthermore, Grabel
rules out that the ideal tax rate is lower than the expected profits associated with
speculation. Rajan (2001) asserts that international capital flows are relatively
inelastic with respect to transaction taxes a` la Tobin, but that the latter ones are
an appropriate device for increasing public funds.
2described by Tobin (1996b)
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Neither Tobin’s nor Spahn’s taxation proposals have ever been introduced to
existing foreign exchange markets, so there is a lack of empirical evidence in favour
of or against such taxation schemes. Although there exists some literature on the
effects of transaction costs on financial markets (see Habermeier and Kirilenko 2003
and the augmentation of their arguments by Forbes 2003 in the same volume), it is
by no means clear that these results can be transferred from e. g. the stock market
to the currency market. Nevertheless, some evidence exists from experiments
and simulations. In a laboratory experiment, Noussair et al. (1998) evaluate
the effect of transaction costs on a double auction. They find that the price is
driven towards its equilibrium price in spite of the monetary costs, though market
efficiency and turnover decrease. Our study follows a different taxation approach:
Noussair and his coauthors impose transaction costs in a fixed absolute height on
the market. Contrary to that, Tobin postulated to introduce a transaction cost
of a fixed percentage. In a recent experimental investigation, Bloomfeld et al.
(2005) investigate the behaviour and the market impact of noise traders. If a
securities transaction tax is imposed, price volatility is not reduced, although they
find some evidence that it limits noise trading. Hanke et al. (2006) ran laboratory
experiments which included two continuous double auction markets. They imposed
a Tobin tax unilaterally as well as on both markets. The results of this study speak
out against a Tobin tax: if introduced unilaterally, almost the complete trading
activity shifts to the other market. If the traders’ ability of evading the taxation
is eliminated by introducing the tax on both markets, the volatility increases
on the one hand whereas the trading volume and the market efficiency decrease
drastically. A half theoretical, half experimental study by Cipriani and Guarino
(2007) outlines the negative effect of transactions costs such as a Tobin tax on price
discovery. In their model, informational cascades arise in which traders refrain
from trading when transaction costs are imposed on markets.
Westerhoff (2003) creates two financial markets in a computational simulation and
imposes a transaction tax on either none, one, or both of them. In particular, he
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distinguishes between orders placed by traders motivated by technical and orders
placed by traders motivated by fundamental analysis. He concludes that the
tax indeed stabilises the prices on the market with the tax, but also destabilises
the prices on the respective other market if no tax is imposed on it. Later on,
Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) show in a collaborative work with a similar model that
both markets stabilise if a tax is imposed on both of them and that other markets
are likely to follow if market regulators introduce a tax in only one market.
We want to emphasise that it cannot be the aim of a Tobin tax to completely
eradicate price volatility. If there is zero volatility, then prices most likely don’t
properly adjust to fundamental values. In his speech at the 2006 meeting of Nobel
laureates in Lindau, Robert Engle conjured up some examples for implications of
a phenomenon like this: if the prices on a stock market had zero volatility and
the fundamental value had not, it would mean that profitable companies don’t
have more access to capital than less profitable companies. If currencies had zero
volatility, this would impede countries that follow sensible economic policies to
advance past countries that don’t. But a high volatility can also do harm to
financial markets and its participants. It is not only a measure for the risk of
investments, but also an important source of information for the pricing of options.
That makes it seem plausible to carefully curb volatility.
In this chapter, an experimental market inspired by a discretised double auction
is investigated. The market does not follow the traditional double auction design
of Smith et al. (1988), because a game-theoretical solution has to be derived as
a benchmark for the investigation. Experiments are run in two variations: First,
the market participants are allowed to interact without imposing any stabilisation
measures on them. Second, a transaction tax a` la Tobin of a fixed percentage is
introduced. The height of this tax across markets is varied to assess the volatility
elasticity with regard to it. Finally, taxed and untaxed markets are compared and
evaluated with respect to trade volume and trade turnover, supply and demand,
market prices, volatility, market efficiency, fiscal revenues, and earnings inequality.
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4.2 An Asset Market Model
In this section, a brief overview on the trade mechanisms of foreign exchange markets
in practice is given. Thereafter, a round-based model of an experimental asset
market motivated by the structure of the beforehand described foreign exchange
platforms is drawn up.
4.2.1 The Structure of Foreign Exchange Markets
In existing financial markets, foreign currencies are traded in different ways (see
Sarno and Taylor 2001, p. 5). About 40 percent of the daily turnover of world
financial markets are traded in brokered transactions: A broker collects limit orders
which consists of quantities and the price of an offer to buy or sell. Then, the broker
matches supply and demand curves and finishes the deals. Traditionally, the bro-
kered market is conducted via voice over telephone lines. An even greater fraction
of the daily trade is done by market participants who trade with each other directly:
the market participants approach each other and the party receiving the call acts as
a market maker. The latter one provides the caller with bid and ask prices, whereas
the caller decides on the quantity and whether to sell, to buy, or to refrain from the
deal. Nowadays, this is mostly done electronically. In 1997, about 70 percent of
the brokered trade has been conducted via the software systems EBS and Reuters’
Dealing 2000-2 (see Payne 2003, p. 5). Later on, Reuters introduced a new trading
system called Dealing 3000. Dealing 2000-2 and Dealing 3000 have been existing
in parallel henceforth. These systems have already been reviewed in recent mar-
ket microstructure studies by Carpenter and Wang (2003) as well as Hupfeld (2002).
Note that it is not intent of the authors to claim the setting to be an experimental
currency market, albeit its features resemble those of standard foreign exchange
trading platforms. Exchange rates are not exclusively formed by the speculating
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motive of day traders. Many market participants use financial devices like simple
or swap options to hedge various kind of bilateral businesses and investments
against exchange rate risks. Fiscal and monetary policy, the interaction and
cooperation of monetary authorities all over the world, correlated commodity
markets, and economic trends influence trade decisions to a high extent. All these
phenomena are non-existent in the setting described here. A simple experimental
market design such as this one is cannot capture the complexity of exchange rate
formation in the world’s economies. Nevertheless, the study at hand should be
seen as a market microstructure investigation of the influence of a Tobin tax as
a financial stabilising measure on market participants and their trade decisions.
For experimental studies of exchange rates and the currency market, confer for
example Kaiser and Kube (2009) (a rephrased version of this paper can be found in
chapter 3 of this dissertation), Noussair et al. (1997), or Arifovic (1996). Inspired
by the approach of Friedman (1984), it draws up a round-based, discrete, and
finite-horizon model which is described in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Modelling an Asset Market
In this section, the model for a simple asset market is described. Based on this
market model, the impact of a Tobin tax will be analysed later by the means of a
laboratory experiment under controlled conditions. In order to obtain a benchmark
for what profit motivated, self-centred, risk-neutral, and rational players would
do, game-theoretical equilibria will be derived. Therefore, the market design is a
compromise of plausibility, playability, and game-theoretical analysability.
On a market, a fixed number of n players has the opportunity to trade units of one
asset against units of a numeraire. Each player is initially endowed with m units
of the asset and x units of cash (the numeraire).The number m is positive and x
is a multiple of 0.01. After a finite and known number T of periods, the market
is closed and all players receive their payoffs. Each period t consists of two steps:
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step 1 determines market prices and market makers for the period, step 2 allows all
players who have not become market makers to place buy or selling orders. More
specifically:
Step 1 proceeds as follows: Let N = (1, ..., n) be the set of all players and let Na
be the set of all players with positive holdings of the numeraire and N b be the set
of all players with positive holdings of the asset in the beginning of the period.
Every player i ∈ Na privately sets a positive ask price pai not greater than his or
her numeraire holdings and every player i ∈ N b sets a positive bid price pbi . Their
prices pai and p
b
i must be integer multiples of 0.01 and they must not exceed some
(sufficiently high) maximum prices p¯a and p¯b, respectively. Moreover, pbi ≤ p
a
i must
hold. For i ∈ Na the price pai is the number of numeraire units player i is willing to
pay for one unit of the asset and for i ∈ N b the price pbi is the number of numeraire
units for which player i is willing to sell one unit of the asset.
After the players have made their decisions on their individual ask and bid prices,
the most favourable prices are determined. The market ask price pa is set to the
lowest individual ask price:
(4.1) pa = min
i∈Na
pai
Analogously, the market bid price pb is set to the highest individual bid price:
(4.2) pb = max
i∈Nb
pb
As we shall see later, Na and N b are always non-empty. Therefore pa and pb are
always well defined. The players who stated the market bid price are the buying
market makers in this period, the players who did so with the market ask price are
the selling market makers. After both market ask and bid price as well as market
makers are determined, the prices are announced publicly. Information on market
makers and individual price decisions remains private. After step 1 a player who
becomes a buying market maker is informed about this and the same holds for
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players who become selling market makers. All other players are informed about
the market ask price and the market bid price.
In step 2, all players who became market makers in step 1 do nothing. Every other
player has the opportunity to decide on trade orders. A player i may either
• place a buying order for di units of the asset, i.e. order to transfer di · p
a units
of the numeraire to a selling market maker (a player j with paj = p
a) for di
units of the asset in exchange, whereas di must be chosen in such a way that
dipi is not greater than player i’s numeraire holdings,
• place a selling order for si units of the asset, i.e. order to transfer si units of
the asset to the buying market maker (player k with pbk = p
b) for si · p
b units
of the numeraire in exchange, whereas the number si must be smaller than or
equal to the asset holdings of player i,
• or refrain from trade.
Players are not allowed to place buying and selling orders at the same time,
neither are they forced to place an order at all. The holdings xi and mi of
numeraire and asset of player i may not become negative. Consequently, the order
size di (resp. si) may not be chosen in a way that xi (resp. mi) is exceeded.
Furthermore, orders are limited in size by d and s and must be positive. The
asset is not divisible, that is, only integer amounts of the asset may be ordered.
Units of the numeraire are divisible up to the second decimal place. If two or
more players are the selling market makers at the same time, all buying orders are
distributed among them as near to the equal division as possible, given the avail-
able supplies. The same holds true for the buying market makers and selling orders.
One special case can arise: if the selling market makers’ total holdings of the asset
are lower than the aggregated buying orders, not all orders can be satisfied. Then,
the players who placed buying orders are numbered at random. Their buying
orders are carried out sequentially and as a whole. If a player’s buying order cannot
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be satisfied completely, the remainder of the market makers’ units of the asset is
transferred to him and the players not considered so far miss out. The same rule
applies if the buying market makers have not enough units of the numeraire to buy
all selling orders.
All information remains private: All players only know how their own holdings of
the asset and the numeraire change. At the beginning of the next period, all players
receive a constant dividend of µ units of the numeraire for each unit of the asset
they are holding. µ is a positive multiple of 0.01. There is no such payment at
the beginning of the first period, neither is there a dividend payment after the final
period. After the final period T , all units of the asset are converted to units of the
numeraire at a fixed exchange rate of c. The values of µ, T , and c are known to all
players. Consequently, the final payoff of player i is
(4.3) Πi = xi + cmi
where xi and mi are the holdings at time T . A variant of the model imposes a
transaction tax a` la Tobin (1978) on the same market institution. Being otherwise
identical to the model described before, all players who place orders have to pay a
fraction τ of the transferred number of units of the numeraire as a tax. If player
i places a buying order over di units of the asset and if that order is satisfied
completely, the selling market maker will receive dip
a units of the numeraire and
give di units of the asset to player i. Player i has to pay di · (1 + τ)p
a units of the
numeraire in total for the asset, of which altogether diτp
a units of the numeraire
are transferred to a global tax account. The total transaction cost τdipa payable by
a buyer i is rounded to the next lower multiple of 0.01. If player i however places
a selling order over si units of the asset and if that order is satisfied completely,
the buying market maker will receive si units of the asset and give sip
b units of
the numeraire to player i. Player i keeps si · (1 − τ)p
b units of the numeraire and
transfers siτp
b units of the numeraire to the global tax account. The units of the
numeraire paid as tax is not available to the players any more, neither is it included
in the payoffs of the players. Pricing and order constraints adjust accordingly.
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4.3 On the Game-Theoretic Nature of the Model
This section discusses the model from a game-theoretic point of view. The market
model has the structure of an extensive game with an upper bound for the length
of play but with a continuum of choices at almost every information set. First,
some definitions and notations are introduced for such games. Only pure strategies
will be considered here. Therefore, the word “strategy” will always refer to a pure
strategy. We think of the players as numbered from 1 to n. A strategy of player
i is a function which assigns to every information of this player a choice of this
information set. For i = 1, ..., n let Λi be the set of all strategies of player i. A
strategy combination or shortly a combination
(4.4) λ = (λ1, ..., λn)
is a vector with λi ∈ Λi for i = 1, ..., n. The set of all combinations is denoted by
Λ. Since we look at games without random choices only, every combination λ ∈ Λ
determines a unique endpoint and a payoff Hi(λ) at this endpoint for every player
i with i = 1, ..., n. We use the notation H(λ) for the vector of these payoffs
(4.5) H(λ) =
(
H1(λ), ..., Hn(λ)
)
We refer to H(λ) as the payoff vector of λ. The total payoff K(λ) for λ is the sum
of all Hi(λ):
(4.6) K(λ) =
n∑
i=1
Hi(λ)
The maximal total payoff is defined as
(4.7) K = max
λ∈Λ
K(λ)
In games of the kind considered here a maximal total payoff may not exist, but this
difficulty does not occur in the case considered here. An i-incomplete combination
λ−i results from a combination λ by taking out player i’s strategy:
(4.8) λ−i = (λ1, ..., λi−1, λi+1, ..., λn)
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The set of all i-incomplete combinations is denoted by Λ−i. Consider a strategy
λi ∈ Λi of player i and an i-incomplete combination ε−i ∈ Λ−i. Let ρ be the
combination in which player i uses λi and the other players play their strategies in
ε−i. We use the notation
(4.9) ρ = λiε−i
in order to express the relationship between ρ on one side and λi and ε−i on the
other side. The security level si(λi) of a strategy λi ∈ Λi is defined as follows:
(4.10) si(λi) = min
ε−i∈Λ−i
Hi(λiε−i) for λi ∈ Λi and i = 1, ..., n
The security level of player i is the maximum of si(λi) over λi ∈ Λi:
(4.11) Si = max
λi∈Λi
si(λi) for i = 1, ..., n
In general si(λ) and Si do not necessarily exist, but this difficulty does not occur
for the market model investigated here. An equilibrium is a strategy combination
(4.12) λ∗ = (λ∗1, ..., λ
∗
n)
such that for i = 1, ..., n we have
(4.13) Hi(λ
∗) ≥ Hi(λiλ
∗
−i) for every λi ∈ Λi
Here λ∗−i is the i-incomplete combination formed by the strategies λ
∗
j in λ
∗ of the
other players j with j 6= i.
All basic game-theoretic definitions and notations used in this chapter have now
been introduced. We continue with some additional definitions and notations relat-
ing to the particular market model investigated here. The fundamental value φ(t)
of one unit of the asset at the beginning of period t is defined as follows:
(4.14) φ(t) = c+ (T − t)µ
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Figure 4.1: The fundamental value φ(t) as a function of time
Here c is the final money value of the unit at T and µ is the dividend obtained per
period. Figure 4.1 displays the fundamental value as a function of time.
Letmi(t) the money holdings and xi(t) the asset holdings of player i at the beginning
of period T . The sum of all xi(t) does not change over time and is denoted by x.
Trade changes the distribution of asset holdings but not x. The sum of all mi(t) is
denoted by m(t). In view of dividends and possibly transaction costs m(t) is not
constant. We refer to
(4.15) Φi(t) = mi(t) + xi(t)φ(t)
as the fundamental value of player i’s holdings at the beginning of period t. The
sum of all Φi(t) is denoted by Φ(t). The maximum prices p¯a and p¯b are sufficiently
high in the sense that each of them is greater than m(1).
We now describe a type of strategies called “passive”. Independently of the prior
history of the play, in step 1 of a period t a passive strategy of a player i always
selects the same ask price
(4.16) pai (t) > φ(t)
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and the same bid price
(4.17) (1 + τ)pbi(t) < φ(t)
If in the second step of a period t a player with a passive strategy is neither a
buying market maker nor a selling market maker, she neither buys or sells anything.
Of course, different passive strategies may specify different ask and bid prices, but
the inequalities for pai (t) and p
b
i(t) must be always satisfied. This completes the
description of a passive strategy.
Before the statement of a proposition which summarises the game theoretic
properties of the model, we want to show that the set Na of players with positive
numeraire holdings and the set N b of players with positive asset holdings never
can be empty. Let us first look at Na. The total number x of asset units is
positive and therefore at least one player must hold a positive number of asset
units. Consequently Na may change over time but never becomes empty. The total
amount of the numeraire also remains constant in the case of a zero transaction tax.
If the transaction tax is positive, then part of the total amount of the numeraire
flows to the global tax account if transactions take place, but not everything and
the total amount of the numeraire at the beginning of the next period will also be
positive. It follows that always at least one player must hold a positive amount of
the numeraire and N b never becomes empty.
The game theoretic properties of the model can now be summarised by the following
proposition.
Proposition: The extensive game generated by the model has the following prop-
erties:
(a) Regardless of the strategy combination used, for t = 1, ..., T − 1 we have
m(t+ 1) ≤ m(t) + µx
xφ(t+ 1) = xφ(t)− µx
Φ(t+ 1) ≤ Φ(t)
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(b) The maximal total payoff is
K = Φ(1)
(c) If λi is a passive strategy of player i, then
Hi(λiε−i) ≥ Φi(1) for every ε−i ∈ Λ−i
(d) The security levels Si exist and we have
Si = Φi(1) for i = 1, ..., n
(e) Every equilibrium λ∗ has the payoffs
Hi(λ
∗) = Si for i = 1, ..., n
Proof: We prove the assertions (a) to (e) in this order.
Proof of (a): At the end of period t all asset owners together receive dividend
payment of µx. If there are no transaction costs then m(t+ 1) is equal to the right
hand side of the first inequality. The same is true in the presence of transaction
costs, if nothing is bought or sold in period t. If there are transaction costs and
assets are traded in period t, then m(t + 1) is smaller than the right hand side of
the first inequality.
The definition of φ(t) yields
(4.18) φ(t+ 1) = φ(t)− µ for t = 1, ..., T − 1
This yields the equation for xφ(t + 1). The inequality for Φ(t + 1) then follows by
the first two relationships.
Remark: Note that we also have shown that the inequalities in (a) hold with “=”
instead of “≤” if in period t no assets are bought or sold or in the case of zero
transaction costs.
Proof of (b): A simple induction argument based on the inequality for Φ(t + 1)
in (a) shows that we must have Φ(T ) ≤ Φ(1). This means that the maximal total
payoff Φ(T ) can be at most Φ(1). It remains to show that this total payoff is actually
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attainable. For this purpose it is sufficient to look at a combination in which the
strategies of all players are passive. If this is the case, assets are neither bought
nor sold during the resulting play. It follows by the remark at the end of the proof
of (a) that Φ(t + 1) = Φ(t) holds for t = 1, ..., T − 1 during this play and that
therefore Φ(T ) = Φ(1) is the consequence of a simple induction argument. This
yields K = Φ(1).
Proof of (c): Player i does not sell or buy the asset unless she is a buying market
maker or a selling market maker. Suppose that in period t with t = 1, ..., T − 1
player i is a buying market maker. If she sells yi(t) units of the asset with yi(t) > 0
in period t then her asset holdings at the beginning of period t+ 1 will be
(4.19) xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)− yi(t)
The fundamental value of these asset holdings is equal to
(4.20) xi(t+ 1)φ(t+ 1) =
(
xi(t)− yi(t)
)(
φ(t)− µ
)
or equivalently
(4.21) xi(t+ 1)φ(t+ 1) = xi(t)φ(t)− yi(t)φ(t)− µ
(
xi(t)− yi(t)
)
Her money holdings at the beginning of period t are as follows:
(4.22) mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) + yi(t)p
a
i (t) +
(
xi(t)− yi(t)
)
µ
The second term is the sales value of yi(t) and the third one is due to the dividends
obtained for what not has been sold at the end of period t. The preceding two
equations yield:
Φi(t+ 1) = xi(t+ 1)φ(t+ 1) +mi(t+ 1)(4.23)
Φi(t+ 1) = xi(t+ 1)φ(t) + yi(t)
(
pai (t)− φ(t)
)
+mi(t)(4.24)
In view of pai (t) > φ(t) and yi(t) > 0 we can conclude
(4.25) Φi(t+ 1) > mi(t) + xi(t)φ(t) = Φi(t)
The fundamental value of player i’s holdings increases from period t to period t+1 if
she sells a positive amount of assets in period t. A similar argument can be applied
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to the case that player i is a selling market maker in a period t = 1, ..., T − 1 and
buys a positive amount zi(t) of assets at her bid price p
b(t). We obtain:
(4.26) Φi(t+ 1) = xi(t)φ(t) + zi(t)
(
φ(t)− pb(t)
)
+mi(t)
In view of (1 + τ)pbi(t) < φ(t) and zi(t) > 0 this yields
(4.27) Φi(t+ 1) > Φi(t)
Of course, player i may never buy or sell anything in the role of a market maker.
However, in any case player i’s passive strategy makes sure that the fundamental
value of her holdings never decreases. We have
(4.28) Φi(t+ 1) ≥ Φi(t) for t = 1, ..., T − 1
A simple induction argument leads to
(4.29) Φi(T ) ≥ Φi(1)
This completes the proof of assertion (c).
Proof of (d): Let λi be a passive strategy of player i. In view of (d) player i’s
payoff is at least Φi(1). Let ε−i be an i-incomplete combination of passive strategies
for all players j with j 6= i. In ρ = λiε−i all players use passive strategies. Therefore
never any assets are bought and sold if ρ is played. In view of the remark after the
proof of (a) we can conclude that we have Hi(ρ) = Φi(1). It follows by (d) that a
security level exists for a passive strategy λi and that it has the value
(4.30) si(λi) = Φi(1)
In view of (b) no strategy λi can yield a higher payoff than Φi(1) against an i-
incomplete combination of passive strategies ε−i for all players j 6= i since Hj(ρ
′) ≥
Φj(1) holds for each of them by (d) and this leaves at most Φi(1) for player i. It
follows that the security level Si of a player i exists and that
(4.31) Si = Φi(1)
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holds as asserted by (d).
Proof of (e): Let λ∗ be an equilibrium. Assume that for one player i we have
(4.32) Hi(λ
∗) < Si
It follows by (c) and (d) that this player can obtain a payoff of at least Si against
the equilibrium strategies of the other players. Therefore
(4.33) Hi(λ
∗) ≥ Si
must hold for i = 1, ..., n. In view of (b) and (d) the sum of all Hi(λ
∗) is smaller
than or equal to the sum of all Si. Consequently we must have
(4.34) Hi(λ
∗) = Si for i = 1, ..., n
as asserted by (e).
Remark: A passive strategy λi achieves at least player i’s security level Si, but it
is weakly dominated in the sense that player i has another strategy γi with
Hi(γiε−i) ≥ Hi(λiε−i) for all ε−i ∈ Λ−i and
Hi(γiε−i) > Hi(λiε−i) for at least one ε−i ∈ Λ−i
The dominating strategy γi deviates from λi by exploiting mistakes of other players
who become market makers. The strategy γi spends all the money holdings for
buying at pa(t) < φ(t) or sells all asset holdings at pb(t) > φ(t), if the opportunity
arises. However, as we have seen, (e) holds for all equilibria, regardless of whether
some or all equilibrium strategies are weakly dominated or not. The equilibrium
payoff of a player always is his security level.
4.4 Results of a Behavioural Experiment
The model introduced in section 4.2 was designed to suit the purpose of running
experiments based on it and to find a game-theoretic solution as a benchmark. This
permits to derive an experimental market to investigate behavioural aspects of the
impact of a Tobin tax. In the following, the proceedings for the experiment are
described together with the experimental results.
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4.4.1 Experimental Setup and Procedures
Experiments have been conducted as computer-based laboratory experiments under
controlled conditions. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree3. Operational details on the experimental software and the course
of the experimental sessions are given in this subsection. Some screenshots of the
experimental software can be found in appendix C.3. The model was calibrated
with the parameters described in table 4.1.
6 sessions of the untaxed model variant and 6 sessions of the taxed one have been
conducted. In the latter case, a constant tax rate was imposed on the market as
described in table 4.2. No participant was allowed to take part in the experiment
more than once, so statistical independence is given across treatments and across
sessions. A total of 96 subjects took part in the experiment with 8 in one session.
All except three of the experimental participants were students4 of the University
of Bonn, Germany. Two participants were employees, and one of them was a senior
in a local high school. The experimental sessions were run at the Laboratory for
Experimental Economics in Bonn in July 2006. One session lasted approximately
2 hours. In the beginning of each session, written instructions were handed out
to the participants (confer appendix E for an English translation of the German
instructions). These instructions were then read aloud to the experimental subjects.
After some example calculations and test questions, the session was started. When
the session was finished, the subjects received their converted payoffs (e0.01 for
each unit of the numeraire held after converting their assets to the numeraire at
a fixed rate of c = 1). The average payoff was e12 (approx. US$ 15.38 at the
time of the experiments) in untaxed sessions and e11.89 (US$ 15.23) in taxed
ones. Each subject was given a show-up fee of e4, which is excluded from the
3cf. Fischbacher (2007)
4Their majors included pharmacology, economics, languages, translation, computer science, law,
ethnology, medicine, political sciences, social sciences, nutritional sciences, business adminis-
tration, slavistic sciences, anglistics, sinology, North-American studies, history of art, physics,
mathematics, communication sciences, and regional sciences.
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beforehand mentioned amounts. After an experimental session had been conducted,
the subjects were asked to fill out an ex-post questionnaire.
Table 4.1: Parameter calibration
n = 8 T = 51
xi(1) = 500∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} mi(1) = 200∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
µ = 0.05 s = d = 25
c = 1 pa = pb = 10000
Each round of the experiment was identical. First, every player had to state
his individual bid and ask prices. He could always see a list of his own and the
market’s bid and ask prices and average prices of all past periods, his holdings of
both numeraire and asset, the dividend received, and his past transactions. After
every player had stated his respective bid and ask price, the market prices were
determined as described in subsection 4.2.2 and shown to the players. Players who
neither were a selling nor a buying market maker could then decide whether they
wanted to engage in trade. If a player wished to initiate a transaction, he had
to choose whether to place a buying or a selling order. The respective price (on
taxed markets, also the tax surcharge) appeared on the screen. The player then
could enter the amount of units of the asset that he wanted to buy or sell. When
all orders had been collected, they were carried out as far as possible. His new
holdings, the change in the holdings, and in taxed markets also the height of the
paid taxes were shown to him at the end of the period. Then the round was over
and the next round started.
In the following subsections, the experimental results are presented. A descriptive
overview of the data can be found in table C.5 in the appendix.
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Table 4.2: Taxation over sessions
treatment untaxed taxed
session 1-6 7 8 9 10 11 12
tax rate (in %) 0 0.5 1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3
4.4.2 Trade Volume and Turnover
The game-theoretical solution shows that the trade volume, that is, the total
number of assets traded on one market, could have an arbitrary size in untaxed
markets but should be zero in taxed ones in equilibrium. The same holds true for
the turnover, which is defined as the total transferred money in exchange for the
asset on one market. The experimental study of Hanke et al. (2006) comes to the
same conclusion. They show that the influence of a transaction tax on the trade
volume of a market is a negative one, especially when there are no tax havens.
Considering these facts, the Tobin tax is likely to reduce both trade volume and
turnover in the experiment described here.
Looking at the aggregate trading volume of each taxed and untaxed market, it is
evident that the opposite holds true for the averages which are displayed in table
4.3 for both types of markets. Unfortunately, the discrepancy in averages is not
substantiated by non-parametric tests.
Table 4.3: Trade volume in untaxed and taxed markets
market mean volume std. dev. min. max.
untaxed 2196.667 402.1043 1681 2759
taxed 2450.833 378.0314 1978 2948
The correlation of the tax rate with the trade volume makes it safe to deduct that
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a higher tax rate leads to a decreased trade volume per session: Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient5 has the low value of ρ = −.8857 at a two-tailed significance
level of p = 0.0189. We consider this finding as a first hint that a low tax may do
no harm to the volume of the asset traded on the market, and that a high tax may
cause the volume to decrease.
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Figure 4.2: Trade volume and tax rate
An OLS regression analysis unveils more details about the interdependency between
tax rate and trade volume. Consider the simple regressional model
(4.35) vi = β0 + β1τi + εi
where vi is the session average of the total observed trade volume for market i, τi
the tax rate for market i, εi the error term for market i and βk the coefficients
to match for all k ∈ {0, 1}. Only taxed markets are regarded for the sake of
comparability. Details of the analysis can be found in table C.3 in the appendix.
The fitted curve and a 95% confidence interval are displayed in figure 4.2. The
goodness-of-fit of R2 = 0.7589 suggests at a significance level of p = 0.0238 that a
linear influence of the tax rate on trading volume exists. A positive β0 = 3066.93
and a negative β1 = −35205.71 for the tax rate are estimated by an OLS analysis.
5Note that all econometric methods have been applied to session aggregates
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Nevertheless, the argumentative power of these coefficients is weak for financial
markets in practice. The author shares the opinion of List and Levitt (2005),
who compare the role of laboratory experiments to economists with the role of
the wind tunnel to aerodynamicists: One can use the results to gain qualitative
insights into treatment effects and possible underlying mechanisms that could be
causing the occurrence of certain data patterns. However, it is not adequate to
extrapolate quantitative laboratory results to markets outside the lab. Thus, it
seems inappropriate to compare the regressional coefficients with existing foreign
exchange, goods, or asset markets and limit our deductions to the following: A
negative relatedness between tax rate and trade volume seems to be likely in the
experiments with our model.
Table 4.4: Trade turnover in taxed and untaxed markets
market mean turnover std. dev. min. max.
untaxed 4680.155 875.059 3778.99 6075.55
taxed 4713.416 1045.566 3110.53 6144.58
Is there a similar relatedness for the trade turnover, that is, for the units of the
numeraire transferred on the markets? Summary statistics on this figure are
displayed in table 4.4. It seems likely that trade turnover is lower in untaxed
treatments and that the tax rate has a negative influence on it. Astonishingly,
there is no statistically significant evidence for a difference between taxed and
untaxed markets: A Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples
cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference in trade turnover between treatments
(p = 0.95021, two-tailed). Another indicator for no significant difference in trade
turnover between treatments is the existence of three markets with a turnover
below and three markets with one above average in both types of markets, that
is, the exact binomial confidence intervals are identical at any level of confidence.
A correlation analysis of tax rate and trade turnover reveals no significant tie
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between tax rate and turnover (Spearman’s ρ = −0.3143, p = 0.5441 two-tailed).
No significant influence of the tax rate on trade turnover can be found, and neither
does the mere existence of a tax influence the trade turnover.
It can be concluded that the tax rate has a significant negative influence on trade
volume. There is no significant likewise difference between taxed and untaxed mar-
kets in regard to trade volume. Interestingly enough, a similar correlation between
trade turnover and the tax rate can not be found – au contraire: there is some
evidence that neither the height of the tax rate nor a tax as such influences the
trade turnover.
4.4.3 Supply and Demand
How does a tax influence the behaviour of the market participants in respect to
supply and demand? The number of traders demanding or supplying units of the
asset is one measure to investigate this effect. In game-theoretical equilibrium,
neither supply nor demand should be quoted in taxed markets because the traders
who supply or demand the asset have to pay the tax. On untaxed markets, there
could be an arbitrary number of supplying and demanding traders in equilibrium.
Astonishingly, traders behave differently: on average, the number of market
participants who supply units of the asset is higher in taxed markets. This effect is
significant at p = 0.0886 (Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples,
two-tailed – summary statistics are shown in table 4.5). This does not hold true
for the number of traders stating a demand.
Table 4.5: Average number of supplying traders in taxed and untaxed markets
market mean #s. std. dev. min. max.
untaxed 1.470588 1.379677 0 6
taxed 1.800654 1.417781 0 6
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The total supply of assets per market is also lower on untaxed markets than on
taxed ones, unfortunately only weakly significant (p = 0.1006 one-tailed). This
does not hold true for the demand. Nevertheless, the total demand for the asset
is correlated negatively with the tax rate (Spearman’s ρ = −0.8286, p = 0.0414
two-tailed). A significant correlation can not be observed for tax rate and total
supply.
Besides the antagonism between observed and predicted behaviour, it seems
irritating that both supply and the number of suppliers are higher in taxed markets
while neither the total demand nor the number of demanding players is affected.
A possible explanation for this boundedly rational behaviour could be that under
the prevalence of transaction costs, traders prefer to keep their holdings in the
numeraire rather than in the asset. The decline of the total demand for the asset
observed with an increasing tax rate gives further circumstantial evidence for this
behaviour. In the next paragraphs, further findings are presented in order to
substantiate this hypothesis.
Traders accept facing losses by supplying units of the asset at a price lower than the
fundamental value. These losses can be seen as opportunity costs for receiving the
numeraire in the actual period t instead of receiving a regular dividend payment in
every period between t and T and, after the final round T , the units of the asset
converted to units of the numeraire. The opportunity cost factor for one supplied
unit sold to the buying market maker is defined as
(4.36) ωS = max
{
φ(t)− pb, 0
}
in the control treatment. This factor has to be corrected for taxes in the Tobin
treatment, so the opportunity cost factor for one supplied unit
(4.37) ωS = max
{
φ(t)− pb (1− τ) , 0
}
in taxed markets. Analogously, the opportunity cost factors for one demanded unit
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offered by the selling market maker is defined as
(4.38) ωD = max {pa − φ(t), 0}
in the control treatment and
(4.39) ωD = max {pa (1 + τ)− φ(t), 0}
in taxed markets. These opportunity cost factors are suited to calculate the total
costs all traders in one market accept by supplying units of the asset. The total
opportunity costs ΩS for supplying units of the asset are equal to the sum of every
period’s ωS, whereas the total opportunity costs ΩD for demanding units of the
asset are equal to the sum of every period’s ωD. The total opportunity costs per
market are displayed in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Total accepted opportunity costs per market (markets 1-6: untaxed,
market 7-12: 0.5 to 3.0 % tax)
Some weak evidence that the total accepted opportunity costs for supplying
units of the assets under value are higher in taxed markets than in untaxed ones
(Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples, p = 0.12229) is found.
Such differences can however not be found for opportunity costs for demanding
units of the asset. The accepted opportunity costs for supplying units of the asset
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under its fundamental value are higher than the respective demand opportunity
cost (p = 0.0092, two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates).
The behaviour of the experimental subjects in supplying and demanding units
of the asset has two seemingly boundedly rational components: a) the accepted
opportunity costs for supplying units of the asset under value are significantly
higher than the accepted opportunity costs for demanding units of the asset over
value, and b) the accepted opportunity costs for supplying units of the asset under
value are higher in taxed markets. The latter effect cannot be confirmed for the
demand opportunity costs. What is observed here seems to be a phenomenon
which could be explained by mental accounting. Firstly coined by Thaler (1980),
mental accounting describes that people group their assets into non-fungible mental
accounts. In a later work, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) apply this theory to derive the
behavioural life cycle hypothesis, which basically states that assets are divided into
current income, current wealth, and future income. According to the authors, the
accounts are widely non-fungible and people hold different marginal propensities
to consume for each of these accounts. This could be a plausible explanation for
the propensity of the subjects to accept costs for receiving units of the numeraire
in exchange for units of the asset at the current period instead of getting the
numeraire for the asset free of cost in a later period.
Another concept well-known in behavioural finance, hyperbolic discounting, was
firstly observed by Chung and Herrnstein (1967) using pigeons; later on it was
reproduced in experiments with human subjects. Hyperbolic discounting describes
the phenomenon that preferences sometimes are dynamically inconsistent: people
tend to prefer smaller payoffs to larger payoffs when smaller payoffs are received
sooner in time. Not only is the behaviour of the experimental subjects described
by this concept; a Tobin tax even increases this propensity: For receiving cash in
exchange for the asset, people accept higher opportunity costs in taxed markets.
This finding must not be exaggerated – the statistical evidence is only weak and
a correlation between tax rate and accepted opportunity costs is not significant.
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Nevertheless, this effect of a Tobin transactions tax on hyperbolic discounting should
be taken into account in ongoing studies.
4.4.4 Market Prices
With a significant negative influence of the tax rate on the number of assets
traded and no significant influence on the number of numeraires traded, one might
suspect that prices might increase significantly with the tax height. As a price
measure for one session, we define the average mid point between market bid and
market ask price as the average price p¯. Furthergoing remarks on prices are based
on it. Summary statistics on the average market price are displayed in figure
4.6. Although there is no significant evidence of increasing prices with increasing
taxes (Spearman’s ρ = 0.4286, p = 0.3968 two-tailed), it can be found that the
average market price is higher in untaxed markets. This effect is weakly significant
(Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples, p = 0.1060).
Table 4.6: Average market prices and fundamentals in taxed and untaxed markets
market mean p¯ std. dev. min. max.
untaxed 2.827533 1.614946 2.02598 6.10853
taxed 1.994837 .4289407 1.518824 2.77549
Market prices per period of one exemplary taxed and untaxed market each are
shown in figure 4.4.
The data on market prices reveal that in most untaxed markets, there are players
which state extremely high bid prices at some time. We have no explanation for
this behaviour. A situation like this occurred at least once in each untaxed session.
It might be the case that some of the players tried to influence following pricing
decisions of the other players by stating high bid prices. Since there is no evidence
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Figure 4.4: Prices per period in untaxed and taxed markets
for this motivation, this explanation is mere speculation. Nevertheless, some of the
market prices were extremely high in taxed markets too, though a situation like
the one described previously occurred less often.
Eliminating scattered outlier prices by comparing the medians of the market prices
instead of the mean, there is no significant difference between taxed and untaxed
markets. This is also predicted by the game-theoretical solution of the model.
If one compares the equilibrium median bid and ask prices (both at 2.25), it is
significant that both median bid (p = 0.0053, Fisher-Pitman permutation test for
paired replicates, two-tailed) and median ask prices (p = 0.0058) are below it. The
market median of the bid-ask spread ∆pt = pt,a − pt,b is zero in one market and
positive in all other markets. Non-negative bid-ask spreads are rational in the
model, too.
Concluding the findings on market prices, no significant differences in medians across
treatments can be found. There are more outliers in untaxed markets. Nevertheless,
the median bid-ask spreads are non-negative like on existing financial and asset
markets.
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4.4.5 Volatility
James Tobin, the inventor of the tax that soon was named after him, thought
of two primary goals to achieve with his instrument: First, to lower financial
volatility in the currency market; second, to raise funds that could be dedicated
to multilateral purposes (see Tobin 1996b). In this subsection, the impact of a
transaction tax on price volatility on the market model is assessed. Therefore, an
adequate volatility measure for the model is needed. One measure which increases
monotonically with an increasing variability of bid and ask price is the sum of the
standard deviations or variances of both prices in one session. Since the variance
measures the average squared distance of the observed values to its mean and since
both prices have a monotonic decreasing fundamental value, the use of this simple
volatility measure seems inappropriate: The variance measures absolute differences
of the actual price to the average of all prices where relative changes between all
consecutive prices appear more adequate.
Let X = {X1, X2, ..., XT} be a time series of arbitrary positive values. Wishing
to obtain a measure for X which increases with increasing distances between all
observations, one could sum up the squared absolute value of the percentage change
of X in two consecutive periods i and j:
(4.40) δ(Xi, Xj) =
(
Xj
Xi
− 1
)2
To address the issue that an increase of Xi = X˙ to Xj = X¨ will result in a different
value for δ(Xi, Xj) than a decrease of Xi = X¨ to Xj = X˙ (for X˙ < X¨ and j = i+1),
a symmetrised measure
(4.41) δsym(Xi, Xj) =
(
Xi
Xj
+
Xj
Xi
− 2
)2
is introduced which quantifies a positive change of X to the same extent like a
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negative one. Thus, a volatility measure for X is:
υ(X) =
T∑
t=2
δsym(Xt−1, Xt)(4.42)
=
T∑
t=2
(
Xt
Xt−1
+
Xt−1
Xt
− 2
)2
(4.43)
Since both bid and ask price are finite and positive per definitionem, it is safe to
utilise υ for evaluating volatility of both prices in our experiment. Hence, the sum of
υ(pa) and υ(pb) is used as a means to quantify the price volatility of an experimental
session (note that in the following an index t of all variables denotes its value in
period t):
(4.44) υ =
T∑
t=2
[(
pat−1
pat
+
pat
pat−1
− 2
)2
+
(
pbt−1
pbt
+
pbt
pbt−1
− 2
)2]
In equilibrium, volatility in taxed markets should be the same as on untaxed ones.
The equilibrium market volatility υeq can be derived by replacing the market bid
and ask prices in (4.44) with the fundamental value φ(t) from equation (4.14):
υeq = 2
T∑
t=2
(
φ(t− 1)
φ(t)
+
φ(t)
φ(t− 1)
− 2
)2
(4.45)
= 2
T∑
t=2
(
c+ (T − t+ 1)µ
c+ (T − t)µ
+
c+ (T − t)µ
c+ (T − t+ 1)µ
− 2
)2
(4.46)
= 2µ4
T∑
t=2
1
φ(t)2φ(t− 1)2
(4.47)
Considering the parameter calibration used, the equilibrium market volatility equals
υeq = 8.13489 ·10
−5. If this benchmark is compared with the data gathered through
the experiments, it can be deducted that a volatility value as low as the equilibrium
market volatility is achieved neither in markets with nor in markets without a Tobin
tax. The lowest volatility measured is 2.7784 · 10−3 in a taxed market and 27.112
in an untaxed one, with a theoretically possible minimum of 0 in both market types.
As mentioned before, the Tobin tax should have no influence on the variability of
prices in equilibrium. Does this apply to the experimental markets? Surprisingly
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enough, no. The price volatility in untaxed markets is always higher than in taxed
ones (significant at p = 0.0021, Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent
samples, two-tailed). Besides this strong result, the price volatility is even
considerably higher on untaxed markets (see table 4.7).
Table 4.7: Price volatility in untaxed and taxed markets
market mean υ std. dev. min. max.
untaxed 31933.36 49416.59 27.112 103220.835
taxed 6.05 10.72 .002 26.933
If all players behaved fully rational, the volatility would be equal for markets with
and without a Tobin tax. However, this is not the case in the experiments. The only
explanation for this seemingly erratic behaviour can be the bounded rationality of
the market participants. The next research question is to find any correlation be-
tween the tax rate and the volatility. At a first glance, there is no visible correlation
between the tax rate and the market’s price volatility: Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient for both measures has a non-significant value (ρ = 0.4286, p = 0.3964,
two-tailed). Figure 4.5 shows the price volatility for markets with different tax rates.
Taking a closer look at this figure, something irritating attracts attention: The
volatility decreases with an increasing tax, but only for tax rates below 2.5%. A
tax rate of 2.5% and higher induces a drastically increased price volatility. The
lack of a broader base of experimental data makes it too early to conclude that
there exists a point below which a higher tax rate is correlated with lower volatility
and above which a higher tax rate is correlated with higher volatility, but one can
see this hint as a starting point for furthergoing investigations.
Summarising the findings concerning the influence of a tax and the tax rate on
volatility, one can say that Tobin’s approach of a transaction tax in fact does reduce
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Figure 4.5: Market volatility and tax rate
price volatility in the markets. This effect is highly significant, albeit neither a
libertarian nor a taxed market achieves equilibrium volatility or no volatility at all.
Some hints are discovered that a higher tax rate reduces volatility only if kept below
a certain threshold: if the tax rate exceeds 2%, the volatility grows. This last point
cannot be regarded as finally confirmed – lots of more experiments would have to
be conducted ahead of concluding such thing. It is not the aim of this study to
calibrate an optimal tax rate for a market setting like the one used, but to find
differences in the traders’ behaviour on taxed and untaxed markets and to explore
reasons for the observed effects.
4.4.6 Market Efficiency
The concept of market efficiency is a prominent one in the field of finance. In
a literature survey, Dimson and Mussavian (2000) provide the reader with a
discussion of arguments in favour of and against the efficient market hypothesis,
which asserts that information that is known to all market participants is reflected
in the market’s prices. The model used in this study features a fundamental value
which is known to all market participants, so testing the experimental results in
regard to market efficiency seems eligible. The idea of comparing the efficiency of
a libertarian market with the efficiency of a market with a Tobin transaction tax
is not new: the pioneering experimental investigation of Hanke et al. (2006) takes
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a closer look at this aspect. Their results suggest that market efficiency decreases
if a Tobin tax is introduced in a market. In this subsection, the impact of taxation
on market efficiency in the used market model is evaluated.
In this context, market efficiency measures in how far information that is known
to all market participants (that is, the rules of the game, which are public in-
formation) are reflected in the market’s prices (that is, to what extent the prices
differ from the fundamental value)6 The measure for market efficiency is based on
the volatility measure defined in subsection 4.4.5. Instead of measuring the sym-
metrised squared percentage change of the market price between two periods, the
symmetrised squared percentage deviation of the market price from the fundamental
value in the same period is calculated:
(4.48) η =
n∑
t=1
[(
φ(t)
pat
+
pat
φ(t)
− 2
)2
+
(
φ(t)
pbt
+
pbt
φ(t)
− 2
)2]
A session with a perfectly efficient market would result in η = 0 – with decreas-
ing efficiency, η increases strictly monotonic; so η literally displays the market
inefficiency. If all players acted fully rational and knew that all other players
acted fully rational, too, the market would be perfectly rational according to the
game-theoretical equilibrium. How do the markets in the experiment behave in
respect to inefficiency and the equilibrium inefficiency of ηeq = 0?
In the experiment, the untaxed markets display a higher η and thus a lower efficiency
than the taxed ones. This effect is significant at p = 0.0042 (Fisher-Pitman permu-
tation test for independent samples, two-tailed). A closer look at the descriptive
statistics of the market inefficiency reveals an even more striking result (cf. table
4.8): the mean market inefficiency is higher by more than 7·104 in untaxed markets.
6In the field of experimental economics, efficiency describes how much lower the total payoff is
compared to the maximum possible payoff. Since untaxed markets are constant sum games,
this measure would be zero for every untaxed sessions.
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Figure 4.6: Market inefficiency and tax rate
Table 4.8: Market inefficiency in untaxed and taxed markets
market mean η std. dev. min. max.
untaxed 61163.66 131093.80 17.11 326777.70
taxed 8.73 5.07 2.65 17.00
So far, it appears that imposing a tax on the market decreases market inefficiency
to a great extent. Although Hanke et al. (2006) find the opposite in their article,
this is only seemingly a contradiction: On one hand, they use a different auction as
a market vehicle for their investigation. Different auctions also react differently to
changes in the parameters. On the other hand, their article focuses on evadability
by allowing traders to switch to a second untaxed market.
How does the height of the tax rate influence a market’s inefficiency? It is evident
that the height of the imposed tax has in fact a positive influence on the market
inefficiency: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for the tax rate and a market’s
inefficiency η has the significant value of ρ = 0.8286 (p = 0.0832, two-tailed).
Figure 4.6 displays market inefficiencies for differently taxed markets.
This finding sheds a new light on the influence of transaction costs on the efficiency of
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the markets. Although the introduction of a tax decreases inefficiency significantly,
this effect is weaker with a growing tax. We assume that inefficiency might even
be higher in taxed markets than in untaxed ones if the tax rate exceeds a certain
value, because under the highest tax rate evaluated in this experiment (3.0%), η is
only 0.6% lower than the lowest observed η in an untaxed market. It seems that a
small tax decreases market inefficiency per se, but that a considerably high tax rate
causes the market participants to act even less rational than on untaxed markets.
4.4.7 Fiscal Revenues
In the frequently occurring political discussions, Tobin’s stabilisation approach is
often regarded as a means to levy taxes and thus as a potential source of vast
fiscal revenues. Many studies claim that if tax escape routes tax existed, actual
tax revenues would be far below the expected. Experimental evidence on that
hypothesis is given by Hanke et al. (2006). Neither is our model appropriate nor is
it our goal to investigate the effect of evadability. If the possibility of tax evasion
did not exist, there is still more to be taken into account: A higher tax rate might
influence the trade turnover negatively. It is of crucial importance to estimate
elasticity parameters of trade turnover in regard to the tax rate before concluding
anything about the height of fiscal revenues. Since the market setting chosen does
not provide the market participants with a possibility to evade the tax, the trade
of the asset must take place under the transaction costs imposed. Nevertheless,
the existence of transaction costs might decrease the trade turnover to an extent
that fiscal revenues rather decline than increase with an increasing tax rate. In
game-theoretical equilibrium, no tax revenues are raised at any tax rate because
no trade takes place at all if the tax rate is greater than zero and no tax is raised
at a tax rate of zero.
This predicted outcome cannot be observed in the experiment. Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient of a market’s fiscal revenues and the tax rate equals ρ = 0.8857
(significant at p = .0376, two-tailed). This considerably high value suggests that
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there indeed is a positive relatedness between tax rate and fiscal revenues. Again,
an OLS regression of the simple model
(4.49) Fi = β0 + β1τi + εi
is conducted where Fi is the total fiscal revenues from market i, τi the tax rate
for market i, εi the error term for market i and βk the coefficients to match for
all k ∈ {0, 1}. The regression analysis displays a high goodness-of-fit value of
R2 = 0.7637 (all estimation results and can be found in table C.4 in the appendix).
Actual values and the fitted curve with a confidence interval are shown in figure
4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Fiscal revenues and tax rate
Although the estimates feature a high goodness-of-fit value, it has to be emphasised
that the explanatory power of this regressional analysis is not too strong: six
observations are too few to claim that the fit is in fact conclusive. The regressional
result can be considered as another hint for linearly increasing fiscal revenues with
an increasing tax rate under our market setting, at least if the tax rate is kept
lower than or equal to 3%.
It is important to stress that this result must not be overinterpreted. As mentioned
already before, the setup doesn’t allow for traders to evade the tax. If such a
possibility was created, it would be likely that the fiscal revenues would decrease.
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However, even with no tax escape routes, increasing transaction costs might decrease
trade volume to an extent that diminishes the fiscal revenues. It has been shown
that one cannot observe a phenomenon as such with relatively low tax rates in the
markets, so this seems to be an important finding. Some authors, e. g. Felix and
Sau (1996) and Frankel (1996), work with relatively high elasticity parameters of the
fiscal revenues to the tax rate to assess the revenue potential of the Tobin tax and
come to the results that the tax raising authority might still collect a considerably
high amount of taxes even with small tax rates. If the elasticity was in fact smaller,
these tax amounts would even be much higher.
4.4.8 Earnings Inequality
The next question this study deals with is the distribution of payoffs among market
participants, an issue that has – to our knowledge – never been investigated before
in the context of a Tobin tax. Although this aspect is rather irrelevant from a
macroeconomic point of view, it is important to investigate it for the sake of market
microstructure.
In equilibrium, the market yields equal payoffs for every participant in either
treatment. However, this is not the case in any of the 12 markets. Moreover, there
has not even been a single experimental subject who received the equilibrium payoff
of e12.00. The next research question this study deals with is: Is there a tendency
in taxed markets to level out differences in the earnings of each participant?
To assess earnings inequality in the different treatments, a variety of inequality
measures have been applied: the Gini coefficient, Theil’s entropy as well as Theil’s
mean log deviation, the Kakwani, Piesch, and Mehran indices, the standard
deviation of logs, the coefficient of variation, and the relative mean deviation of
all player’s payoffs in all sessions have been calculated. Note that each measure
would be zero in equilibrium. Stunningly, earnings inequality is significantly lower
in taxed markets (cf. table C.2 in the appendix) – this holds true for all inequality
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measures but the Piesch index. Figure 4.8 displays the Lorenz curves of all payoffs
in equilibrium (bisecting line), taxed treatments (middle curve), and untaxed
treatments (lower curve).
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Figure 4.8: Lorenz curves for both treatments
How is earnings inequality correlated with the tax rate? Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient is negative for tax rate and all investigated measures of
inequality, although this effect is not significant (except the relative mean deviation:
ρ = −0.5001, p = 0.0978 for n = 12). This is only a weak indicator for a negative
influence of the tax rate on earnings inequality.
Summarising our findings on market inequality, it can be said that the payoffs of
the participants of a market with a Tobin transactions tax imposed are distributed
more equally among players than on untaxed markets.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the consequences of a Tobin tax on an asset market.
The situation in the beforehand derived game-theoretical equilibrium is compared
with the results gained by a series of laboratory experiments. This comparison
reveals that players act boundedly rational in regard to several aspects of the
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market. Firstly, an investigation of the trade turnover and trade volume yields
trade turnover stays uninfluenced by a tax, whereas the trade volume decreases
with the tax height. Contrary to that finding, both trade volume and turnover
could be of arbitrary height on untaxed markets but should be zero on taxed
ones in equilibrium. Regarding supply and demand, there should neither be
supply nor demand on taxed and supply and demand of arbitrary height on
untaxed markets in equilibrium. Astonishingly, the average number of suppliers
is higher in taxed markets. Furthermore, supplying traders accept higher op-
portunity costs for supplying units of the asset under value on taxed markets
than on untaxed ones. This can be seen as support for the theory that the
boundedly rationial behaviour of hyperbolic discounting is fortified by a Tobin tax.
Concerning market prices, it is evident that there are more outliers in untaxed
markets. The markets display non-negative median bid-ask spreads in every session.
In the experiments, neither zero nor equilibrium volatility is ever achieved. In
equilibrium, a tax should make no difference in volatility. Nevertheless, strong
volatility reducing effects of a Tobin tax can be observed: all taxed markets feature
a smaller volatility than all untaxed markets. There is no statistically significant
correlation between tax rate and volatility, although the results suggest that
volatility decreases with an increasing tax, but only to a certain tax height. A
growing tax rate above 2% increases the volatility drastically in the experiment,
albeit the statistical evidence is not strong enough to generally conclude this
point. The equilibrium market inefficiency is never achieved by the experimental
markets, although the observed inefficiency is significantly higher in untaxed
markets. Nevertheless, an increasing tax rate also increases market inefficiency.
The fiscal revenues collected by a Tobin tax increase with an increasing tax rate
in the experiment. This is not surprising, because the trade turnover does not
differ significantly with increasing taxes and only the trade volume decreases.
Furthermore, there is evidence that speaks out for a lower earnings inequality on
taxed markets.
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Concluding the results of this chapter, it has been demonstrated that a Tobin tax
in fact improves the situation with regard to volatility and market efficiency, but
only if the tax rate is kept at a low point: The best market performance can be
observed if there is a Tobin tax with a very low tax rate. Another point which
has to be emphasised is that the participants of the experiments have behaved
boundedly rational. Our study shows the crucial importance to take bounded
rationality into account when creating theories on how a Tobin tax might affect
markets. Finally, we want to stress that we investigate a simple experimental
asset market. There are some authors who claim that the foreign exchange market
behaves in fact like any arbitrary stock or asset market. We are convinced that this
is definitely not the case and that various factors like e. g. the interlinks between
foreign exchange and other markets and different motives to engage in trade forbid
to treat these markets equally.
Still, there is room left for future work. One could introduce the possibility of es-
caping the tax by creating another libertarian market. Furthermore, it would be
possible to investigate the trade behaviour if trading derivates like futures or swap
options were introduced. With respect to the fact that only roughly one third of
the daily global average foreign exchange trade turnover is traded via spot transac-
tions7 and that the original idea of James Tobin was to only tax spot transactions,
this could give further valuable insights into how markets react when such a tax is
introduced. Furthermore, one could investigate other financial stabilisation schemes
by the means of the laboratory. For example, Paul Spahn’s approach to a transac-
tion tax has never been evaluated in an experiment. Our investigation thus should
only be seen as a starting point for further behavioural and experimental studies of
stabilisation schemes.
7confer Galati et al. (2005, p. 5)
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“You gotta have a swine to show you where the truffles are.”
– Edward Albee (1962)
Since some of the econometric and statistical methods applied in this thesis are not
common ones in the field of experimental economics, they are briefly outlined in
this chapter. A slightly modified version of this chapter has been published in the
Stata Journal1.
5.1 The Virtues of Non-Parametric Testing
In behavioural sciences, frequently used statistical tools are regression analysis
and non-parametric tests like Spearman’s rank correlation, the McNemar change
test, the Fisher exact test, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance, the
Wilcoxon signed ranks test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test.
In contrast to parametric statistics, non-parametric approaches do not make
assumptions on distributions or parameters of distributions of the samples to be
investigated. There are many occasions when normality of the distribution of a
sample is implausible. First, it is generally considered to be adventurous to assume
normality of a sample when its size is relatively small – often, a sample size of
35 is regarded to be sufficient. Unfortunately, observations can be expensive in
1see Kaiser (2007)
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experimental economics2, sample sizes that large are often beyond the boundaries
of the budget. Second, decision variables in experimental economics are often
discrete and/or censored – two properties that are speaking against the use of
normal distributions. The third and probably most important argument against
the normality assumption is that the shape of the observed sample does often not
even come close to the shape of a normal distribution.
This chapter deals with two tests that can replace the two Wilcoxon tests if the
observations are given at least on an interval scale. These tests are known as
the Fisher-Pitman test for paired replicates and the Fisher-Pitman permutation
test for independent samples (see Fisher 1935 and Pitman 1937), also referred to
as randomisation tests. Why are the permutation tests more powerful than the
respective Wilcoxon test? Siegel and Castellan (1988) compare both Wilcoxon
and permutation tests with the appropriate parametric test. They find that the
asymptotic power efficiencies of both Wilcoxon signed-rank and ranksum tests
compared with the respective parametric t test are only 95.5%, whereas both
permutation tests display power efficiencies of 100.0%. With the exponential
decline of costs of computing power, permutation tests – or, resampling meth-
ods in general – enjoyed an increasing popularity. For example, Good (2002)
derives exact permutation tests for comparing slopes of two different regression lines.
In this chapter, two algorithms for the well-known permutation tests are outlined:
one for paired replicates, and one for two independent samples. Both algorithms
are complex in regard to sample size. Thus p-values are time-consuming to compute
even for moderate sample sizes. After I outline the exact algorithms, I show a
Monte Carlo simulation approach to approximate p-values. Monte Carlo methods
for permutation tests, firstly mentioned by Dwass (1957), can be useful if the
sample size grows to an extent that the time for the computation of exact p-values
grows to be too long. This asymptotic approach of determining p-values takes less
2For example, an observation of the experiment described in chapters 3 and 2 did cost between
1200 and 1800 Euro.
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time, but the p-values determined are less accurate. This accuracy trade-off is
examined by the means of a comparative Monte Carlo investigation in this chapter.
Later on, examples for the application of both tests are given before concluding
the case for the permutation tests.
As an addendum to the article that evolved to be this dissertation chapter, software
implementations (for the statistical software packages STATA and MATA) of both
tests in questions were developed. The interested reader can find them on the
internet.3
5.2 Rationale of the Tests
Below, firstly the exact algorithms are outlined. The rationale of the test is de-
scribed in Siegel and Castellan (1988). I limit the description of the details to the
extent necessary for specifying the respective algorithm. The interested reader can
find detailed instructions on how to carry out the tests in the book mentioned be-
forehand. After deriving two algorithms for the exact case, a method to facilitate
Monte Carlo simulations is shown.
5.2.1 One Exact Algorithm for Each Permutation Test
The permutation test for paired replicates assumes as the H0 hypothesis that
paired observations of an outcome under two different conditions are randomly
assigned to the two conditions for each subject. In the following, a brief summary
on the rationale of the test is given before an algorithm to compute the p-values is
derived.
3see http://www.stata-journal.com/software/sj7-3/st0134/
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The Permutation Test for Paired Replicates
Let Xi specify the interval-scaled outcome under a first condition for a subject
i ∈ {1, ..., n} and Yi the outcome for the same subject under a second condition.
Let then di = Xi − Yi be the difference of the outcomes under the first and the
second condition. If H0 was true, a positive and a negative sign for di would be
equally likely. As the size of the regarded sample is n, there are 2n possibilities for
the distribution of a positive or a negative sign among all differences in di, which
would be all equally likely if H0 was true.
For each of these possibilities, one can calculate the sum of the differences
∑
di and
compare it with the
∑
di the actually observed (the critical value). The relation
of the number of all theoretically possible sums which are less than or equal to
the critical value of all theoretically possible sums, 2n, is equal to the lower-tailed
p-value; the relation of the number of all theoretically possible sums that are
greater than or equal to the critical value to 2n is equal to the upper-tailed p-value.
The two-tailed p-value is the minimum of 1 and twice the value of the upper-tailed
and the lower-tailed p-values.
The algorithm that facilitates the necessary computations uses binary counting to
derive all possible
∑
di. In particular, it performs the following steps:
• Let Xi and Yi contain the observed values of subject i in a sample of n inde-
pendent observations.
• Create the differences di = Xi − Yi.
• Compute the critical value c =
∑
di.
• Create an n-rows sign vector S with S⊤ = (−1,−1, ...,−1).
• Let l = 0 and u = 0.
• Repeat the following steps:
1. For every j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
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a) If Sj = −1, set Sj = 1 and end this loop.
b) Set Sj = −1.
2. Compute the test statistic a =
∑n
i=1 Si × |di|.
3. If a ≤ c, increase l by one.
4. If a ≥ c, increase u by one.
5. If Si = (1, 1, ..., 1), end this loop.
• The upper-tailed p-value equals pupper =
u
2n
.
• The lower-tailed p-value equals plower =
l
2n
.
• The two-tailed p-value equals ptwo = min {1, 2× pupper, 2× plower}.
Since this test considers not only the signed ranks, but also the actual size of the
difference of the observations, it accounts for more of the data than the Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test.
The Permutation Test for Independent Samples
The Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples is a powerful alterna-
tive to the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum test. It tests the difference between
the means of two independent samples. Let Xi contain the interval scaled outcome
of a subject i among m subjects in the first group and Yj the outcome of a subject
j among n subjects in the second group . The H0 hypothesis states that there is no
difference in the mean of the population from which Xi is drawn to the mean of the
population from which Yi is drawn or, in other words, that all of the m+n observa-
tions may be considered to be from the same population. If H0 were true, it would
be equally likely that an observed value occurs in X or in Y . This scenario creates(
m+n
n
)
equally likely possibilities of distributing all observed values among X and Y .
For each of these possibilities, one can calculate the difference of the sums of both
theoretically possible samples
∑
Xi−
∑
Yj and compare it with the same measure
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of the observed values. The latter one is the critical value for the test. The relation
of the number of all theoretically possible sums which are less than or equal to the
critical value to all theoretically possible sums,
(
m+n
n
)
, is equal to the lower-tailed
p-value; the relation of the number of all theoretically possible sums which are
greater than or equal to the critical value to
(
m+n
n
)
is equal to the upper-tailed
p-value. The two-tailed p-value is the minimum of 1 and twice the value of the
upper-tailed and the lower-tailed p-value.
The algorithm performs the necessary computations as described here:
• Let Xi contain the observed value of an individual, i, in the first group of
m independent observations and Yj contain the observed value of another
individual, j, in the second group of n independent observations.
• Let Z be the concatenation of X and Y . Thus, Xi = Zi∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} and
Yj = Zm+j∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
• Compute the critical value c =
∑m
i=1 Zi −
∑m+n
j=m+1 Zj.
• Let l = 0 and u = 0.
• Create a (m+n)×
(
m+n
n
)
matrixM that contains in its columns all possibilities
to distribute m times the number 1 and n times the number −1 in the m+ n
rows.
• For every e ∈
{
1, ...,
(
m+n
n
)}
:
1. Calculate the test statistic a =
∑m+n
i=1 Mie × Zi.
2. If a ≤ c, increase l by one.
3. If a ≥ c, increase u by one.
• The upper-tailed p-value equals pupper =
u
(m+nn )
.
• The lower-tailed p-value equals plower =
l
(m+nn )
.
• The two-tailed p-value equals ptwo = min {1, 2× pupper, 2× plower}.
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Just like the Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates, this test is
superior to respective Wilcoxon test if the observed values are given at least on an
interval scale.
As one can see, the realisation of either one of the tests turns out to be very time
consuming: for the permutation test for paired replicates, the outer loop has a
complexity of O(2n). The permutation test for independent samples can be even
more intensive in terms of computation: the complexity equals O(
(
m+n
n
)
). In the
following, a method is drawn up to approximate the p-values by using Monte Carlo
simulations.
5.2.2 One Monte Carlo-Based Algorithm for each Permutation
Test
Monte Carlo simulations are an appropriate device to reduce the number of com-
puting operations and thus the computational costs while setting aside accuracy
only to a small extent.
The Permutation Test for Paired Replicates
Instead of computing the test statistic for the complete set of the sign vectors,
the it is calculated only for randomly drawn sign vectors (with the possibil-
ity of repetition). The p-value equals the ratio of sign vectors for which the
test statistic is less than or equal to (or greater than or equal to for a right-
tailed test) the critical value to the total number k of sign vectors drawn. Of
course, this is less accurate and leads to an error term in the p-values, but with
a sufficiently high k the error term influences only their fourth or fifth decimal place.
In detail, the Monte Carlo-based algorithm for the Fisher-Pitman permutation test
for paired replicates looks as follows:
• Let Xi and Yi contain the observed values of subject i in a sample of n inde-
pendent observations.
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• Let k be the number of simulation runs to facilitate.
• Create the differences di = Xi − Yi.
• Compute the critical value c =
∑
di.
• Let l = 0 and u = 0.
• Repeat the following steps:
1. For every j ∈ {1, ..., k}:
2. Create a sign vector S with S⊤ = (S1, ..., Sn) by setting Si = 1− 2R∀i ∈
{1, ..., n} with R ∼ Bernoulli(p = 0.5).
3. Compute the test statistic a =
∑n
i=1 Si × |di|.
4. If a ≤ c, increase l by one.
5. If a ≥ c, increase u by one.
• The upper-tailed p-value equals pupper =
u
k
.
• The lower-tailed p-value equals plower =
l
k
.
• The two-tailed p-value equals ptwo = min {1, 2× pupper, 2× plower}.
By limiting the number of investigated sign vectors to k, the overall computational
effort gets reduced drastically. Considering the speed of today’s computers, a total
of k = 2 · 105 runs of the simulation should be adequate.
The Permutation Test for Independent Samples
How is the permutation test for independent samples carried out as a Monte Carlo
simulation? Basically, the algorithm is conducted as follows:
• Let Xi contain the observed value of an individual, i, in the first group of
m independent observations and let Yj contain the observed value of another
individual, j, in the second group of n independent observations.
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• Let Z be the concatenation of X and Y . For Z holds true: Xi = Zi∀i ∈
{1, ...,m} and Yj = Zm+j∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
• Compute the critical value c =
∑m
i=1 Zi −
∑m+n
j=m+1 Zj.
• Let l = 0 and u = 0.
• Create a sign vector S with S⊤ = (S1, ..., Sm+n) and Si = 1 if 1 ≤ i <= m
and Si = −1 if m < i ≤ m+ n.
• For every i ∈ {1, ..., k}:
1. Shuffle the sign vector S.
2. Calculate the test statistic a =
∑m+n
i=1 Si × Zi.
3. If a ≤ c, increase l by one.
4. If a ≥ c, increase u by one.
• The upper-tailed p-value equals pupper =
u
k
.
• The lower-tailed p-value equals plower =
l
k
.
• The two-tailed p-value equals ptwo = min {1, 2× pupper, 2× plower}.
Just like in the case of the permutation test for paired replicates, a total of
k = 2 · 105 runs of the simulation should be sufficient.
5.3 Comparison of Exact and Monte Carlo Results
To get an idea on the size of the difference in the p-values given by the exact and
the Monte Carlo versions of the tests, a simulation study is conducted.
In the case of the test for paired replicates, one draws two samples, x and y, with
the same sample size, n = 12, with specific underlying distributions X ∼ N(µx, 1)
and Y ∼ N(µy, 1). Lower-tailed p-values are calculated for both exact and Monte
Carlo versions of the test, and the absolute difference between the p-values is
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stored. This process is repeated c times for each µx and µy in question. For
the case of two independent samples, one proceeds analogously with a combined
sample size of 12. Figure 5.1 displays the average absolute differences in p-values
for c = 5, µx = 0 and µy = i× 0.01∀i ∈ Z ∧ 0 ≤ i < 20.
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Figure 5.1: Mean absolute difference in p-values of exact and Monte Carlo tests for
random samples of N(0, 1) against N(µy, 1)
It is obvious that the differences in p-values are negligibly small, that is, smaller
than 0.001 (paired replicates: significant at p = 0.0016, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, independent samples: significant at p = 0.0004, same test). Additionally,
the difference in means of the underlying distributions seems not to be correlated
with the simulation error (paired replicates: Bravais-Pearson’s product moment
correlation coefficient r = −0.0145, independent samples: r = 0.0142). Thus, the
Monte Carlo versions of the tests seem to be accurate enough for the investigated
distributions.
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5.4 An Example for the Usage of Both Tests
A little notional example will exemplify the usage of both tests. Consider the
following (fictional) setting: 6 high school and 6 graduate students are asked
independently of each other to collect receipts that show money spent on cinema
visits and on music CDs over three months. The receipts are then collected and
totaled for each student. The students are classified by the age group they belong
to: a student aged 15–18 belongs to the age group 1, a student aged 22–25 belongs
to the age group 2. The data set is described in table 5.1.
To determine the statistical significance of a subject’s spending more money for
movies or music, it is adequate to facilitate the Fisher-Pitman permutation test for
paired replicates. The test gives in a two-sided level of p = .0083 – that is, the
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis that the expenditure for cinema
visits is greater than or equal to the expenditure for music is only 0.83%. This
probability can be considered highly significant.
The same dataset can be used to demonstrate the permutation test for in-
dependent samples. Suppose that one wants to know if the expenditures for
music CDs differ significantly between age groups. To investigate this research
question, the Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples is an
adequate choice. One applies the test for the hypothesis H0 : the expenditures
for music are identical over age groups. and finds a two-tailed p-value of p = 0.0065.
The permutation test for two independent samples shows that the probability of
falsely rejecting the H0 hypothesis that the expenditure for music CDs in the first
age group is lower than or equal to the expenditure for music CDs in the second
age group is only .00649. Just like in the first case, this can be regarded highly
significant.
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Table 5.1: Sample data set
age group expd cinema expd music
1 65.22 68.02
1 72.13 83.77
1 58.69 55.96
1 66.72 90.13
1 64.38 70.54
1 81.29 82.43
2 45.08 55.15
2 60.09 61.12
2 33.22 39.75
2 59.67 57.09
2 18.39 26.88
2 22.82 33.64
5.5 Discussion
In this chapter, the rationale of two powerful non-parametric tests is outlined.
The Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates provides p-values for
the difference in means of two outcomes of one subject in a sample, whereas the
Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples provides p-values for the
difference in means of two independent groups. Efficient ways to calculate exact
p-values are outlined. The high complexity of the underlying algorithms makes it
furthermore necessary to approximate the p-values if the sample size is large, thus
a Monte Carlo simulation approach is also drawn up. A comparative simulation
study demonstrates that the difference in p-values of exact and Monte Carlo ap-
proaches is small enough. Thereafter, the test is exemplified with a fictional dataset.
There is still some room for future work: On one hand, calculating confidence
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intervals from both tests and Hodges-Lehmann estimators associated with them
could be possible. On the other hand, the number of simulation runs to perform
has been set to 2 × 105 high-handedly. Although the precision of Monte Carlo
tests has been evaluated using comparative simulations, the optimum number of
simulation cycles to run could be determined algebraically in order to reduce the
error term in p-values to a fixed minimum given the sample size. Nevertheless,
the tests in their current design provide the scientist with a serviceable tool to
investigate significance levels of differences in means.
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“Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof.”
– The Bible, Ecclesiastes 7:8
This dissertation investigates macroeconomic phenomena by the means of labora-
tory experiments. Specifically, interlinks between economic policy and the labour
market are outlined. Another focus is on the determinants of firms’ currency trade
behaviour. A further part investigates the impact of a transaction tax as proposed
by Tobin (1978) on an asset market. Some of the econometric methods applied
in all chapters, namely exact and Monte Carlo versions of the Fisher-Pitman
permutation tests for independent samples and for paired replicates, are derived in
chapter 5. In this chapter, a more detailed summary of the research chapters of
this thesis is given before concluding.
6.1 Summary
Chapter 2 of this dissertation thesis studies how policy decisions of governments
and central banks influence the labour market and how they the institutions
react to unfulfilled employment goals. This is done by the means of a laboratory
experiment: various institutions of two countries are simulated by human players.
In the model, the fiscal and monetary policy institutions have several goals to
achieve in order to obtain their maximum payoff. Governments can use the fiscal
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instrument of the expenditures, whereas central banks state a price target for the
good that is produced by the country’s firms.
The labour market reacts to according to theory on average. Nevertheless, a great
share of the labour market reactions cannot be explained by changes in policy. If
both instruments are applied in a way that theory predicts changes into the same
direction, the effects of policy are stronger. It can even be observed that the effects
of uncoordinated policy on wage are opposite to theory.
Governments tend to adjust the expenditures according to theory to reduce over-
and underemployment in a significant number of cases. In the currency union
treatment, another fraction of decisions is in line with the hypothesis that gov-
ernments try to influence the actual price with their expenditure decision. In the
two currency case, this cannot be observed. Instead, the governments irrationally
try to decrease the difference between their own expenditures and the nominal
expenditures of the other country. Central banks however fail to apply their target
price instrument correctly – instead of doing so, they track the previously observed
price in order to keep their penalty for deviations between actual price and target
price low. The discovered effects as a whole lead to a new picture of an explanation
why observed Phillips curves are not due to a direct causal relationship and how
nevertheless a negative correlation between the rate of inflation and the rate of
unemployment can arise.
Chapter 3 investigates the determinants of a firm’s currency trade behaviour. As
a vehicle of the investigation, different aspects of the same model and the same
experiments as in chapter 2 are used. Two determinants of the currency trade
decisions have been identified, namely the interest rate and individual exchange
rate estimates. On average, the firms raised debts in the country with the lower
interest rate and transferred the money to the account in the other country.
Some decisions are conforming to simple trend extrapolation, although these were
significantly less in number. An antagonism can be observed in this behaviour:
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It would have been possible to make higher profits by trading on exchange rate
changes instead of interest rates, because the variations of currency prices are
usually stronger than interest differences. However, it is demonstrated that the
subjects are incapable of estimating exchange rate changes correctly. This might
be the reason for their reliance on safe facts – namely, interest rates – instead of
highly speculative assumptions on future exchange rate changes.
The trade decisions based on exchange rate estimates are significantly less profitable
than those based solely on interest rates. In the spirit of Gigerenzer and Todd
(1999), a simple decision rule was created on the base of which subjects are likely
to make profits. According to this rule, a trader should offer a fixed amount of the
currency that is the cheapest in terms of interest rate. It could also be observed
that the trade activity declines with an increasing exchange rate volatility. This
can be seen as a further indicator for the players’ ambiguity aversion affecting their
willingness to face the uncertainty of making losses by trading.
It is evident that the players offered their respective home currency more frequently
and to a higher extent than the respective foreign currency. This home currency
bias is likely to be caused by exchange rate uncertainty, for a positive home currency
offer settles the foreign account debts to a certain extent – thus reducing possible
losses by exchange rate changes. More evidence for exchange rate uncertainty
among players is found in the individual exchange rate estimates entered into the
profit calculator: subjects expect the exchange rate rather to increase than to
decrease. Since increasing exchange rates lower the production profit of a firm,
it is safe to conclude that the subjects deal with exchange rate uncertainty by
stating pessimistic expectations. A rather minor finding of this chapter is that the
influence of currency trade on exchange rate volatility is quite small.
The currency crises that have been observed for example in the late 1990s in
eastern Asia however demonstrate impressively that this is not always the case
in practice. James Tobin’s idea to cope with excess volatility of exchange rates
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is to impose a transaction tax on every spot transaction on the currency market.
Chapter 4 investigates the influence of a transaction tax as such on an asset market.
Laboratory experiments with an experimental asset markets have been conducted
with and without a tax imposed. The features of the market model used resemble
those of the currency market in practice. A game-theoretical solution is derived as
a benchmark for the experimental results.
The observed behaviour suggests that the turnover is not influenced by the tax, but
that the trade volume decreases linearly with the tax height. This discrepancy can
be explained by the fact that average market prices are higher in untaxed sessions.
It is surprising that the average number of suppliers is higher in taxed markets.
They are also willing to face higher opportunity costs by selling the asset under
its value. One possible explanation for this behaviour is that the mere existence
of a transaction tax influences the trader’s tendency towards hyperbolic discounting.
Neither zero nor equilibrium volatility was achieved in the experiments conducted,
be it on taxed or on untaxed markets. According to the game-theoretical solution,
there should be no influence of the tax on price volatility. Contrary to that
prediction, taxed markets all display a much lower volatility than taxed ones.
Another market feature investigated is market efficiency. Although critics suspect
that a Tobin tax might decrease market efficiency, the opposite is however found
in the experimental data: market inefficiency is significantly higher in untaxed
markets. The tax rate is nevertheless correlated positively with market inefficiency.
Fiscal earnings increase with higher tax rates. Additionally, a significantly lower
earnings inequality can be observed on taxed markets.
Significance tests are used throughout all chapters of this thesis. In order to test
for differences in means, Fisher-Pitman permutation tests are applied. Since these
tests can become computationally intensive, efficient ways to compute exact and
approximate p-levels are derived in chapter 5. Two different tests are outlined;
one for paired replicates and one for independent samples. The H0 hypothesis of
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the paired replicates permutation test states that the means of the distributions
of two paired samples X and Y are identical. A critical value is computed on the
base of the sum of the difference vector. For every possible distribution of -1 and
1 on the difference vector, the test statistic is calculated. With a high n, it is
computationally too intensive to compute the test statistics. Hence, a method to
facilitate Monte Carlo simulations is derived. It is not necessary to compute the
test statistic for all possible sign vectors. Instead, one randomly draws a fixed and
sufficiently high number of them and calculates the test statistic like in the exact
approach.
Contrary to the paired replicates test, the Fisher-Pitman test for two independent
samples deals with two samples X and Y that are not paired. Its H0 hypothesis
assumes that the means of both samples in question are identical. As critical value
for the test, the difference between the sums of both samples is used. This figure
is calculated for all possible redistributions of the observations of the combined
sample on both samples. The computational costs increase strongly with higher
sample sizes to an extent that calculating the p-values can take excessive time
even with modern computers. Hence, an approach similar to the Monte Carlo
method applied for the paired replicates test is conducted for a high number of
observations: Instead of comparing the test statistic of all possible redistributions
of the observations with the critical value, this is only done with a random subset
of redistributions. By the means of a Monte Carlo study, it is demonstrated that
the p-values approximated by Monte Carlo simulations are sufficiently accurate
compared to the exact algorithms. Furthermore, both tests are exemplified with a
notional dataset.
6.2 Closing Discussion
This dissertation shows in chapters 2 to 4 that behavioural aspects which make eco-
nomic agents deviate from strict rationality have to be considered when dissecting
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macroeconomic phenomena. It has been set forth that the deflexion of the decisions
made by experimental subjects from the predicted rational behaviour is not id-
iosyncratic, but systematic. As already foreshadowed in chapter 1, it seems tenuous
to extrapolate the quantitative results from the laboratory to macroeconomies
or financial markets in practice or, in other words, to assume external validity.
Nevertheless the laboratory evidence makes it possible to explain mechanisms that
might be at work when irrational or boundedly rational patterns of behaviour occur.
One such pattern is a significant correlation of employment and the rate of inflation.
Not being predicted by theory, it is evident that this relatedness exists and that
not the change of the rate of inflation causes the change in employment, but that
both of them are caused by a chain of reactions of fiscal policy on firms’ production
decisions and the other way around.
Another important field that is traditionally investigated with the means of
experiments is decision making under uncertainty. In the context discussed in
this dissertation, price volatility sparks off uncertainty. This has far reaching
consequences for the agents’ economic course of action. Theories for behaviour
as such are manifold. One of the first and probably most important theories
on economic behaviour under risk that took into account cognitive processes of
humans is the Nobel Prize winning prospect theory. Developed by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), prospect theory finds psychological explanations for behaviour
inconsistent with expected utility theory when subjects face risk at the time they
make their decisions. The influence of price volatility on decision making applies
on both goods prices and exchange rates, that is, currency prices.
Excess volatility – a property of prices that does not prevail in game-theoretical
equilibrium of the model investigated – can be observed in the experiments in
question as a product of boundedly rational agents. As has been demonstrated, it
can be coped with by the means of transaction costs in form of a Tobin tax. To
curb undesirable effects like market inefficiency and reduced trade volume, the tax
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rate should be kept low.
The advantages of the econometric methods that have been applied in order to
arrive at the conclusions of the chapters outweigh the disadvantages, not least
because of the efficient realisation of the algorithms. The methods are also superior
to rank-based statistical methods because they take into account more of the data
if the attributes investigated are measured at least on an interval scale. This is
obviously the case for the decision variables and resultant measures elicited by the
means of laboratory experiments. Not only are most of these measures censored
and too few in number too assume normality; their samples also resemble those
obtained by normal distributions only seldomly. This forbids the use of standard
econometric methods applied traditionally in macroeconomics.
Many questions remain unanswered so far, many more than could be covered
within the scope of a dissertation thesis. The model used in chapters 2 and 3 is
adequate to investigate also other effects that occur in macroeconomic settings.
For example, the process of wage bargaining can be analysed in a very detailed
way with respect to the influence of other decision variables and key measures like
unemployment, aggregate profits, or the wage that prevails in the other country.
It would also be a interesting to gather evidence on the decision making process of
firms with respect to production: Since the firms interact under a quantity-setting
Cournot regime with manifold variable parameters (like wages, interest, exchange
rate changes, expenditure) that change over time, this experiment is an ideal
vehicle for testing the influence of changes in the environment on production
decisions in an oligopoly. Although a preliminary analysis yielded no striking
results, a detailed inspection of the specific effects of a currency union could be
conducted. The model could be extended to three countries. This would open
up a whole new horizon for furthergoing investigations: If there was a currency
union imposed on only two of the three countries, one could study the effects of
currency unions on non-members. With a concept of exchange rates somewhat
less easier to capture by the experimental subjects, three countries could also
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interact without a currency union taking place amongst any two of them. Another
viable extension of the model could be the augmentation of a firm’s decision
variables with a decision on investment into capital. With investment being
present in the model, it would be possible to dissect the influence of gross domestic
product of one experimental country onto other variables and the other way
around. As an extension to chapter 2, Okun’s law – the relatedness of the real
growth rate and the rate of unemployment – would be an interesting object of study.
The investigation of the impact of transaction costs on markets in chapter 4
was conducted to find whether the levy of a Tobin tax yielded a lower price
volatility and what effects on other aspects of the markets could be observed.
A tax as proposed by James Tobin is by no means the only imaginable method
to reduce price volatility. On asset markets, an authority that intervenes with
supply or demand to influence prices in order to keep them stable would be
imaginable. Such an authority has been introduced (and abandonned) on the
market for tin (confer Ba¨cker 1998, p. 6). On the currency market, central banks
act as watchdogs over exchange rates. Traditionally, central banks intervene with
currency supply or demand to cope with excess volatility or to protect exchange
rates from devaluation. Besides intervention, they also have the instrument of
interest policy. Usually applied under a long term horizon scope, there have been
incidents when interest rates have been used to deal with short term fluctuations
(e. g. in September 1992, the Swedish central bank raised its overnight interest
rate to an annualised interest rate of 500 percent to defend the Krone from a
speculative attack, see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993, p. 99). An experimental
comparison of markets with a Tobin tax, a two-tier transaction taxation scheme
as proposed by Spahn (1996), and a market with an intervening authority whose
payoff depends solely on volatility would deliver further insights into behavioural
aspects of measures that curb excess volatility. If players were endowed with assets
and cash asymmetrically, their behaviour could differ significantly. Corsetti et al.
(2004) show in the context of currency crises that such asymmetries can have an
important influence on behaviour. It would be interesting to explore the effect of
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endowment asymmetries on asset markets.
The methodology used for calculating the p-levels of the Fisher-Pitman tests in
chapter 5 could also be extended. Deriving confidence intervals from both tests in
exact and in Monte Carlo versions should be possible, and so should, consequently,
be the derivation of a Hodges-Lehmann point estimate – that is, the point that
results by shrinking the interval to a confidence level of zero percent asymptotically.
The number of Monte Carlo simulation cycles conducted can surely be limited to
an upper bound if proof was found on how the number of cycles influences the
error term in p-levels.
As has been demonstrated in this work, there are many aspects that influence
individual decision making and that are systematically not conforming with the
theory that agents behave self-centered, risk neutral, and profit maximising. This
emphasises the need for not only further investigation of the models dissected
in this thesis, but for the broader establishment of behavioural methods in
macroeconomics. This necessity finds more and more advocates in the fields of
macroeconomics and in the field of experimental economics. As one anonymous
referee of a top-ranking economics journal has put it: The field of experimental
macroeconomics has a bright future.
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Market
A.1 Measuring Association
For testing association of two variables, several methods are utilised. The first one
described does so by the use of Yule’s Q (Yule 1900), which is a special case of
Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma (Goodman and Kruskal 1979). Assume that there
are two decision variables x and y. Let ∆x = xt − xt−1 and ∆y = yt − yt−1 be the
difference of x respective y in two consecutive periods and A, B, C, D the number
of changes in one experimental session that satisfy the following conditions:
∆x > 0 ∆x < 0
∆y > 0 A B
∆y < 0 C D
Yule’s Q is defined as
(A.1) Q =
AD −BC
AD +BC
and Q ∈ [−1; 1]. If all positive changes of x coincided with positive changes of y
and all negative ones of x with negative ones of y, Q would equal 1; if all positive
changes of y coincided with negative changes of y and the other way round, Q
would equal −1. Q thus gives a measure of association between changes of x and
y. Since the values of x and y within one session are no independent observations,
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Fisher’s exact test for 2 × 2 tables is not applicable here. Instead, Q is used as a
descriptor for one session in this context.
This method neglects much of the data, because only the direction of changes
is taken into account. A stronger method of showing association would be the
use of correlation coefficients like Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ρ and
Bravais and Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient r. These measures
take also into account the strength of the change – by rank in the first case,
absolute in the second. To calculate a measure for one session, one calculates
the correlation coefficient with all 20 ∆x and ∆y in each of the two countries
separately. Significance levels of the respective coefficient are meaningless, because
the values observed do not satisfy the condition of independence. The average
of both countries’ correlation coefficients can than be used as a descriptor of
association for one session.
Similarly, an OLS regression can be done. Most of the results gained by regressions
(like t and F test values) are irrelevant here, since the preconditions for parametric
testing cannot be met: It cannot be assumed that ∆x and ∆y are normal
distributed. There are only 20 data points per country and session, and these
points are not even independent. Hence, only the coefficients of the fitted model
can be interpreted and used as a session descriptor.
The session descriptors obtained by one of the methods mentioned beforehand
can now be tested with the standard repertoire of non-parametric tests. In this
investigation, treatment effects are investigated either with the Fisher-Pitman per-
mutation test for two independent samples1 or with the Mann-Whitney U ranksum
test. Matched observations are tested for significance either with the Fisher-Pitman
permutation test for paired replicates or with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The
tests have been applied as described by Siegel and Castellan (1988).
1For both permutation tests used in this study, only the exact versions have been applied. Details
can be found in Kaiser (2007).
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Thus, the association tables can be interpreted as follows. The tables are separated
in three parts: session values of the corresponding measures are displayed in the
first 15 rows. Thereof, the first 6 sessions have been conducted with a currency
union imposed, sessions 7 to 15 without. The leftmost column denotes the session
number. Column two gives Yule’s Q. It has been calculated in the way described
above. The deltas of the two variables concerned have been grouped in positive
and negative ones – deltas of size 0 have been left out. Column three gives the
session average of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ρ of the deltas of the two
variables concerned of both countries. Column four displays the session average
of Bravais-Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient r of the deltas of both
countries. In column four, coefficients of a simple regressional model have been
calculated. This is done in the following way: Let ∆x and ∆y be the variables in
question. For each country, the coefficients α1 of the simple regressional model
∆yt = α0 + α1∆xt + ǫt(A.2)
are calculated. Then, the session averages of α1 are calculated. These values are
displayed in the table’s rightmost column.
The next three rows of each table show overall and treatment averages of the
respective measures. In the remainder of the table, p-levels for some significance
tests are given. The row labeled “U test” shows the p-level of a two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U ranksum test for difference in medians of the treatments. Analogously,
the p-level of a two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation test for two independent
samples for differens in means of the treatments is given in the next row. The last
six rows show p-levels for two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the hypothesis
that the median of the respective session measure is equal to zero. Rows labeled
“permtest” give p-levels for two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation tests for paired
replicates of the hypothesis that the mean of the respective session measure is
equal to zero. These two tests are carried out for both samples at a time, for
the one-currency treatment only and for the two-currency treatment only. Aster-
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isks aligned to p-levels denote a significance of p <= 0.1∗, p <= 0.05∗∗, p <= 0.01∗∗∗.
Due to the lack of normality of data, the missing independence of the variables,
and the number of observations (n <= 20), standard panel econometrics are not
applicable in this case. Therefore, the statistical approaches described above are
applied to gather valid empirical results.
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Table A.1: Association between changes in D and L
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .89090908 .53197628 .53698033 3.3303568
2 .86666667 .46782005 .35299572 1.2156571
3 .36842105 .11908777 .07611553 .17857121
4 .55555558 -.00251985 .00065764 -.04580859
5 .53846157 .33457318 .45627755 1.9508604
6 .5714286 .20722342 .17883807 .24171905
7 .57575756 .54344535 .64690089 3.7225645
8 -.41176471 -.05973276 .14957494 .23244147
9 .81176472 .29379556 .33103731 .1751063
10 .70093459 .13254564 .19047837 .69279313
11 .38461539 .04101373 .18007608 .23346035
12 -.16666667 -.19691101 -.12038984 -.40928435
13 .60000002 .53334624 .57978159 .8840574
14 -.07692308 -.12882607 -.14836073 -.37226874
15 .91794872 .48835483 .31350252 1.8677782
mean .47514061 .22034616 .24829773 .92653361
1 curr. .63190709 .27636014 .26697748 1.145226
2 curr. .37062962 .1830035 .23584457 .78073869
U test .63735189 .63735189 .90618562 .47950012
2-s. permtest .24055944 .5046953 .81438561 .5966034
Wilcoxon .00314293∗∗∗ .0124533∗∗ .00261078∗∗∗ .0124533∗∗
permtest .00168∗∗∗ .00714∗∗∗ .00153∗∗∗ .00616∗∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .02770785∗∗ .04639946∗∗ .02770785∗∗ .04639946∗∗
permtest (1 curr.) .03125∗∗ .0625∗ .03125∗∗ .0625∗
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .06631603∗ .13864063 .02087926∗∗ .10974464∗
permtest (2 curr.) .05859375∗ .109375∗ .02734375∗∗ .078125∗
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Table A.2: Association between changes in p and L (sum of both countrys’ L in
currency union case)
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 . .02180795 -.00483699 -.00001736
2 -.25 .3381024 .47829017 .00310888
3 -.45454547 -.09086499 -.00699323 -.00002034
4 -.71428573 -.47181401 -.39025187 -.00288319
5 .42857143 .51011044 .61310822 .00492527
6 1 -.04431865 -.05364851 -.00014554
7 -.57894737 -.28180957 -.24491552 -.00272558
8 -.04477612 -.0131925 .00748356 -.00125074
9 .57746476 .25246271 .26515219 .00188907
10 -.15789473 .11524387 .1520485 .00145002
11 -.34693879 -.05468167 -.07480788 -.00033911
12 -.76271188 -.34246856 -.32861868 -.00703706
13 -.83486241 -.39139366 -.38038075 -.00224922
14 .11111111 .06786335 -.02211174 -.00030532
15 -.05882353 .0413316 -.13951713 -.00131199
mean -.14904562 -.02290809 -.00866664 -.00046082
1 curr. .00194805 .04383719 .10594463 .00082795
2 curr. -.232931 -.06740494 -.08507416 -.00131999
U test .64073838 .72367361 .34577859 .12550647
2-s. permtest .45254745 .45594406 .22897103 .15264735
Wilcoxon .22089889 .73327139 .57006088 .36348795
permtest .31372 .74976 .90644 .5494
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .8927384 .91651191 .91651191 .91651191
permtest (1 curr.) 1 .875 .5 .5
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .10974464 ∗ .51466972 .26039294 .17307092
permtest (2 curr.) .15625 .40625 .26953125 .15625
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Table A.3: Association between changes in w and L
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .71257484 .32984722 .24771473 .00065659
2 -.42857143 -.12325452 .02485628 .00026706
3 -.47169811 -.21301539 -.22725235 -.00145529
4 -.20879121 -.2948477 -.51479226 -.00186467
5 -.5 .01018215 .04027928 .00020162
6 .21348314 -.16453125 -.24525125 -.0009599
7 -.10204082 .16520831 .2976388 .00066269
8 -.55555558 -.54986286 -.50234348 -.00254149
9 -.65605098 -.41557458 -.40107095 -.00239469
10 -.03225806 .04017282 .0258825 -.00178363
11 -.3125 -.04290524 .01794975 -.00024642
12 .18181819 -.05031118 -.00042136 -.00022494
13 -.54929578 -.14973611 .04516982 .000608
14 -.08333334 -.01010194 .04293044 .00050106
15 -.10497238 .32469925 .48303092 .00224936
mean -.1931461 -.07626873 -.04437861 -.00042164
1 curr. -.11383379 -.07593658 -.1124076 -.00052576
2 curr. -.24602097 -.07649017 .00097405 -.00035223
U test .63735189 .72367361 .40939549 .81366372
2-s. permtest .51908092 .9978022 .44355644 .81638362
Wilcoxon .06089266∗ .23297911 .95470755 .36348795
permtest .06243∗ .2436 .54986 .24847
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .60017949 .46307102 .60017949 .34544753
permtest (1 curr.) .625 .46875 .5 .28125
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .03815171∗∗ .37425932 .51466972 .67840238
permtest (2 curr.) .03515625∗∗ .40625 .9921875 .55078125
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Table A.4: Association between changes in D and w
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .6793893 .48459259 .57864887 1018.5087
2 -.07284768 .0146476 -.05802431 -21.258877
3 -.17557251 .01508005 .15698358 119.09781
4 .17647059 .0599982 .18128593 58.880119
5 .01408451 .09713202 .22355729 178.51538
6 .375 .04746473 .06938109 42.402367
7 .52380955 .35144183 .50632429 1305.0809
8 .15789473 -.0236753 -.04569466 -13.059792
9 -.85507244 -.39458805 -.56166375 -50.70726
10 .73333335 .51331723 .44191033 167.0609
11 -.65517241 -.03308903 .09227917 5.2726507
12 -.08450704 -.07507601 -.04905227 -1.5794601
13 -.25 -.01846782 -.03429008 -.37407589
14 -.75 -.25765419 -.10227989 -13.083472
15 -.26229507 -.01525696 -.03881077 -290.98178
mean -.02969901 .05105779 .09070366 166.91827
1 curr. .16608737 .1198192 .19197208 232.69091
2 curr. -.16022326 .00521685 .02319138 123.06985
U test .15729921 .05934644∗ .19485065 .15729921
2-s. permtest .21538462 .38241758 .28091908 .57222777
Wilcoxon .776425 .60923507 .1914464 .23297911
permtest .81308 .42847 .23252 .17403
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .24886387 .02770785∗∗ .04639946∗∗ .04639946∗∗
permtest (1 curr.) .28125 .03125∗∗ .0625∗ .0625∗
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .31393809 .44126813 .76709687 .67840238
permtest (2 curr.) .39453125 .95703125 .953125 .734375
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Table A.5: Association between changes in p and w (sum of both countrys’ w in
currency union case)
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 . -.33305159 -.25284463 -.54507786
2 .33333334 -.00903955 -.05597125 -.04119897
3 .57894737 .29954642 .49759498 .26627773
4 1 .63155466 .45150989 .89294624
5 .33333334 .1268072 .03056319 .05780348
6 -1 -.30789798 -.15296568 -.15902814
7 .884058 .36071932 .10080601 .19642615
8 .01408451 .09648899 .08198986 .32847983
9 -.90909094 -.41021475 -.49666828 -.57685125
10 .22222222 .10295416 .10760242 .22138473
11 .06666667 .05867929 .21876252 .35573184
12 .13513513 -.02511753 -.11332479 -.1730092
13 .90099013 .32093608 -.03464539 -.01442852
14 .12280702 .13289084 .18402988 .17579302
15 .65517241 .28307295 .00647605 -.37849832
mean .23840423 .08855523 .03819432 .04045005
1 curr. .24912281 .06798653 .08631442 .07862041
2 curr. .23244946 .10226771 .00611425 .01500314
U test .54806618 .81366372 .90618562 1
2-s. permtest .96003996 .82157842 .57262737 .75884116
Wilcoxon .08992365∗ .23297911 .57006088 .60923507
permtest .15686 .24049 .56964 .69011
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .41421618 .91651191 .75315236 .75315236
permtest (1 curr.) .5625 .75 .5 .6875
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .10974464∗ .13864063 .51466972 .76709687
permtest (2 curr.) .1953125 .203125 .9609375 .921875
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Table A.6: Association between changes in D/p and L
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .93142855 .57639802 .5454067 .35082471
2 .48571429 .12636699 .02794464 .00684947
3 .125 .07987943 .08791801 .02359653
4 .79591835 .28828776 .29721206 .07577488
5 -.25 -.07664637 -.05843884 -.04298443
6 .43089432 .09705184 .17321727 .02436309
7 .75609756 .60917926 .64462137 .44708923
8 -.11392405 .12974235 .15502077 .03658997
9 -.33333334 -.21628454 -.17405742 -.01990921
10 .56521738 -.10606481 -.07754081 .03323668
11 .35384616 .14661655 .19267555 .03080907
12 .41935483 .1744262 .2101949 .09119759
13 .8101266 .57317352 .65080464 .1051805
14 -.09090909 -.12145458 -.1149544 -.03596649
15 .89830506 .47235805 .33766374 .18998653
mean .38558244 .18353531 .19317921 .08777587
1 curr. .41982592 .18188961 .17887664 .07307071
2 curr. .36275346 .18463244 .20271426 .09757932
U test .72367361 .90618562 .90618562 .34577859
2-s. permtest .81118881 .98421578 .87552448 .75724276
Wilcoxon .00640649∗∗∗ .02309573∗∗ .01705872∗∗ .01705872∗∗
permtest .00509∗∗∗ .02064∗∗ .01198∗∗ .00911∗∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .0747355∗∗ .04639946∗∗ .0747355∗ .17295492
permtest (1 curr.) .09375∗ .0625∗ .09375∗ .21875
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .05061243∗ .10974464 .06631603∗ .03815171∗∗
permtest (2 curr.) .0546875∗ .125 .0859375∗ .03515625∗∗
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Table A.7: Association between changes in D/p and w
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .74100721 .51320571 .57860345 109.66641
2 -.01123596 -.04576236 -.00968262 -.82886106
3 .125 .07438358 -.01597084 1.2281036
4 -.47761193 -.26839751 -.34788638 -26.137983
5 -.04854369 .0412076 .15495096 17.136532
6 .47368422 .15154819 .13259307 9.0600071
7 -.19402985 .14520285 .36507824 124.35532
8 -.01910828 -.16240306 -.13341719 -6.498147
9 .70491803 .33929306 .31997097 5.8814411
10 .18518518 .27714545 .27684125 13.004979
11 -.23076923 -.10798727 -.17827591 -5.8186088
12 -.39784947 -.08311396 .07793891 3.3234096
13 -.72602737 -.25689223 .00976492 .19160923
14 -.3548387 -.24026006 -.25514036 -4.0188293
15 -.05882353 -.07045646 -.08071928 -23.795858
mean -.01926956 .02044757 .05964328 14.449968
1 curr. .13371664 .07769754 .08210127 18.354035
2 curr. -.12126036 -.01771908 .04467128 11.847257
U test .19485065 .40939549 .81366372 .55568979
2-s. permtest .25894106 .45234765 .78081918 .80759241
Wilcoxon .57006088 .90956094 .49552088 .42652825
permtest .86369 .74011 .37611 .32215
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .60017949 .46307102 .60017949 .34544753
permtest (1 curr.) .5 .59375 .625 .46875
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .17307092 .85895492 .59395468 .85895492
permtest (2 curr.) .38671875 .80859375 .55859375 .6953125
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Table A.8: Association between changes in D/p and L if the decision pairs are
coordinated
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 . -.02728797 -.13390854 -.13529666
2 .93548387 .26785713 .22948584 .10098459
3 1 .40194955 .29883602 .08732039
4 1 .28929645 .51181936 .19051759
5 -1 -.25712901 -.29538482 -.13136141
6 . .43612781 .46366143 .08639194
7 .89473683 .58741629 .44964176 .43708169
8 -.14285715 -.09805222 -.29708052 -.04321771
9 1 .45412415 .55851352 .11068749
10 .60000002 -.19956109 -.12654909 .0855485
11 .71428573 .14285713 .17785874 .04199865
12 .60000002 .16904762 .303271 .08263536
13 1 .81896055 .7951709 .14272234
14 0 -.3564018 -.28044993 -.10644893
15 .80000001 .05000001 .13350612 .06468274
mean .56935764 .17861364 .18589279 .06761644
1 curr. .48387097 .18513566 .17908488 .03309274
2 curr. .60735172 .17426563 .19043139 .09063224
U test .43336564 .90618562 1 .90618562
2-s. permtest .73846154 .95024975 .95264735 .49190809
Wilcoxon .02430906∗∗ .06089266∗ .04682647∗∗ .13975587
permtest .01171875∗∗ .05619∗ .05675∗ .07931∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .4496918 .1158515 .17295492 .75315236
permtest (1 curr.) .625 .15625 .21875 .53125
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .01741848∗∗ .26039294 .13864063 .08583096
permtest (2 curr.) .015625∗∗ .21484375 .15625 .07421875
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Table A.9: Association between changes in D/p and L if the decision pairs are
uncoordinated
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 1 . . .
2 -.07692308 -.31360307 -.3891685 -.13617471
3 -.42857143 -.32122993 -.20589526 -.04372591
4 1 -.2 .25681403 .05960754
5 -.66666669 -.3761037 -.47853893 -.08872695
6 1 .5 .11728857 .01558134
7 .81818181 .69166666 .89145756 .54614305
8 1 1 1 .17291805
9 -1 -.58904725 -.65677339 -.04597524
10 .33333334 -.34047621 -.41054296 -.09986776
11 .33333334 .44999999 .22723861 .03197807
12 -.2631579 .16212121 -.14942253 -.03903054
13 . -.34999999 -.39681503 .00615917
14 -1 .40000001 .47922465 .09277428
15 .81818181 .77142859 .49812344 .37300649
mean .20483651 .10605402 .05592788 .06033335
1 curr. .3046398 -.14218734 -.13990002 -.03868774
2 curr. .12998405 .24396589 .16472115 .11534506
U test .47127066 .38612467 .38612467 .16151332
2-s. permtest .6953047 .1958042 .31068931 .11988012
Wilcoxon .32608698 .36268594 .72989091 .59361824
permtest .33607 .45508 .69132 .3009
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .34008461 .50018426 .34523107 .34523107
permtest (1 curr.) .4375 .375 .375 .375
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .67214397 .17307092 .37425932 .26039294
permtest (2 curr.) .65625 .21875 .41796875 .17578125
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Table A.10: Association between changes in D/p and w if the decision pairs are
coordinated
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 1 -.08716691 -.01823908 -371.39996
2 -.42857143 .10778928 .21970341 18.864817
3 -.5 -.53019685 -.54979193 -19.797785
4 -1 -.40592006 -.50417697 -59.712582
5 . -.187572 -.17381784 -45.858463
6 . .03702129 .06932826 5.4390054
7 -.71428573 -.29454565 -.21038602 -32.587006
8 .11111111 -.14633854 -.04688209 -3.8038073
9 . .1240555 .26883948 88.855614
10 .60000002 .64100832 .47857589 29.883244
11 -.71428573 -.1177683 -.09345416 -.32244897
12 0 .12738095 .4040949 30.539755
13 -1 -.1 .14748375 1.3732135
14 -1 -.55135381 -.51880825 -12.536705
15 -.80000001 -.33333334 -.25073233 -18.22263
mean -.37050265 -.11446267 -.0518842 -25.952383
1 curr. -.23214286 -.17767421 -.15949903 -78.744162
2 curr. -.43968254 -.07232165 .01985902 9.2421366
U test .60722555 .63735189 .40939549 .09896015∗
2-s. permtest .62222222 .55224775 .30769231 .05754246∗
Wilcoxon .09778771∗ .12515346 .53212989 .42652825
permtest .078125∗ .16741 .53919 .45416
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .58071216 .17295492 .34544753 .1158515
permtest (1 curr.) .75 .1875 .34375 .15625
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .07857855∗ .44126813 .85895492 .85895492
permtest (2 curr.) .0625∗ .54296875 .84765625 .5703125
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Table A.11: Association between changes in D/p and w if the decision pairs are
uncoordinated
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 1 . . .
2 .02040816 .17684105 -.07997216 -.15380239
3 0 .59772897 .59360904 31.78647
4 -1 .40000001 .31238237 14.205398
5 1 .09510779 .15821682 -10.747852
6 1 .5 .56376964 45.007366
7 0 .50833333 .50152487 86.563148
8 . -1 -1 -89.200584
9 1 .70938402 .84509778 11.161258
10 -.2 -.23071645 -.15821312 -3.6615686
11 .33333334 -.55000001 -.88333416 -25.06041
12 -.45454547 -.4848485 -.53441268 -18.15605
13 . .94999999 .94047678 22.121433
14 -1 -1 -.91404545 -4.7407513
15 1 .88928568 .33797234 187.02032
mean .20763046 .11150828 .04879086 17.581741
1 curr. .33673469 .35393556 .30960114 16.019516
2 curr. .0969697 -.02317355 -.09610374 18.449645
U test .46118208 .64037086 .38612467 .46335515
2-s. permtest .58624709 .31368631 .27772228 .98601399
Wilcoxon .31792699 .55082554 .72989091 .39672623
permtest .35058594 .53051 .78643 .34476
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .23282335 .04311445∗ .0796158∗ .22491588
permtest (1 curr.) .375 .0625∗ .125 .25
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .79771356 .85883234 .59395468 .85895492
permtest (2 curr.) .8125 .91796875 .69921875 .58984375
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Table A.12: Association between εG and Dt+1 −Dt
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .75438595 .38742098 .24595559 .00064395
2 . .06871861 .05397055 .00003397
3 1 -.13789991 -.24357887 -.00026711
4 . -.00510327 .07339463 .00051195
5 . -.26991728 -.2059712 -.00012444
6 .09090909 -.07404934 .04512198 .00033781
7 1 .2242907 .55275005 .00091978
8 -.04761905 .02715698 .12879746 .00044884
9 . .53477049 .58059114 .006118
10 . .25354338 .23443931 .00063968
11 .125 .35158992 .38081875 .0010238
12 -1 .06720622 .14590435 .00032316
13 1 .7940805 .82268864 .00353917
14 . .05448782 .02998783 .00121139
15 .5714286 .24056423 .40387523 .00139475
mean .38823384 .16779067 .21658303 .00111698
1 curr. .61509835 -.00513837 -.00518455 .00018935
2 curr. .27480159 .28307669 .36442809 .0017354
U test .59942628 .04512695∗∗ .01842213∗∗ .01332833∗∗
2-s. permtest .5952381 .03396603∗∗ .00919081∗∗∗ .00559441∗∗∗
Wilcoxon .09426431∗ .04682647∗∗ .0124533∗∗ .00178538∗∗∗
permtest .125 .02834∗∗ .01121∗∗ .00083∗∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .10880943 .60017949 .75315236 .24886387
permtest (1 curr.) .25 .90625 1 .28125
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .34008461 .00768579∗∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗
permtest (2 curr.) .4375 .00390625∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗
Yule’s Q has been calculated with this matrix:
εG < 0 εG > 0
a = #(Dt+1 −Dt≤0) b = #(Dt+1 −Dt<0)
c = #(Dt+1 −Dt>0) d = #(Dt+1 −Dt≥0)
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Table A.13: Association between εC and pt+2 − pt+1
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 1 0 .1228817 .17999998
2 . .31701484 .39056888 .13220799
3 1 .49778455 .63880384 .52603078
4 . -.21663599 -.29540095 -.11356045
5 . 0 -.0650341 -.00921009
6 1 .25457379 -.11903628 -.27254286
7 .53846157 .30576384 .01075415 -.00411319
8 1 .45851845 .35663432 .19388597
9 . .00081575 -.12973781 -.10493602
10 . -.10581078 -.23540595 -.16623756
11 .33333334 .26681855 .08908409 -.02731941
12 1 .33999497 .40149528 .26623625
13 1 .79888928 .84194756 1.0796323
14 . .11881533 .15149602 .0785353
15 1 .23569649 .10072461 .34336954
mean -.87464388 -.21814927 -.15065169 -.1401319
1 curr. -1 -.14212287 -.11213052 -.07382089
2 curr. -.81196582 -.26883354 -.17633247 -.18433924
U test .28884437 .40897686 .72367361 .55568979
2-s. permtest .83333333 .38121878 .72927073 .60979021
Wilcoxon .00500017∗∗∗ .00577686∗∗∗ .12515346 .1914464
permtest .00390625∗∗∗ .00545∗∗∗ .0926∗ .1174
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .08326452∗ .19566774 .46307102 .60017949
permtest (1 curr.) .25 .25 .46875 .5625
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .0235441∗∗ .01515597∗∗ .13864063 .21352435
permtest (2 curr.) .03125∗∗ .01171875∗∗ .1328125 .15625
Yule’s Q has been calculated with this matrix:
εC < 0 εC > 0
a = #(pt+2 − pt+1<0) b = #(pt+2 − pt+1≤0)
c = #(pt+2 − pt+1≥0) d = #(pt+2 − pt+1>0)
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Table A.14: Association between q− − p and changes in D
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 .11111111 -.18556449 -.36925536 -.00173081
2 -.37142858 -.03534833 -.00187327 -.00026552
3 -.33333334 -.17505313 -.17482322 -.00035323
4 1 -.09319478 -.03514126 -.00113276
5 -.7368421 -.31779614 -.4502061 -.00302071
6 -.3548387 -.16261397 -.20196077 -.00074115
7 -.44 -.20414586 -.07946661 -.0003883
8 .64102566 .18944299 .21923411 .00384301
9 1 .21356378 .23768611 .0044742
10 -.5714286 -.19811636 -.25424749 -.00209381
11 -.125 -.02340296 .02134057 .00074243
12 -.21875 -.27271491 -.40580568 -.00299893
13 .81818181 .40921563 .40927172 .00995726
14 .07692308 .04941741 .03951345 .00005057
15 -.17073171 -.1157708 -.42421508 -.00110646
mean .02165924 -.06147213 -.09799659 .00034905
1 curr. -.11422193 -.16159514 -.20554333 -.00120736
2 curr. .11224669 .00527655 -.02629877 .00138666
U test .44324966 .23859283 .19485065 .15729921
2-s. permtest .47552448 .10989011 .2041958 .13586414
Wilcoxon .82024447 .23297911 .17284835 .53212989
permtest .88303 .25298 .16748 .74056
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .46307102 .02770785∗∗ .02770785∗∗ .02770785∗∗
permtest (1 curr.) .6875 .03125∗∗ .03125∗∗ .03125∗∗
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .76709687 .95276502 .76709687 .51466972
permtest (2 curr.) .56640625 .94921875 .78125 .3671875
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Table A.15: Association between relative changes in Lt and qt−1
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 0 .02719297 .03685571 .34049881
2 .11111111 -.16228069 -.24015562 -.77414364
3 .49222797 .50526315 .66575891 1.8775816
4 .2631579 .23245613 .25392616 .4376851
5 .10614525 -.24649122 -.32632536 -.61559677
6 .3114754 .35877192 .62324619 .81490737
7 .21348314 .17192984 .24549127 .24503748
8 .52127659 .36228073 .43824106 .67410618
9 .41935483 .42456138 .36461043 .49668857
10 .28 .1754386 .13670453 .52680421
11 -.11111111 .00964913 .01498001 -.07584679
12 .82456142 .39385965 .21270925 .41525087
13 .65517241 .30263159 .27666157 .74933672
14 .80281693 .3859649 .41261026 .93578738
15 .59183675 .36666667 .39719683 .31314933
mean .36543391 .22052632 .23416741 .42408309
1 curr. .21401961 .11915204 .16888433 .34682208
2 curr. .46637677 .28810917 .27768947 .47559044
U test .07709987∗ .23859283 .63735189 .72367361
2-s. permtest .08951049∗ .16303696 .47712288 .73246753
Wilcoxon .00146004∗∗∗ .00451405∗∗∗ .008985∗∗∗ .03090801∗∗
permtest .00055∗∗∗ .00366∗∗∗ .0073∗∗∗ .01754∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .03501498∗∗ .34544753 .34544753 .46307102
permtest (1 curr.) .0625∗ .375 .34375 .4375
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .01086222∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗ .01086222∗∗
permtest (2 curr.) .0078125∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗ .0078125∗∗∗
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Table A.16: Association between relative changes in Qt and qt−1
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 -.16556291 .01745877 .03445025 -.06387582
2 .56626505 .03508771 -.09476508 -.04305368
3 .65517241 .39385965 .5347988 .26988158
4 .10614525 .2377193 .24662793 .21882325
5 -.25 -.28079376 -.359467 -.31427941
6 .10497238 .3763158 .57227266 .61045837
7 -.05660377 .11172405 .12874275 .18491416
8 .80555558 .53684211 .57206821 .54092711
9 .59183675 .27456141 .26487455 .27986589
10 .2 .17017543 .01357642 .00445074
11 .56284153 .18070176 .11304444 .18491192
12 .84210527 .45175439 .27637285 .1961229
13 .68159205 .34473684 .34757188 .23666234
14 .56284153 .18859649 .14326699 .10410465
15 .5714286 .30526316 .16044676 .73056674
mean .38523931 .22293354 .19692549 .20936538
1 curr. .16949869 .12994125 .15565293 .11299238
2 curr. .52906639 .2849284 .22444054 .27361405
U test .07683591∗ .28884437 .63735189 .34577859
2-s. permtest .05554446∗ .16663337 .62457542 .27252747
Wilcoxon .00537636∗∗∗ .00377224∗∗∗ .01059354∗∗ .01459661∗∗
permtest .00215∗∗∗ .00142∗∗∗ .01078∗∗ .0084∗∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .46307102 .17295492 .34544753 .60017949
permtest (1 curr.) .375 .25 .34375 .5
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .01079278∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗ .00768579∗∗∗
permtest (2 curr.) .0078125∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗ .00390625∗∗∗
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Table A.17: Association between relative changes in Lt−1 and D
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 -.51145041 -.37742585 -.19270541 -.63881272
2 .07692308 -.08071688 -.09190267 -.09664156
3 -.1 .00110565 -.12752189 -.09685007
4 -.25 -.00534499 -.02731094 .02278833
5 0 -.05443712 -.0951781 -.24388784
6 -.48148149 -.13424119 -.15986913 -.00350131
7 -.42857143 -.27939501 -.3296048 -1.0169687
8 -.14285715 -.06797422 -.06823093 -.02972793
9 -.69696969 -.2730279 -.07125854 -.02634602
10 -.34146342 -.25434208 -.30852425 -.34114212
11 -.25 -.18425277 -.10915067 -.09351409
12 -.41935483 -.01320881 .00343445 -.01054147
13 -.83333331 -.29482493 -.30125234 -.12250231
14 .11111111 .07002227 .10162596 .05229626
15 -.55223882 -.18975817 -.06505205 -.21397085
mean -.32131242 -.14252147 -.12283342 -.1906215
1 curr. -.21100147 -.10851006 -.11574802 -.17615086
2 curr. -.39485306 -.16519573 -.12755702 -.20026859
U test .26246383 .34577859 .72367361 1
2-s. permtest .21898102 .43236763 .86273726 .90629371
Wilcoxon .00236236∗∗∗ .00261078∗∗∗ .00377224∗∗∗ .00377224∗∗∗
permtest .0008∗∗∗ .00104∗∗∗ .00144∗∗∗ .00224∗∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .09169028∗ .04639946∗∗ .02770785∗∗ .0747355∗
permtest (1 curr.) .125 .0625∗ .03125∗∗ .09375∗
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .01086222∗∗ .02087926∗∗ .05061243∗ .02840184∗∗
permtest (2 curr.) .0078125∗∗∗ .015625∗∗ .0390625∗∗ .02734375∗∗
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Table A.18: Association between relative changes in Q and q
session Yule’s Q Spearman’s ρ Pearson’s r Regression
1 -.26436782 -.08085747 .16499878 .04091367
2 -.68472904 -.45187968 -.28590751 -.50519663
3 -.625 -.3631579 -.39408624 -.77369785
4 -1 -.91954887 -.93182832 -.96754473
5 -.65686274 -.19849765 -.00971703 .00064482
6 -.93939394 -.78345865 -.69365346 -.65698183
7 -.02439024 .12123232 .28352794 .22966769
8 -1 -.95714283 -.94044626 -.94107044
9 -.93877554 -.44511279 -.35830751 -.31843233
10 -.75 -.23533835 -.09632505 -.21823981
11 -.95804197 -.55413532 -.44271874 -.35777915
12 -.88764048 -.54887217 -.46500778 -.57965386
13 -.8425197 -.58947372 -.48925203 -.69597834
14 -.94244605 -.4255639 -.36413604 -.51911336
15 -.48571429 -.43984962 .10173719 .1413276
mean -.73332545 -.45811044 -.3280748 -.40807564
1 curr. -.69505892 -.46623337 -.35836563 -.47697709
2 curr. -.75883647 -.45269515 -.30788092 -.36214133
U test .51649305 .81366372 1 .47950012
2-s. permtest .67772228 .94505495 .8023976 .58461538
Wilcoxon .00065331∗∗∗ .0009871∗∗∗ .00640649∗∗∗ .00538567∗∗∗
permtest .00007∗∗∗ .0002∗∗∗ .00428∗∗∗ .00208∗∗∗
Wilcoxon (1 curr.) .02770785∗∗ .02770785∗∗ .0747355∗ .1158515
permtest (1 curr.) .03125∗∗ .03125∗∗ .09375∗ .125
Wilcoxon (2 curr.) .00768579∗∗∗ .01086222∗∗ .03815171∗∗ .02840184∗∗
permtest (2 curr.) .00390625∗∗∗ .0078125∗∗∗ .03515625∗∗ .03125∗∗
170
A.3 Screenshots
A.3 Screenshots
Figure A.1: Screenshot of the government’s input frame.
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Figure A.2: Screenshot of the central bank’s input frame.
172
A.3 Screenshots
Figure A.3: Screenshot of the firm’s input frame.
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Figure A.4: Screenshot of the labour union’s input frame.
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B Appendix for Chapter 3: Currency
Trade and Exchange Rate
Uncertainty
B.1 Tables
Table B.1: Conformance to trading motive (in %)
interest difference decision in this
49.06
58.87
and speculative direction
advice point in decision in the
9.81
advice the same direction opposite direction
requested interest difference decision conforming
4.91
18.37
and speculative to interest difference
advice point in decision conforming
13.46
opposite directions to speculative advice
advice not decision conforming to interest difference 13.78
22.76
requested decision not conf. to interest difference 8.98
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Table B.2: Session averages of the Yule coefficient for home and foreign currency
offers and positive and negative interest differences
session mean of Y
7 0.660509447
8 0.717647059
9 1
10 0.714285714
11 0.685887846
12 1
13 0.364303959
14 0.714285714
15 0.689426144
Table B.3: Correlation between standardised currency offer and exchange rate vari-
ation resp. interest difference
session ρψi,∆et−1 ρψi,∆rt
7 .2455976 .3793693
8 .2247791 .3342151
9 .2307252 .3200829
10 .3652776 .5290438
11 .3357749 .2522709
12 .2256564 .2448294
13 .2222274 .2467859
14 .2878838 .388714
15 .2350855 .1502816
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Table B.4: Correlation measures of e˜g and e˜r per session
session ρe˜g ,e˜r R2
7 .24156232 .00860725
8 -.0553194 .01056194
9 .0622224 .00299655
10 .09360007 .0799354
11 -.19678558 .00004638
12 -.16077205 .00980022
13 .0007471 .00000013
14 -.06672657 .00314537
15 .0533577 .01553479
total .00174475 .00023264
Table B.5: Percentage of correct and wrong predictions of the sign of the exchange
rate change per session
session % of correct pred. % of wrong pred.
7 .484472 .515528
8 .2272727 .7727273
9 .3409091 .6590909
10 .287234 .7127659
11 .1060606 .8939394
12 .35 .65
13 .3030303 .6969697
14 .3139535 .6860465
15 .5164835 .4835165
mean .3254907 .6745093
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Table B.6: Profitability of different classes of trade decisions
session u ∆rt h
7 -0.0000129 0.0008271 0.0007644
8 0.0000177 0.0006271 0.000031
9 0.00000952 0.0007683 0.0002806
10 0.00000504 0.0007049 0.0001186
11 -0.0000281 0.000705 0.000736
12 0.000013 0.0007072 0.0000335
13 0.00000841 0.000526 0.0000559
14 0.0000157 0.0006678 0.00044
15 0.00000788 0.0007031 0.000172
mean 0.00000402 0.000692944 0.000292444
Table B.7: Session averages of standardised currency trade profits per trader class
session v¯κ=1curr v¯
κ=2
curr v¯
κ=3
curr
7 .00019079 – .0003877
8 .00002533 .0000529 -.00005867
9 -.00003201 .00018062 .00013901
10 .00003344 – .00008763
11 .00010462 .00020501 .00023354
12 .00021509 .00026016 –
13 .00000829 .00003267 –
14 -.00002572 – .00036751
15 .00003503 .00020517 .0001043
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Table B.8: Hypothetical (if decision rule was applied) and standardised trade prof-
its
session vstdcurr (ct. A) v
std
curr (ct. B) v
std
curr sess. avg. v
hyp
curr sess. avg. v
hyp
curr (ct. A) v
hyp
curr (ct. B)
7 0.0000179 0.00000499 0.0000115 0.0000111 0.000014 0.00000817
8 0.0000000552 0.000000204 0.00000013 -0.0000000247 -0.000000497 0.000000448
9 0.00000194 0.00000565 0.0000038 0.00000406 0.00000433 0.00000379
10 0.00000334 0.00000127 0.0000023 0.00000269 0.00000353 0.00000185
11 0.00000736 0.00000317 0.00000526 0.00000483 0.0000048 0.00000486
12 0.0000102 0.000011 0.0000106 0.0000122 0.0000129 0.0000114
13 0.000000862 0.000000486 0.000000674 0.0000011 0.00000132 0.000000873
14 0.00000263 -0.00000245 0.0000000872 0.0000161 0.0000222 0.00001
15 0.00000651 -0.00000172 0.0000024 0.0000163 0.0000192 0.0000133
Table B.9: Correlation between cumulative exchange rate volatility and aggregate
standardised currency offers
session ρψ,δ¯t
7 .10857596
8 -.10248707
9 -.35036669
10 -.82100541
11 -.61775789
12 -.04612983
13 .31677962
14 -.77531099
15 -.66592277
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Table B.10: Cumulative aggregate standardised home and foreign currency offers
session ψh ψf
7 61.95385 42.25773
8 67.0229 41.67973
9 61.93498 43.23082
10 31.17691 18.48489
11 49.43409 31.9665
12 71.39223 38.49543
13 53.88873 47.14093
14 52.4529 44.96228
15 57.7877 31.99247
mean 56.33825 37.8012
Table B.11: Shares of growing, falling, and constant exchange rate expectations
session ǫ+ ǫ− ǫ=
7 .36024845 .2173913 .42236024
8 .30303031 .25757575 .43939394
9 .30113637 .16477273 .53409094
10 .28723404 .21276596 .5
11 .09090909 .12121212 .78787881
12 .25 .2 .55
13 .42424244 .26262626 .3131313
14 .37790698 .39534885 .22674419
15 .27472529 .22527473 .5
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B.2 Calibration
Qm = 20 η = 0.14
Qc = 60 ζ1 = 600
Q0 = 45 ζ2 = 500
γ1 = 80 La = 600
γ2 = 20 Lb = 720
σ = 0.6 r0 = 1.05
F = 15
B.3 Symbols
∆et−1 difference in the height of exchange rate between period t and t− 1
∆rt difference in the height of interest factors of both countries
Ψ relation of currency offers to foreign account debt
δ¯ exchange rate volatility
ǫ exchange rate expectation measure
γ1, γ2 constants with γ1 > γ2 > 0
η strike wage coefficient
ψ standardised currency offer
ζ1, ζ2 constants with ζ1 ≥ ζ2 > 0
C1 credit constraint on the home account of firms
C2 credit constraint on the foreign account of firms
D total expenditures as determined by government
e exchange rate, price of one unit of foreign money in home currency
e¯ tentative exchange rate
e+ next period’s exchange rate
eˆ a firm’s estimate of this period’s exchange rate
eˆ+ a firm’s estimate of next period’s exchange rate
F fixed labour needed to run the firm
f exchange rate aim
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h measure for the speculative advice
I total home central bank currency offer
K total home account balances of foreign firms transferred to owners
K∗ total foreign account balances of home country firms transferred to owners
K− value of K in the previous period
K∗− value of K
∗ in the previous period
Li amount of labour needed for producing Qi
m price of home materials in home currency
m− price of home materials in the previous period
p target price of the current period
p+ next period’s target price
q price of the home country consumption good
Q0 production capacity (in the case of wage conflict) with Q0 < Qc
Qc production capacity (in the case of wage agreement)
Qi production of firm i
Q−i production of all firms except firm i
Qm minimum production
Qˆi estimate on the height of its own production of firm i
Qˆ−i estimate of firm i on the height of the total production of all other firms in its home
country
r interest factor
r0 ideal interest factor
Si home account of firm i
S∗i foreign account of firm i
sˆ scale for the profit calculator of a firm
v expenditure deflated total profit with v = Π
D
vi expenditure deflated profit of a home country firm i with vi =
Πi
D
vprod production profit
vcurr currency trade profit
w nominal wage rate
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X total offer of home currency by firms with X =
∑10
i=1Xi
X∗ total offer of foreign currency by firms with X∗ =
∑10
i=1X
∗
i
Xi amount of home currency offered by firm i
X∗i amount of foreign currency offered by firm i
X¯i maximum foreign currency offer of firm i
X¯∗i maximum foreign currency offer of firm i
Y Yule coefficient for a firm player
y measure for calculating Y
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C Appendix for chapter 4: The
Tobin Tax
C.1 Symbols
µ - dividend paid for each unit of the asset
η - market efficiency
τ - tax rate
Πi - payoff of participant i
φ(t) - fundamental value of one unit of the asset in period t
Φ(t) - fundamental value of all units of the asset in period t
υ - volatility
c - exchange rate in units of the numeraire for one unit of the asset in
the end of the experiment
d¯ - statutory demand constraint
di - demand of participant i
i - participant number
m - initial endowment of the asset of every participant
mi - holdings of the asset of participant i
n - number participants
p - average price in period t
pa - market ask price in period t
pb - market bid price in period t
pai - individual ask price of participant i in period t
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pbi - individual bid price of participant i in period t
s¯ - statutory supply constraint
si - supply of participant i
T - total number of periods
t - current period
x - initial endowment of the numeraire of every participant
xi - holdings of the numeraire of participant i
C.2 Tables
Table C.2: Different measures of earnings inequality
inequality measure untaxed (mean) taxed (mean) p
Gini coefficient .1875074 .1370911 0.09632∗
Theil’s entropy .0854972 .0350746 0.06277∗
Theil’s mean log deviation .2661607 .0372477 0.05411∗
Kakwani index .0486117 .0209698 0.06385∗
Piesch index .1360516 .1045064 0.13095
Mehran index .2904188 .2022604 0.07467∗
standard deviation of logs .967887 .2833992 0.05086∗∗
coefficient of variation .3696102 .2682073 0.09740∗
relative mean deviation .1407252 .1025833 0.07792∗
p-levels: Fisher-Pitman permutation test for independent samples, one-tailed
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Table C.3: OLS regression of trade volume and tax rate
variable Coeff. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% CI
τ -35205.71 9922.063 -3.55 0.024 [−62753.78,−7657.652]
cons. 3066.93 193.204 15.87 0.000 [2530.512, 3603.355]
n = 6, F (1, 4) = 12.59, Prob. > F = 0.0238, R2 = 0.7589, Adj. R2 = 0.6986, root MSE= 207.53
Table C.4: OLS regression of fiscal revenues and tax rate
variable Coeff. Std. Err. t P > |t| 95% CI
τ 4855.723 1350.519 3.6 0.023 [1106.082, 8605.365]
cons. .2193 26.297 0.01 0.994 [−72.794, 73.233]
n = 6, F (1, 4) = 12.93, Prob. > F = 0.0229, R2 = 0.7637, Adj. R2 = 0.7046, root MSE= 28.248
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Table C.5: Descriptive statistics per market
tax fiscal volatility market trade market total total #d1 #s1 ΩD ΩS median median median
rate revenues volume turnover ineff. supply demand pa pb pa − pb
1 0 0 27.112 1681 4335.00 51.212 10080 6144 0.92 1.55 9.05 374.55 2 1.8 0.15
2 0 0 103220.8 2024 3873.90 326777.7 7720 10592 1.73 1.69 88.25 135.2 1.8 1.6 0.2
3 0 0 87598.3 1936 4803.46 39877.32 13472 13080 1.41 1.78 20.00 277.96 2 2.05 0.02
4 0 0 65.614 2554 5214.03 17.115 10504 13184 1.63 1.16 53.18 252.65 1.93 1.91 0.09
5 0 0 652.276 2226 3778.99 201.102 9024 10312 1.51 1.43 0.60 652.23 1.6 1.49 0.13
6 0 0 36.018 2759 6075.55 57.488 6920 16448 2.37 1.22 412.57 150.71 2.2 2 0.3
7 0.005 27.21 0.659 2751 5332.06 4.419 13040 10680 1.63 1.94 42.09 583.24 1.94 2 0.15
8 0.01 52.26 0.256 2948 5101.23 7.92 10384 18936 2.1 1.45 133.61 403.71 1.8 1.8 0
9 0.015 70.75 0.176 2585 4631.24 2.656 10368 11016 2.18 1.86 37.22 291.32 1.89 1.85 0.1
10 0.02 65.24 0.003 2098 3175.77 10.06 9112 9752 1.69 1.41 46.18 924.16 1.54 1.47 0.07
11 0.025 165.2 8.293 2345 6309.78 10.327 15584 7648 1 1.78 260.38 171.63 2.61 2.7 0
12 0.03 130.51 26.933 1978 4241.58 17.001 10648 5880 1.47 2.35 77.37 471.92 2 1.68 0.37
1 #s: mean number of suppliers per period, #d: mean number of demanders per period
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C.3 Screenshots
Screenshot of Step 1 (Control Treatment)
Translation:
• von: of
• Verbleibende Zeit: remaining time
• Bite geben Sie ein, wieviel Sie ho¨chstens fu¨r ein Wertpapier bezahlen mo¨chten (Kaufpreis):
Please state how much you are willing to pay at most for one asset (bid price)
• Bitte geben Sie ein, wieviel Sie mindestens fu¨r ein Wertpapier erhalten mo¨chten (Verkauf-
spreis): Please state how much money you want to receive at least in exchange for one asset
(ask price)
• Ihr Kontostand: Your account balance
• Ihr Bestand an Wertpapieren: Your asset balance
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Periode Markt- Markt- Ihr gebotener Ihr gebotener Konto-
kaufpreis verkaufsreis Kaufpreis Verkaufpreis stand
period market market Your bid Your ask Account
bid price ask price price price balance
Wertpapier- Dividende Nachfrage Angebot Vera¨nderung Vera¨nderung
bestand Kontostand Wertpapier.
asset dividend demand supply change of the change of the
balance account balance asset balance
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Screenshot of Step 2 (Control Treatment)
Translation:
• von: of
• Verbleibende Zeit: remaining time
• Ihr Kontostand: Your account balance
• Ihr Bestand an Wertpapieren: Your asset balance
• Zu diesem Preis ko¨nnen Sie Wertpapiere verkaufen: You can sell assets at this price
• Zu diesem Preis ko¨nnen Sie Wertpapiere kaufen: You can buy assets at this price
• Wie viele Wertpapiere wollen Sie kaufen: How many units of the asset do you want to buy
• Wie viele Wertpapiere wollen Sie verkaufen: How many units of the asset do you want to
sell
• nicht handeln: refrain from trade
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Periode Markt- Markt- Ihr gebotener Ihr gebotener Konto-
kaufpreis verkaufsreis Kaufpreis Verkaufpreis stand
period market market Your bid Your ask Account
bid price ask price price price balance
Wertpapier- Dividende Nachfrage Angebot Vera¨nderung Vera¨nderung
bestand Kontostand Wertpapier.
asset dividend demand supply change of the change of the
balance account balance asset balance
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Screenshot of Step 1 (Tobin Treatment)
Translation:
• von: of
• Verbleibende Zeit: remaining time
• Bite geben Sie ein, wieviel Sie ho¨chstens fu¨r ein Wertpapier bezahlen mo¨chten (Kaufpreis):
Please state how much you are willing to pay at most for one asset (bid price)
• Bitte geben Sie ein, wieviel Sie mindestens fu¨r ein Wertpapier erhalten mo¨chten (Verkauf-
spreis): Please state how much money you want to receive at least in exchange for one asset
(ask price)
• Ihr Kontostand: Your account balance
• Ihr Bestand an Wertpapieren: Your asset balance
• Steuersatz in Prozent: tax rate (percent)
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Periode Markt- Markt- Ihr gebotener Ihr gebotener Konto- gezahlte
kaufpreis verkaufsreis Kaufpreis Verkaufpreis stand Steuern
period market market Your bid Your ask Account tax
bid price ask price price price balance paid
Wertpapier- Dividende Nachfrage Angebot Vera¨nderung Vera¨nderung
bestand Kontostand Wertpapier.
asset dividend demand supply change of the change of the
balance account balance asset balance
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Screenshot of Step 2 (Tobin Treatment)
Translation:
• von: of
• Verbleibende Zeit: remaining time
• Ihr Kontostand: Your account balance
• Ihr Bestand an Wertpapieren: Your asset balance
• Marktpreis fu¨r den Verkauf von Wertpapieren: Market price for selling one unit of the asset
• Steuern pro Wertpapier: tax amount for one unit of the asset
• Zu diesem Preis ko¨nnen Sie Wertpapiere verkaufen (nach Abzug der Steuern): At this price
you can sell the asset (after taxes)
• Marktpreis fu¨r den Kauf von Wertpapieren: Market price for buying one unit of the asset
• Zu diesem Preis ko¨nnen Sie Wertpapiere kaufen (inkl. Steuern): At this price you can buy
the asset (including taxes)
• Wie viele Wertpapiere wollen Sie kaufen: How many units of the asset do you want to buy
• Wie viele Wertpapiere wollen Sie verkaufen: How many units of the asset do you want to
sell
• nicht handeln: refrain from trade
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• Steuersatz in Prozent: tax rate (percent)
Periode Markt- Markt- Ihr gebotener Ihr gebotener Konto- gezahlte
kaufpreis verkaufsreis Kaufpreis Verkaufpreis stand Steuern
period market market Your bid Your ask Account tax
bid price ask price price price balance paid
Wertpapier- Dividende Nachfrage Angebot Vera¨nderung Vera¨nderung
bestand Kontostand Wertpapier.
asset dividend demand supply change of the change of the
balance account balance asset balance
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D Instructions for Experiment 1
D.1 The Two-Currency Case
This is a translation of the original German instructions, taken from the sepa-
rate paper by Robin Pope, Reinhard Selten, Sebastian Kube, Johannes Kaiser and
Ju¨rgen von Hagen (2007): Exchange rate determination: A model of the decisive
role of central bank cooperation and conflict. Discussion Paper, University of Bonn,
Dept. of Economics.
Welcome to This Experiment
This experiment has 18 participants. There are two countries in the experiment
• country A and
• country B
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one of these
countries.
In each of the two countries there are 9 players with 5 different roles:
• government
• central bank
• labour union
• employers’ association
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• 5 firms.
The firms are numbered from 1 to 5. Each country has its own currency. Your role
in this experiment will be randomly assigned to you. The game runs over several
rounds. Each round consists of several steps:
• government decision
• central bank decisions
• wage bargaining between union and employers’ association
• decisions of firms on production quantities
• decisions of firms on currency transactions
At the above five steps participants playing these roles make their decisions. Three
further steps then follow:
• currency market: determination of the exchange rate
• round payments and determination of account balances
• transfer of the firm accounts
In these three steps, players make no decisions. The outcomes of these three steps
are calculated by the computer.
The Steps in Detail
In the following everything is described from the point of view of country A. Every-
thing is analogous for Country B. However, the value for country B will be marked
by an asterisk, ∗. Decisions are always made for the current round.
Government Decisions
By means of fiscal policy, not modelled in detail, the government in each country
determines that country’s amount of total expenditure, D and D∗, respectively.
This total expenditure is spent entirely on a consumption good produced by firms
in that country.
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Central Bank Decisions
Each central bank has to fix three decision parameters:
• the interest rate
Note that 1+interest rate = interest factor, r and r∗, respectively. Eg an
interest rate of 8% corresponds to the interest factor 1.08. Firms can take
short run loans and make short run money investments at this rate.
• the target price for the next round, p+ and p
∗
+, respectively. This is the price
that the central bank would like to see as the price for the domestic good in
the next round. So the current target price p has been set in the prior round,
and p+ is now set for the next round.
• the exchange rate aim, f and f ∗, respectively. The exchange rate aim states
how many units of own currency that the central bank would like to receive for
one unit of the foreign currency. What is actually received after the exchange
rate market operates, is the actual exchange rate, e and e∗ = 1/e, something
not fixed by each central bank alone but is the result of the currency market’s
operation. The central banks intervene on the currency market to defend
their exchange rate aims. This happens automatically and results in a final
exchange rate e between f and 1/f∗.
Wage Bargaining Between Union and Employers’ Association
In this step the union and the employers’ association in each country negotiate the
wage rate, w and w∗, respectively, for the current round. This is done by exchanging
text messages (chatting) and wage offers. These wage offers are not permitted to be
lower than the official minimum wage, w0 = 0.14p. Bargainers have 10 minutes for
the wage negotiations. If no consensus is reached, there is a strike in that country.
In the event of a strike, production capacity and demand are lower than normal in
this round, and the wage rate is equal to the minimum wage rate w0.
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Decisions of Firms on Production Quantities
Firms have to make two decisions. The first is to choose a quantity Qi (here i is
the number of the particular firm) of the consumption good to produce and sell.
The maximum quantity is 60, but in the case of a strike, the maximum is 45. The
minimum quantity is 20. Three inputs are needed for production:
• Home raw materials
For one unit of the consumption good, one needs one unit of home raw ma-
terials purchasable on the home material market at a cost of m = wr. (This
is because each unit of raw materials is produced with a unit of labour that
costs w. Then interest paid on prepaid wages increases the total unit cost to
wr.)
• Foreign raw materials
For each unit of the consumption good produced a firm uses one unit of foreign
raw materials, bought on the foreign material market at a cost of m∗ = w∗r∗
in foreign currency.
• Labour
Running a firm requires 15 units of labour plus 1 unit of labour for each unit
of the consumption good produced. Workers can only be hired on the home
labour market where the wage rate is w per unit hired.
If one has decided to produce Qi units, then one needs:
• Mi(= Qi) units of home raw materials at a total cost of Mim
• M∗i (= Qi) units of foreign raw materials at a total cost of M
∗
i m
∗ in foreign
currency
• Li units of labour with Li = 15 +Qi at a total cost of Liw
Decisions of Firms on Currency Transactions
Each firm has a home account and a foreign account. All transactions are entered
on the relevant account. Thus the home account is charged with the wage expenses
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Liw and the foreign bank account is charged with the costs M
∗
i m
∗ for foreign raw
materials. The existence of two accounts makes currency transactions possible after
the production quantity has been fixed. A firm can:
• either offer home currency Xi
Here the firm takes a loan of Xi at an interest inclusive cost of r from its
home bank and for this it receives Xie
∗ in foreign currency. After earning
foreign interest on this foreign currency, the firm has an amount of Xie
∗r∗ on
its foreign bank account.
• or offer foreign currency
X∗i Here the firm borrows on its foreign account an amount X
∗
i at an interest
inclusive cost of r∗ . This money is then exchanged on the currency market
and the firm receives X∗i e in home currency, on which it earns interest at the
rate r on its home bank account.
• or offer no currency
This means not being active on the currency market.
Take into consideration:
• A firm cannot offer both currencies at the same time
• The amount of currency transactions is limited by how much the firm decided
to produce, since a firm must cover its costs for material, labour etc.
The maximum amount of home currency a firm can offer is (80− Li)w
The maximum amount of foreign currency a firm can offer is 20w∗
• When a firm offers a currency, it is not yet decided how many units of the
other currency it will receive, since it does not get them at the exchange rate
for the last round. The currency offers of all firms may have an influence on
the exchange rate in the current round. The amount flowing to a firm account
in the other currency is calculated at the exchange rate of the current round.
• At the end of the round, the balance on both of a firm’s accounts will show
what it has earned, however, in different currencies. In the next round the
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firm’s foreign account will be automatically offered at the currency market
and will be exchanged to its own currency and this offer may again influence
the exchange rate. The value of its foreign account balance in its own currency
will be determined by the currency market of the next round. A firm should
pay attention to this in connection with its own currency transactions.
• If you are a firm, you can make use of a profit calculator as a decision support.
Here you enter your exchange rate expectations for the current round and the
next round, how much you want to produce and what you expect the other
four firms will produce together. On the basis of these expectations, the
computer provides a table with an adjustable scale. In this table you can see
your profits obtained if all your expectations come true. At the same time the
computer determines which currency you should offer if your exchange rate
expectations turn out to be exactly correct.
Currency Market
After all players have made their decisions for the current round, the currency
market determines the current exchange rate. The exchange rate is not randomly
determined, but depends on the decisions of the firms and the automatic interven-
tions of the central banks. It is determined in such a way that the demand for a
currency becomes equal to the supply of this currency.
The supply of home currency is composed of:
• The home currency offers of foreign firms (from their point of view the home
currency is the foreign currency) and home currency offers of domestic firms
(= X)
• Money amounts on the foreign accounts of foreign firms at the end of the
preceding round, offered in this round, in order to exchange it into their
domestic currency (= K)
201
D Instructions for Experiment 1
• Possible interventions in home currency of the domestic and the foreign central
bank (= I)
The demand for the home currency is composed of:
• The foreign currency offers of foreign firms (offers of domestic currency from
their point of view) and foreign currency offers of home country firms (= X∗)
• Money amounts on foreign accounts of home country firms at the end of the
preceding period, offered in order to exchange it into home currency (= K∗)
• Possible interventions in foreign currency of the domestic and the foreign
central bank (= I∗)
Therefore the preliminary exchange rate eˆ is determined by X +K + I = eˆ(X∗ +
K∗ + I∗)
Central Banks and the Currency Market
The above exchange rate is only preliminary, since the central banks intervene in
two ways. At first, each central bank makes precautionary offers in order to defend
its own exchange rate aim against that of he other central bank. However, these
interventions are limited in the form of a dependence on the preceding round’s
material price, m and m∗ respectively.
There can be two kinds of conflict:
• Each central bank wants a lower value for its own currency than the other
bank does, ie f > 1/f∗. In this case, the home country central bank offers
I = 600m− of its home currency and the foreign central bank offers I
∗ =
600m∗− of its currency.
• Each central bank wants a higher value for its own currency than the other
central bank does, ie f < 1/f∗. In this case the home country central bank
offers I∗ = 500m∗− of the foreign currency and the foreign central bank offers
I = 500m− of the home currency (the foreign currency from its point of view).
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It is possible that the preliminary exchange rate eˆ is outside the interval between
the two exchange rate aims. In this case the two central banks cooperate in order
to keep the exchange rate in this interval:
• If the preliminary exchange rate eˆ is smaller than f and 1/f∗, then the final
exchange rate will be the smaller of the two values, f and 1/f∗
• If the preliminary exchange rate eˆ is greater than f and 1/f∗, then the final
exchange rate e is the greater of these two values.
• If the preliminary exchange rate eˆ is between f and 1/f∗ or at one of these
values, then it is also the final exchange rate.
Round Payoffs and Account Balances
In each round you receive a number of points, your round payoff, which depends
on your decisions and those of the other participants and on your role. You are
credited with these points on your payoff account, an account with a balance in
points not usable as a resource in the game.
• Firms
After each round the account balances of each firm are transferred to its own-
ers. The owners exchange accounts in foreign money to their home currency,
but only in the next round. Therefore firms - as also employers’ associations
- obtain their payoffs for this round only in the next round. Firms and em-
ployers’ associations receive the value of the domestic account plus that of the
foreign account at next round’s exchange rate. The domestic component plus
the remitted foreign component together comprise the profit of a firm. The
round payoff of a firm is profit divided by total domestic expenditure, D or
D∗, respectively.
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Determination of Firm Account Balances (see Table 2) If You Are a Firm
Home Bank Account
1. Wage payments and offers of home currency are deducted from your home
bank account
2. If you have offered foreign currency you are credited on your home bank with
the amount into which this converts into your home currency
3. This credit on your home bank account is multiplied up by the domestic
interest factor
4. You are credited on your home bank account with the value of your sales (The
determination of this value is described below)
5. The costs for domestic materials are deducted from your home bank account
Consequently the final balance on your home bank account is
Qiq + r(X
∗
i e− Liw −Xi)−Mim
Foreign Bank Account
1. If foreign currency is offered, the amount is deducted from your foreign bank
account
2. If you have offered home currency, you are credited on your foreign bank
account
3. This credit is multiplied up by the foreign interest factor.
4. The costs of foreign materials is deducted
Consequently the final balance on your foreign bank account is
r∗(Xie
∗ −X∗i )−M
∗
i m
∗
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How Sales are Determined
The total amount produced is always sold. However, the sales price q depends on
many factors. Normally the price q is total domestic expenditure divided by total
domestic production, ie q = D/Q.
In the case of a strike, demand is decreased, and the price is lower, q = 0.6(D/Q).
Once more we want to direct your attention to the profit calculator. It facilitates
your decisions by making all these computations for you. It computes the price
resulting from your prediction, deducts variable cost per unit for labour and mate-
rials, and then computes your gross profits. The fixed labour costs for running firm
are deducted from this. Since labour costs arise before interest is paid, the profit
calculator also takes account of the opportunity costs arising thereby. In the fields
of the table you can see your operating profit. This is not your payoff, but only the
part of your profit due to your production decision.
Unions and Employers’ Associations
If agreement is not reached in wage bargaining, then there is a strike and you receive
no payoff in this round. If, however, you agree on a wage rate, then you receive the
following payoffs.
• Union
Your success is measured by the wage rate divided by the current target price.
You receive U = w/p
• Employers’ association
Your success only indirectly depends on the wage rate. You receive the sum
Π of profits in your country divided by the total expenditure, V = Π/D
Since the sum of profits will only be determined in the next round, you receive
the payoff for this round in the next round.
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Government and Central Bank
You pursue several goals including price stability and adequate employment. Your
payoff function is as follows:
B = 5− 4
(
p+
p
− 1
)2
− 4
(
q
p
− 1
)2
− 4 (r − 1.05)2 − 2
( m
em∗
− 1
)2
−2
(
e
f
− 1
)2
− 0.02 |600− L|+ − 0.01 |L− 720|+
Here L denotes total labour demand in your country, ie labour demand of domestic
firms for production purposes (5 ∗ 15 + Q) and the labour demand in the domes-
tic materials industry (M = Q + Q∗). The notation |X − Y |+ has the following
meaning:
(D.1) |X − Y |+ =


X − Y for X > Y
0 else
Your payoff is at its maximum if you attain all of your seven goals.
Final Payoffs
After the end of the experiment you receive the sum of your points (your round
payoffs) at a conversion factor depending on your role:
• as a government or central bank, you receive 1 Taler for 1 point
• as a union you receive 19.6875 Taler for 1 point
• as an employers’ association you receive 50 Taler for 1 point
• as a firm you receive 250 Taler for 1 point
The number of Talers is then paid in EURO according to the following rule:
Sum in Talers between Conversion factor into e
0 and 60 x
60 and 100 60 + 0.5(x− 60)
100 and 200 80 + 0.3(x− 100)
200 and 300 110 + 0.2(x− 200)
over 300 110 + 0.1(x− 300)
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You can always look at your decision of the preceding round. You start in an
already existing world and therefore you are in round 2 and you can see how the
world looked in the preceding round, round 1. This is shown to you in order to help
you to get your bearings. You see examples of decisions like those you could take
yourself and you can also look at the results obtained (exchange rate, payoffs etc).
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Table 1: Example
Explanations:
• / : not relevant here
• values with ∗ eg: if you are in country A, then the D in country B is D∗ for
you
country A country B
values from the Materials price in the preceding round m− 2.666664 3.733338
preceding round actual target price p = that targetted for this 10 14
round in the preceding round
government total expenditure D 2000 2800
interest rate r 1.05 1.05
central bank next period’s target price p+ 10 14
exchange rate aim f 0.71429 1.4
wage bargaining strike no no
wage rate w 2.53968 3.55556
firm 1 as example production decision Q1 40 /
home currency offer X1 0 /
foreign currency offer X∗1 0 /
firm decisions total home production 200 200
summed for the total home currency offer 0 0
whole country total foreign currency offer 0 0
materials demand for materials M 400 400
industry materials price m 2.666664 3.733338
markets final exchange rate e 0.71429 1.4
consumption goods price q 10 14
home bank account of firm 1 146.66692 /
foreign bank account of firm 1 -149.33352 /
payoff of firm 1 in this round if e+ = e 0.02 /
payoffs union payoff 0.253968 /
profit sum 200 /
payoff of emloyers’ association 0.1 /
payoff of central bank 5 /
payoff of the government 5 /
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Table 2: Development of Account Balances of Firm i
Home Bank Account Foreign Bank Account
0 0
−Liw −Xi −X
∗
i
X∗i e− Liw −Xi Xie
∗ −X∗i
r(X∗i e− Liw −Xi) r
∗(Xie
∗ −X∗i )
Qiq + r(X
∗
i e− Liw −Xi) r
∗(Xie
∗ −X∗i )
Qiq + r(X
∗
i e− Liw −Xi)−Mim r
∗(Xie
∗ −X∗i )−M
∗
i m
∗
0 0
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E Instructions for Experiment 2
This is a translation of the original German instructions for the Tobin tax experi-
ment.
E.1 Control Treatment
Welcome to This Experiment!
General Information
This experiment gives you the opportunity to earn money with your decisions. The
size of your earnings depends on your own decisions and on the decisions of the other
members of your group. You will receive a show-up fee of e4.00 irrespective of the
result of the experiment. Please read the explanations of the experiment carefully.
All participants receive identical explanations. We would like to ask you not to
communicate with the other participants from now on. If you have any questions,
please feel free to ask us. All decisions are taken anonymously. You will shortly
draw a random number. This number corresponds to the number of the booth in
the laboratory.
The Course of the Experiment
In the beginning of the experiment, you will receive 500 units of the experimental
currency (“Taler”) and 200 units of an experimental asset. You will be in a market
together with 7 other players. In the course of the experiment, you can trade the
assets at prices which are determined by yourself. For each asset which you own in
the end of a round, you will receive a dividend of 0.05 Talers in the beginning of the
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following round. The experiment runs for 51 rounds. In the process, each round
consists of two steps:
1. Each player indicates how Talers much he/she is willing to pay for one unit
of the asset at most (bid price) and how much Talers he/she wants to receive
for one unit of the asset at least (ask price). The ask price has to be at least
as high as the bid price. If you should run out of assets, you cannot enter
any ask price; similarly, you cannot enter any bid price if you do not have any
more money. After each player has specified the bid and the ask price, the
market prices are determined: The market bid price is defined by the highest
bid price, the market ask price by the lowest ask price of all players.
2. Those players who determined the market prices are not allowed to enter
anything in the second step. All the other players decide whether they want
to buy or sell assets at the market prices or whether they want to refrain from
trading. They are only allowed to sell assets which they own and only able to
buy assets for which they can pay. The maximum trading volume is limited
to 25 assets per round. If one of the prices should have been set by more than
one player, demand and supply will be equally shared between these players.
If the amount of the asset demanded is higher than the supply at market price (i.e.
the amount of the asset owned by those players who set the market ask price), the
demanding players act in random order; if the supply is exhausted, the remaining
potential buyers will miss out. A similar procedure is followed with the potential
sellers in the case that the supply is higher than the demand of the players who
defined the market price.
The End of the Experiment
In the end of the experiment, you will be told your final account balance and the
amount of the asset you possess. You will be paid for every unit of the asset that
you possess at a fixed conversion rate, then. The rate of conversion is 1, thus, you
will receive 1 Taler for each asset you own. Afterwards, a short questionnaire will
appear on your screen. Please answer the questions as carefully as possible.
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Payments
The overall balance of your account (including the money transferred to you for
your asset stock) will be converted at a rate of 1 Taler : 1 Cent and paid out to
you.
E.2 Tobin Treatment
Welcome to this Experiment!
General Information
This experiment gives you the opportunity to earn money with your decisions. The
size of your earnings depends on your own decisions and on the decisions of the other
members of your group. You will receive a show-up fee of e4.00 irrespective of the
result of the experiment. Please read the explanations of the experiment carefully.
All participants receive identical explanations. We would like to ask you not to
communicate with the other participants from now on. If you have any questions,
please feel free to ask us. All decisions are taken anonymously. You will shortly
draw a random number. This number corresponds to the number of the booth in
the laboratory.
The Course of the Experiment
In the beginning of the experiment, you will receive 500 units of the experimental
currency (“Taler”) and 200 units of an experimental asset. You will be in a market
together with 7 other players. In the course of the experiment, you can trade the
assets at prices which are determined by yourself. For each asset which you own in
the end of a round, you will receive a dividend of 0.05 Talers in the beginning of the
following round. The experiment runs for 51 rounds. In the process, each round
consists of two steps:
1. Each player indicates how Talers much he/she is willing to pay for one unit
of the asset at most (bid price) and how much Talers he/she wants to receive
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for one unit of the asset at least (ask price). The ask price has to be at least
as high as the bid price. If you should run out of assets, you cannot enter
any ask price; similarly, you cannot enter any bid price if you do not have any
more money. After each player has specified the bid and the ask price, the
market prices are determined: The market bid price is defined by the highest
bid price, the market ask price by the lowest ask price of all players.
2. Those players who determined the market prices are not allowed to enter
anything in the second step. All the other players decide whether they want
to buy or sell assets at the market prices or whether they want to refrain
from trading. They are only allowed to sell assets which they own and only
able to buy assets for which they can pay. The maximum trading volume
is limited to 25 assets per round. If one of the prices should have been set
by more than one player, demand and supply will be equally shared between
these players. Taxes arise for each unit of the asset traded. These are always
paid by the player who decides to buy or sell units of the asset in the second
step. Correspondingly, he/she pays more for assets he/she buys and receives
less for assets he/she sells. The tax rate as well as the corresponding prices
in- and excluding taxes are shown on your screen. The player who determined
the market price always receives or pays exactly the price offered by him/her.
If the amount of the asset demanded is higher than the supply at market price (i.e.
the amount of the asset owned by those players who set the market ask price), the
demanding players act in random order; if the supply is exhausted, the remaining
potential buyers will miss out. A similar procedure is followed with the potential
sellers in the case that the supply is higher than the demand of the players who
defined the market price.
The End of the Experiment
In the end of the experiment, you will be told your final account balance and the
amount of the asset you possess. You will be paid for every unit of the asset that
you possess at a fixed conversion rate, then. The rate of conversion is 1, thus, you
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will receive 1 Taler for each asset you own. Afterwards, a short questionnaire will
appear on your screen. Please answer the questions as carefully as possible.
Payments
The overall balance of your account (including the money transferred to you for
your asset stock) will be converted at a rate of 1 Taler : 1 Cent and paid out to
you.
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